本文關鍵詞：風險投資對IPO盈余管理影響的實證研究　出處：《首都經濟貿易大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 風險投資 IPO盈余管理 中小企業(yè)板 創(chuàng)業(yè)

【摘要】：2004年中小企業(yè)板和2009年創(chuàng)業(yè)板的推出，降低了中小企業(yè)的上市門檻，為其提供了更加廣闊的融資平臺。同時，這也使得風險投資具備了更加寬松的退出渠道，使得越來越多的風險投資機構通過幫助這些中小企業(yè)進行首次公開募股（IPO）從而成功退出并獲得風險資本的增值。但是，為了達到上市標準或籌集更多資金，我國很多首次公開發(fā)行上市的公司都存在盈余管理行為。針對這種現(xiàn)象，作為投資者的風險投資機構在被投企業(yè)IPO過程中可能會起到認證作用或者監(jiān)督作用，從而抑制IPO公司管理層的盈余管理行為，但它也可能會起到躁動作用，縱容甚至幫助被投企業(yè)進行IPO盈余管理。 因此，本文將2004年6月至2012年12月間在中小企業(yè)板上市的公司以及2009年10月 2012年12月間在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的公司作為研究樣本，運用實證研究的方法，檢驗有風險投資支持的公司是否比無風險投資支持的公司盈余管理程度更低，以及高聲譽風險投資是否比低聲譽風險投資更能抑制IPO公司的盈余管理行為。 本文的研究結果顯示，對在我國中小企業(yè)板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的公司來說，風險投資的參與確實能在一定程度上減輕上市公司的IPO盈余管理行為。但是，與國外的研究結果相比，我國風險投資的這種認證作用和監(jiān)督作用并沒有那么強。另外，研究結果還表明，高聲譽的風險投資機構確實比低聲譽的風險投資機構更能抑制IPO公司的盈余管理行為，但是這種差異并不是很明顯。 最后，針對這些研究結論，，本文提出了一些啟示與建議，旨在加強防范擬上市公司的IPO盈余管理行。另外，本文還提出了發(fā)展我國風險投資業(yè)的一些建議。
[Abstract]:The launch of the SME Board in 2004 and the gem in 2009 lowered the listing threshold of SMEs and provided them with a broader financing platform. At the same time. This also gives venture capital a more relaxed exit channel. Make more and more venture capital institutions by helping these small and medium-sized enterprises to carry out initial public offering (IPO) so as to successfully exit and gain the value of venture capital. However. In order to meet the listing standards or raise more funds, many companies listed on the IPO in China have earnings management behavior. As an investor, the venture capital institution may play a role of certification or supervision in the IPO process of the invested enterprise, thereby restraining the earnings management behavior of the management of IPO company. But it can also play a restless role, conniving or even helping invested companies manage IPO earnings. So... This paper takes the companies listed on the SME Board from June 2004 to December 2012 and the companies listed on the gem from October 2009 to October 2009 as the research samples. The empirical study is used to test whether the companies with venture capital support have lower degree of earnings management than those without venture capital support. And whether high reputation venture capital can restrain earnings management behavior of IPO more than low reputation risk investment. The results of this paper show that the participation of venture capital can alleviate the IPO earnings management behavior of listed companies to some extent. Compared with the foreign research results, the role of the certification and supervision of venture capital in China is not so strong. In addition, the results also show that. It is true that high reputation venture capital firms can restrain earnings management behavior of IPO more than low reputation venture capital firms, but the difference is not obvious. Finally, in view of these research conclusions, this paper puts forward some enlightenment and suggestions, in order to strengthen the prevention of listed companies' IPO earnings management. In addition. This paper also puts forward some suggestions for the development of venture capital industry in China.
【學位授予單位】：首都經濟貿易大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

【引證文獻】

相關期刊論文 前1條

1 葛海燕;;風險投資發(fā)展策略淺議[J];新經濟;2015年05期

相關碩士學位論文 前2條

1 顧恬;外部監(jiān)督、IPO特征與IPO財務舞弊識別的實證研究[D];暨南大學;2016年

2 錢監(jiān)亮;創(chuàng)業(yè)投資對中小板上市公司盈余管理影響的研究[D];東華大學;2015年

本文編號：1423355