本文關(guān)鍵詞：“追名”還是“逐利”:獨(dú)立董事履職動(dòng)機(jī)之探究　出處：《管理科學(xué)》2017年04期 　論文類(lèi)型：期刊論文

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【摘要】：經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離引發(fā)的代理問(wèn)題是催生獨(dú)立董事這一群體的制度根源。引入獨(dú)立董事制度,維護(hù)公司整體利益,尤其是關(guān)注中小股東的合法權(quán)益不受損害,是監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的重要舉措。獨(dú)立董事在本質(zhì)上也是剩余索取者的代理人,與股東之間同樣存在代理問(wèn)題。如何構(gòu)建獨(dú)立董事激勵(lì)機(jī)制,使其與中小股東建立有效受托責(zé)任關(guān)系,是監(jiān)管部門(mén)和實(shí)務(wù)界面臨的一大難題。以2002年至2015年滬、深兩市A股主板上市公司為樣本,使用手工配對(duì)法、Logit回歸和OLS回歸,采用進(jìn)一步分析和一系列穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn),從個(gè)人特征、公司特征和制度環(huán)境3個(gè)層面考察零薪酬獨(dú)立董事的影響因素,并從"追名"和"逐利"兩個(gè)角度對(duì)獨(dú)立董事履職動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行探討。研究結(jié)果表明,從個(gè)人特征看,零薪酬更可能出現(xiàn)在獨(dú)立性較強(qiáng)的董事中;從公司特征看,零薪酬更可能出現(xiàn)在違規(guī)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較低的公司;從制度環(huán)境看,零薪酬更可能出現(xiàn)在市場(chǎng)化程度較高的地區(qū)。零薪酬獨(dú)立董事在出席董事會(huì)時(shí)也更加勤勉,以上結(jié)論與"追名"動(dòng)機(jī)邏輯一致。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),會(huì)計(jì)背景的零薪酬獨(dú)立董事能進(jìn)一步甄別出財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高的公司;由于存在自選擇,零薪酬獨(dú)立董事任職公司的治理水平更高,其并未出具更多的否定意見(jiàn)。研究結(jié)果說(shuō)明經(jīng)濟(jì)和聲譽(yù)兩種激勵(lì)方式在不同獨(dú)立董事個(gè)體間發(fā)揮的作用差異較大。一方面,為獨(dú)立董事零薪酬現(xiàn)象提供了合理解釋,說(shuō)明上市公司應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)自身所處的制度環(huán)境、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平以及每位獨(dú)立董事的具體特征等設(shè)定差異化的薪酬水平;另一方面,也對(duì)監(jiān)管部門(mén)完善獨(dú)立董事激勵(lì)機(jī)制、培育獨(dú)立董事人才市場(chǎng)具有現(xiàn)實(shí)的指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:The agency problem caused by the separation of management right and control right is the institutional root of the group of independent directors. The introduction of independent director system to protect the overall interests of the company, especially concern about the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders will not be damaged. Independent directors are essentially agents of residual claimants, and there are also agency problems between shareholders and independent directors. How to construct the incentive mechanism of independent directors. To establish an effective fiduciary responsibility relationship with small and medium shareholders is a big problem faced by regulators and practitioners. From 2002 to 2015, Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share main Board listed companies as a sample. Manual paired logit regression and OLS regression were used for further analysis and a series of robust tests from individual characteristics. This paper examines the influencing factors of independent directors with zero pay from three aspects of corporate characteristics and institutional environment, and discusses the motivation of independent directors from the perspectives of "chasing fame" and "chasing profits". The research results show that the independent directors are motivated to carry out their duties. From the point of view of individual characteristics, zero pay is more likely to appear in the directors with strong independence; From the company characteristics, zero pay is more likely to appear in the company with low risk of violation; From the perspective of institutional environment, zero pay is more likely to appear in areas with a higher degree of marketization, and independent directors with zero pay are also more diligent in attending the board of directors. The above conclusions are consistent with the motivation logic of "chasing fame". Further study shows that independent directors with zero pay background can further identify the companies with higher financial risk; Because of the existence of self-selection, the governance level of the independent directors with zero remuneration is higher. It does not issue more negative opinion. The research results show that the economic and reputation incentives play different roles among different independent directors. On the one hand. It provides a reasonable explanation for the phenomenon of zero compensation of independent directors, and explains that listed companies should set different compensation levels according to their own institutional environment, risk level and the specific characteristics of each independent director. On the other hand, it has practical guiding significance for the supervision department to perfect the incentive mechanism of independent director and to cultivate the market of independent director talents.
【作者單位】： 中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;中國(guó)人民銀行常州市中心支行;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(71602191)~~
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 引言 獨(dú)立董事制度的出現(xiàn),源于早期公司治理措施的失敗,特別是董事會(huì)職能的失效。建立獨(dú)立董事制度的初衷是在股權(quán)高度分散的情況下可以讓獨(dú)立董事代表全體股東對(duì)上市公司的經(jīng)理人進(jìn)行監(jiān)督,以減少因?yàn)榻?jīng)理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為導(dǎo)致的代理問(wèn)題[1]。本質(zhì)上講,獨(dú)立董事也是剩余索取

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