本文關(guān)鍵詞： 證券監(jiān)管 聲譽(yù)機(jī)制 CEO 過度投資　出處：《經(jīng)濟(jì)管理》2017年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：證券監(jiān)管處罰作為公司外生沖擊事件,直接或間接影響違規(guī)公司未來的會(huì)計(jì)與財(cái)務(wù)行為。本文選取2006—2014年中國A股上市公司違規(guī)監(jiān)管數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,基于行為金融學(xué)理論,從聲譽(yù)修復(fù)角度考察證券監(jiān)管處罰對違規(guī)公司投資行為的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)與未受處罰的公司相比,違規(guī)公司被處罰后傾向于過度投資,通過激進(jìn)的投資行為對沖處罰的負(fù)面影響,借以修復(fù)公司受損形象,但導(dǎo)致公司投資效率下降,損害投資者利益;(2)CEO學(xué)歷水平越高,上述現(xiàn)象越嚴(yán)重;(3)公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制并未能有效約束高學(xué)歷CEO的刺激反應(yīng)。最后,使用匹配后雙重差值分析、樣本自抽樣回歸分析,以及不同子樣本、不同匹配變量多重檢驗(yàn)分析后,結(jié)果一致穩(wěn)健。本文立足企業(yè)微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)行為,拓展了證券監(jiān)管處罰經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的研究視角。
[Abstract]:As an exogenous event, securities regulatory punishment directly or indirectly affects the future accounting and financial behavior of the offending companies. This paper selects the regulatory data of China A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2014 as the research sample, based on behavioral finance theory. From the perspective of reputation repair, we investigate the impact of securities regulatory penalties on the investment behavior of illegal companies. The study found that: 1) compared with those companies that have not been penalized, the offending companies tend to overinvest after being punished. The negative effects of hedging penalties through aggressive investment behavior are used to repair the damaged image of the company, but the lower the investment efficiency of the company, the higher the level of CEO education at the expense of investors. The more serious the above phenomenon is, the more serious the company's internal governance mechanism does not effectively restrain the stimulatory response of the highly educated CEO. Finally, the use of matching double difference analysis, sample self-sampling regression analysis, and different sub-samples, The results are consistent and robust after multiple test and analysis of different matching variables. Based on the microeconomic behavior of enterprises, this paper expands the research perspective of the economic consequences of securities regulatory penalties.
【作者單位】： 廣東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;中山大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目“公司治理與企業(yè)家的主觀幸福感研究”(71272201)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.91;F275;F832.51

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