發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-18 14:40

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于代理問題的高管期權(quán)激勵(lì)對資本結(jié)構(gòu)動(dòng)態(tài)調(diào)整的影響研究　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 高管期權(quán)激勵(lì) 資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整 股權(quán)集中度 兩職合一

【摘要】：自現(xiàn)代企業(yè)誕生以來,委托代理問題一直是公司治理理論中的討論核心。改善所有者與代理人之間的利益目標(biāo)不一致問題是解決委托代理問題的必要環(huán)節(jié),因此股權(quán)激勵(lì)歷來被視為解決委托代理問題的有效工具。在股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃中大多數(shù)企業(yè)選擇了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)方式,這種方式使得所有者和代理人之間的利益目標(biāo)相趨同,促使經(jīng)營者真正從企業(yè)發(fā)展和股東利益的角度出發(fā)來努力工作。它能夠促使管理層調(diào)整企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu),以實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化目標(biāo);但其造成的管理者利用職權(quán)謀取私利的現(xiàn)象屢見不鮮又使得人們對激勵(lì)效果存疑。本文結(jié)合了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)與資本結(jié)構(gòu)動(dòng)態(tài)調(diào)整兩方面的內(nèi)容,以及股權(quán)集中度、兩職合一對二者的調(diào)節(jié)作用,以期為我國股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)踐提供一定的理論支持。本文首先闡述了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)與資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論的研究背景和研究意義,并對以往相關(guān)研究結(jié)論進(jìn)行回顧;其次,界定了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)和資本結(jié)構(gòu)的概念內(nèi)涵,并對本文所應(yīng)用的期權(quán)價(jià)值理論、權(quán)衡理論、委托代理理論進(jìn)行了細(xì)致闡述;再次,基于文獻(xiàn)綜述和理論回顧提出了本文的假設(shè),實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施對資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度的影響;最后,分析了本文的研究結(jié)論,并提出五條基于實(shí)踐層面的建議。本文的主要研究結(jié)論如下:第一,股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的實(shí)施在一定程度上提高了資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整成本,加大了調(diào)整資本結(jié)構(gòu)的困難程度,增加了實(shí)際資本結(jié)構(gòu)與目標(biāo)資本結(jié)構(gòu)之間的距離。第二,股權(quán)較為集中時(shí),期權(quán)激勵(lì)對資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度的抑制程度減弱;而股權(quán)較為分散時(shí),會(huì)增強(qiáng)這種負(fù)向影響。第三,當(dāng)總經(jīng)理和董事長為一人時(shí),會(huì)加強(qiáng)期權(quán)激勵(lì)對資本結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整速度的負(fù)向影響;當(dāng)總經(jīng)理和董事長分任情況時(shí),期權(quán)激勵(lì)對資本結(jié)構(gòu)動(dòng)態(tài)調(diào)整速度的抑制程度減弱。第四,企業(yè)規(guī)模、成長性、盈利性、資產(chǎn)擔(dān)保價(jià)值以及賬面市值比均會(huì)對企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整行為產(chǎn)生影響,而且影響效果具有一定的穩(wěn)健性�？傊�,本文的研究結(jié)果表明,股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施對資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整的作用逐漸顯現(xiàn),但在執(zhí)行過程中仍不可避免地存在一些問題。通過改善資本市場環(huán)境、規(guī)范信息披露、增強(qiáng)內(nèi)部監(jiān)督等手段,才能確保股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)對資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整的正面積極作用。
[Abstract]:Since the birth of modern enterprises, the principal-agent problem has been the core of the theory of corporate governance. Therefore, equity incentive has always been regarded as an effective tool to solve the principal-agent problem. In this way, the interests of owners and agents converge, and the managers work hard from the perspective of the development of the enterprise and the interests of the shareholders, and it can promote the management to adjust the capital structure of the enterprise. To realize the goal of maximizing enterprise value; However, the phenomenon that managers make use of their power to seek private interests is common and makes people doubt the incentive effect. This paper combines the two aspects of stock option incentive and dynamic adjustment of capital structure. As well as the ownership concentration, the two positions in one of the two of the regulatory role of the two. In order to provide some theoretical support for the practice of stock option incentive in China. Firstly, this paper expounds the research background and significance of stock option incentive and capital structure theory, and reviews the previous relevant research conclusions. Secondly, it defines the concept connotation of stock option incentive and capital structure, and elaborates the option value theory, trade-off theory and principal-agent theory applied in this paper. Thirdly, based on the literature review and theoretical review, this paper puts forward the hypothesis, and empirically tests the impact of the implementation of stock option incentive on the speed of capital structure adjustment; Finally, this paper analyzes the conclusions of this paper, and puts forward five suggestions based on practice. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first. To a certain extent, the implementation of stock option incentive plan increases the cost of capital structure adjustment, increases the difficulty of adjusting capital structure, and increases the distance between actual capital structure and target capital structure. When the equity is concentrated, the inhibition degree of option incentive on the speed of capital structure adjustment is weakened. Third, when the general manager and chairman are one person, the negative effect of option incentive on the speed of capital structure adjustment will be strengthened. When the general manager and the chairman of the board of directors are divided, the inhibition of option incentive on the speed of dynamic adjustment of capital structure is weakened. 4th, enterprise size, growth, and profitability. Asset guarantee value and book market value ratio will have an impact on the corporate capital structure adjustment behavior, and the effect has a certain robustness. In short, the results of this paper show that. The effect of stock option incentive on the adjustment of capital structure appears gradually, but there are still some unavoidable problems in the process of implementation. Through improving the capital market environment, we can standardize the information disclosure. Only by strengthening internal supervision can we ensure the positive effect of stock option incentive on the adjustment of capital structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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