發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-12 13:11

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系溢出效應(yīng)實(shí)證研究　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2014年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系 時(shí)點(diǎn)溢出效應(yīng) 時(shí)段溢出效應(yīng) 分析師預(yù)測(cè)行為

【摘要】：有效發(fā)揮董事會(huì)監(jiān)督功能有助于緩解管理者與股東之間的代理沖突。雖制度背景各異,但董事兼職現(xiàn)象普遍存在于世界各國(guó)的證券市場(chǎng)中,董事兼職形成的企業(yè)聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系受到社會(huì)的廣泛關(guān)注。雖然董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系(董事兼職形成的企業(yè)聯(lián)系)對(duì)公司治理影響效應(yīng)的研究結(jié)論尚未達(dá)成一致,但董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系的內(nèi)向型影響效應(yīng)以及外向型溢出效應(yīng)已被一致認(rèn)可。本論文從外部信息使用者的角度,研究董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系是否影響外部信息使用者的決策行為。在界定相關(guān)概念和綜述已有研究文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,本文構(gòu)建了董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系影響外部信息使用的機(jī)理模型,并在此基礎(chǔ)上展開(kāi)實(shí)證分析。首先從內(nèi)向型溢出效應(yīng)和外向型溢出效應(yīng)兩個(gè)角度實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系對(duì)分析師預(yù)測(cè)行為的影響；再次,從董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系形成、斷裂以及公司受到處罰三個(gè)時(shí)點(diǎn),采用事件研究的方法實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系對(duì)股價(jià)的時(shí)點(diǎn)溢出效應(yīng)；最后,從股價(jià)聯(lián)動(dòng)視角來(lái)研究董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系的時(shí)段溢出效應(yīng)。實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明：(一)上市公司董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系影響分析師預(yù)測(cè)行為。董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系的信息溢出效應(yīng)降低了分析師意見(jiàn)分歧度,但同時(shí)董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系信息溢出形成的同質(zhì)預(yù)期加劇分析師的預(yù)測(cè)誤差;(二)董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系存在顯著的時(shí)點(diǎn)溢出效應(yīng)。董事聯(lián)結(jié)形成(提名多席位董事)、特殊事件下(公司受到處罰)以及董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系斷裂(多席位董事辭職)對(duì)股價(jià)均存在顯著的負(fù)向溢出效應(yīng),表明公司間的社會(huì)聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系影響投資者決策行為,目標(biāo)公司某一特定行為產(chǎn)生的信號(hào)會(huì)隨著董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系傳導(dǎo)至與之存在聯(lián)結(jié)的其他公司的股價(jià)中,同時(shí)也說(shuō)明了投資者關(guān)注董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系對(duì)資產(chǎn)價(jià)格的影響作用,但是進(jìn)一步的回歸分析表明,董事的多席位特征與超額收益率并未存在顯著相關(guān)性；(三)董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系存在顯著時(shí)段溢出效應(yīng)。董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系數(shù)量矩陣與股價(jià)收益相關(guān)系數(shù)矩陣顯著正相關(guān),表明董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系影響股價(jià)聯(lián)動(dòng),并且這種影響主要是由于董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系的資源價(jià)值導(dǎo)致而非投資者基于董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系的分類(lèi)投資模式所致；(四)在不同時(shí)間區(qū)間下董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系對(duì)股價(jià)的溢出效應(yīng)存在差異。在時(shí)點(diǎn)溢出效應(yīng)中,董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系這一社會(huì)關(guān)系屬性作為影響股價(jià)波動(dòng)的主要因素,而董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系特征(數(shù)量)對(duì)股價(jià)影響不顯著；而在時(shí)段溢出效應(yīng)中,董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系數(shù)量帶來(lái)的資源價(jià)值則是影響股價(jià)聯(lián)動(dòng)的主要因素。因此,在某一時(shí)間點(diǎn)的投資決策中,投資者更多考慮是否存在某種關(guān)聯(lián),而某一段時(shí)間區(qū)間內(nèi),投資者則會(huì)更多依賴(lài)于這種關(guān)聯(lián)帶來(lái)的資源價(jià)值；(五)不同制度背景下董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系溢出效應(yīng)的差異�；诿绹�(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中董事會(huì)單一治理機(jī)制的制度背景,學(xué)者們的研究結(jié)論尚存爭(zhēng)議。以中國(guó)董事會(huì)與監(jiān)事會(huì)雙重治理機(jī)制為制度背景,本論文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)多席位董事提名以及辭職對(duì)股價(jià)均存在顯著的負(fù)向沖擊,這種負(fù)向沖擊并未因代理成本的差異而存在差異。在多席位董事提名時(shí),投資者更加關(guān)注其有限資源(時(shí)間和精力)對(duì)董事會(huì)治理效率的影響,多席位董事提名公告效應(yīng)支持繁忙假說(shuō)。而多席位董事辭職時(shí),投資者對(duì)其傳遞公司財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)信息的關(guān)注強(qiáng)于其時(shí)間和精力的保障程度,加之外部席位的減少抑制了董事監(jiān)督效率的發(fā)揮,因而多席位董事辭職同樣呈現(xiàn)出負(fù)向溢出效應(yīng),多席位董事辭職起到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)警示作用。本文研究結(jié)論有助于加深董事聯(lián)結(jié)關(guān)系對(duì)股價(jià)影響效應(yīng)的研究,同時(shí)也從社會(huì)關(guān)系視角豐富了分析師預(yù)測(cè)行為的影響因素研究,也為上市公司、投資者以及監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的決策提供證據(jù)支持。
