發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-15 08:52

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：民營(yíng)上市公司高管持股比例與組織績(jī)效相關(guān)性研究　出處：《天津商業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 民營(yíng)上市公司 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 高管持股 公司績(jī)效

【摘要】：通過分析我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司2015年報(bào)可以發(fā)現(xiàn)不同民營(yíng)上市公司第一大股東持股比例存在一定差異,在這種情況下,若想更好的研究民營(yíng)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、高管持股與其績(jī)效間的關(guān)系應(yīng)該考慮到第一大股東持股比例不同對(duì)所要研究的結(jié)果產(chǎn)生的影響。所以本文將按第一大股東持股比例不同,將研究數(shù)據(jù)劃分為:股權(quán)集中度相對(duì)分散(第一大股東持股比例小于20%)、股權(quán)集中度相對(duì)集中(第一大股東持股比例在20%-40%之間)、絕對(duì)控股(第一大股東持股比例大于40%)三個(gè)分樣本的研究區(qū)間,再對(duì)每個(gè)分類樣本做回歸分析研究各變量之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系。最后,本文通過對(duì)細(xì)分樣本進(jìn)行研究,進(jìn)一步分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、高管持股與公司績(jī)效間的關(guān)系,從而使研究更具針對(duì)性和可靠性。本文以民營(yíng)上市公司2012-2015年披露的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、高管持股與公司績(jī)效間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。本文研究數(shù)據(jù)主要來自國(guó)泰安數(shù)據(jù)服務(wù)中心的中國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)和萬(wàn)德數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)。第一大股東持股比例、高管持股比例及凈資產(chǎn)收益率數(shù)據(jù)是直接取得的,其他數(shù)據(jù)是利用EXCEL2010進(jìn)行加工計(jì)算得出來的,所有數(shù)據(jù)的處理均利用EXCEL2010和SPSS17.0完成。此外,為了提高統(tǒng)計(jì)分析的有效性,在樣本的選取過程中將剔除一些明顯存在錯(cuò)誤的數(shù)據(jù)。最后在對(duì)所要研究的樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行整理后,利用SPSS數(shù)據(jù)分析軟件對(duì)其進(jìn)行單因素方差分析、描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性分析和多元線性回歸分析。通過對(duì)所要研究的樣本進(jìn)行數(shù)據(jù)分析和多元線性回歸分析可知:(1)當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|持股比例小于20%時(shí),第一大股東持股比例與公司績(jī)效間不存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。(2)當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|持股比例大于20%時(shí),第一大股東持股比例與公司績(jī)效間存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系。(3)我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司第二到第十大股東持股比例之和與民營(yíng)上市公司績(jī)效間存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。(4)由多元線性回歸分析可知,當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|持股比例小于20%時(shí),我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司高管持股比例與公司績(jī)效間存在不顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。(5)當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|持股比例在20%-40%之間以及大于40%的研究區(qū)間內(nèi),我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司高管持股比例與公司績(jī)效間存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。為了有效的完善我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司的公司治理機(jī)制從而提升民營(yíng)上市公司的盈利能力,本文通過對(duì)研究結(jié)果的分析,建議民營(yíng)上市公司可以適當(dāng)?shù)奶岣咂涔蓹?quán)集中度和股權(quán)制衡度,建立一個(gè)相對(duì)集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。除此之外,本文還建議在當(dāng)前公司內(nèi)外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制尚不完善的情況下盡量減少其高管持股比例,因?yàn)槊駹I(yíng)上市公司高管持股對(duì)其盈利能力產(chǎn)生不利影響。最后,民營(yíng)上市公司應(yīng)結(jié)合自身特征選擇合適的公司規(guī)模并將資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率控制在合理的范圍內(nèi),因?yàn)楦哔Y產(chǎn)負(fù)債率會(huì)增加公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并且不利于盈利能力的提升。
[Abstract]:Through the analysis of the 2015 annual report of private listed companies in China, we can find that there are some differences in the proportion of the largest shareholders in different private listed companies, in this case. If we want to study the ownership structure of private listed companies better. The relationship between executive ownership and its performance should take into account the impact of different shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder on the results to be studied. The research data can be divided into two parts: the degree of equity concentration is relatively dispersed (the proportion of the largest shareholder is less than 20%, and the ratio of ownership concentration is relatively concentrated (the proportion of the first largest shareholder is between 20% and 40%). Absolute holding (the proportion of the largest shareholder holding more than 40 parts) of the three samples of the study interval, and then for each classification of the sample to do regression analysis of the correlation between the variables. Finally. Through the study of subdivision samples, this paper further analyzes the relationship between ownership structure, executive ownership and corporate performance. In order to make the research more targeted and reliable. This paper takes the statistical data of the private listed companies from 2012-2015 as the research object, and analyzes the ownership structure of the private listed companies in China. Empirical analysis of the relationship between executive ownership and corporate performance. The data are mainly from the Cathay Pacific data Service Center of private listed companies database and Wande database. The largest shareholder shareholding ratio. The data of executive shareholding ratio and ROA are obtained directly, while other data are processed and calculated by EXCEL2010. All the data are processed by EXCEL2010 and SPSS17.0. In addition, in order to improve the effectiveness of statistical analysis. In the process of sample selection, some obviously wrong data will be eliminated. Finally, after finishing the sample data to be studied, using SPSS data analysis software to carry out single-factor ANOVA. Descriptive statistical analysis. Correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. Through the data analysis and multiple linear regression analysis of the samples to be studied, we can know that: 1) when the proportion of the first largest shareholder is less than 20%. There is no significant positive correlation between the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the performance of the company. (2) when the holding ratio of the first largest shareholder is greater than 20, there is no significant positive correlation between the proportion of the first shareholder and the performance of the company. There is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of the first largest shareholders and the company performance. (3) there is a significant positive correlation between the sum of the second to tenth shareholder holding ratio of the private listed companies and the performance of the private listed companies. (. 4) multiple linear regression analysis. When the first shareholder holds less than 20 shares. There is no significant negative correlation between the proportion of private listed companies and corporate performance. 5) when the proportion of the largest shareholders is between 20%-40% and more than 40% research interval. In order to effectively improve the corporate governance mechanism of private listed companies in order to improve the profitability of private listed companies, there is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of private listed companies and corporate performance. Through the analysis of the research results, this paper suggests that private listed companies can appropriately improve the degree of equity concentration and equity checks and balances, and establish a relatively centralized equity structure. This paper also suggests that the company's internal and external oversight mechanism is not perfect to reduce the proportion of its executive shareholding, because the private listed companies have a negative impact on their profitability. Finally. Private listed companies should select the appropriate company size according to their own characteristics and control the asset-liability ratio within a reasonable range because high asset-liability ratio will increase the operating risk of the company and is not conducive to the improvement of profitability.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F272.91;F832.51

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