[Abstract]:Effective supervision of the board of directors function helps to alleviate the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Although the institutional background is different, but the part-time phenomenon exists in the world in the stock market, the formation of the link between the part-time enterprise attention. Although the board of Directors Association (part-time director of the enterprise to reach contact) conclusion the effects of corporate governance has not been consistent, but the coupling between introversion and extroversion spillover effect has been recognized. This paper from the external information users' point of view, whether on board connection influences the decision-making behavior of the external information users. Based on defining the related concepts and reviews the existing literature on in this paper, constructs the mechanism model of the connected relationship affect the external use of information, and on the basis of empirical analysis first. From two angles inward and outward spillover spillover effect empirical link between the board of directors on analyst forecast behavior; thirdly, formed from the Directors Association, and the company punished three break point, the empirical method by using event study test board connection point spillover effect on stock price; finally, the spillover effect of time to study the relationship between directors from the price linkage perspective. The empirical results show that: (a) to predict the behavior between the board of directors of Listed Company Directors Association analysts. The coupling effects of information spillover effect reduces the analyst disagreement, but at the same time the relationship between the formation of homogeneous information spillover expected prediction error increased analysts; (two) there are significant spillover effects of directors point connection. The board connections form (nominated multi seat board), special events (by the company To punish) and board connection fracture (multi seat directors to resign) has significant negative spillover effect on stock prices, indicating the company between the social relationships influence the decision-making behavior of investors, the Target Corp signal generated a certain behaviour with the Directors Association and other companies are conducted to the connection of the stock price, at the same time also illustrates the role of investors concerned about the link between the board of directors on the impact of asset prices, but further regression analysis showed that the characteristics of the multi seat and the excess rate of return does not exist significant correlation; (three) there are significant periods of spillover effect is positively related to board connection. The connection between the number of matrices associated with the stock return coefficient matrix, that the relationship between influence stock price linkage, and this effect is mainly due to the connection of the resources value instead of lead Based on the classification of investment patterns caused by coupling between directors of investors; (four) the Directors Association spillover effect on stock prices in different time interval difference. In time, the spillover effect, director of association of the social relations of attribute as the main factors that affect the stock price volatility, and the connected relationship characteristics (quantity) of stock price no significant influence; and in time the spillover effects of the number of Directors Association, bring resource value is the main factors affecting the price linkage. Therefore, a certain time point in the investment decision-making, more investors consider whether there is a link, and a time interval, investors will be more dependent on the the associated resource value; (five) the difference between the spillover effect of the connected system. Under the background of different institutional background of directors in American stock market will be single governance mechanism based on learning The researchers concluded is controversial. To Chinese board of directors and board of supervisors double governance mechanism as the institutional background, this paper found many seats and the resignation of directors shares have significant negative impact, the negative impact is not due to differences in agency cost differences. In many seats to nominate directors, investors pay more attention to its limited resources (time and energy) influence on the governance efficiency of the board of directors, multi seat director nomination announcement effect hypothesis. While many seats support busy directors to resign, degree of protection of investors on their company's financial risk transfer information about its strong time and energy, and the external seats reduce inhibition efficiency directors play, so many seats directors to resign also showed negative spillover effect, multi seat director's resignation plays the risk warning. The conclusion of this study will help Yu Jiashen The research on the effect of director association on stock price also enriches the factors that influence analysts' prediction behavior from the perspective of social relations, and also provides evidence for the decision making of listed companies, investors and regulators.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F832.51

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