本文關(guān)鍵詞：政府干預(yù)、股權(quán)激勵及其對企業(yè)業(yè)績的影響　出處：《大連理工大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 上市公司 股權(quán)激勵 政府干預(yù) 業(yè)績

【摘要】：隨著公司股權(quán)的日益分散,所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離的現(xiàn)象在世界各國企業(yè)越來越突出,引發(fā)了委托—代理問題。為了解決經(jīng)理人和股東之間的利益矛盾,合理激勵公司管理層人員,很多公司開始采取股權(quán)激勵的方式。股權(quán)激勵已經(jīng)成為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)維持持續(xù)發(fā)展和競爭力的重要手段和措施。在此背景下,針對我國的股權(quán)分置改革背景,提出以下問題：我國上市公司的股權(quán)激勵行為主要受什么因素制約?上市公司股權(quán)激勵是否對企業(yè)業(yè)績產(chǎn)生了積極的影響? 首先,在對股權(quán)激勵基本概念和主要模式分析的基礎(chǔ)上,回顧了股權(quán)激勵的主要相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ),并對我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵現(xiàn)狀進行了分析,揭示我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵中存在的主要問題。在此基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建了政府干預(yù)、股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)業(yè)績關(guān)系的分析框架,通過對政府干預(yù)與上市公司股權(quán)激勵的關(guān)系、上市公司股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)業(yè)績的關(guān)系進行理論分析,提出了相應(yīng)的研究假設(shè)。 其次,立足于中國情境,以我國深滬兩市A股實施股權(quán)激勵計劃的上市公司為研究樣本,運用計量經(jīng)濟學方法對政府干預(yù)與上市公司股權(quán)激勵、上市公司股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)業(yè)績的關(guān)系進行了回歸分析,從而對上市公司股權(quán)激勵行為及其對企業(yè)業(yè)績的影響進行了實證研究,主要得到以下結(jié)論。 (1)政府干預(yù)對上市公司的股權(quán)激勵行為具有一定的抑制作用。上市公司所處地區(qū)的政府干預(yù)程度越強,上市公司股權(quán)激勵的水平就越低。結(jié)果表明,上市公司股權(quán)激勵的推出在中國有其特殊的制度背景,上市公司管理者多任務(wù)目標的存在影響了股權(quán)激勵的強度。政府干預(yù)的存在使得上市公司并不完全是一個價值最大化者,因此上市公司沒有采取股權(quán)激勵的強烈動機。 (2)我國的上市公司股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)業(yè)績提升起到積極地促進作用,股權(quán)激勵與公司的經(jīng)營績效明顯正相關(guān),股權(quán)激勵可以通過激勵管理層更加努力,從而實現(xiàn)促進我國上市公司業(yè)績的目的。這表明即使我國資本市場還不夠成熟,上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵仍能起到積極的激勵作用,但要想提高股權(quán)激勵的效果,還應(yīng)進一步完善我國資本市場。 最后,在理論和實證研究的基礎(chǔ)上,從減弱政府干預(yù)、加強市場調(diào)節(jié)機制以及完善公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的角度出發(fā),提出減弱政府干預(yù),加強資本市場和人才市場調(diào)節(jié)、規(guī)范企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu),強化企業(yè)業(yè)績考核標準的政策建議,從而有助于股權(quán)激勵機制的完善和作用發(fā)揮。
[Abstract]:With the increasing dispersion of corporate equity, the separation of ownership and control rights is becoming more and more prominent in the world, which leads to the principal-agent problem in order to solve the conflicts between managers and shareholders. Many companies begin to adopt the way of equity incentive, which has become an important means and measures to maintain the sustainable development and competitiveness of modern enterprises. In this context, many companies begin to adopt equity incentives. In view of the background of the split share structure reform in China, this paper puts forward the following questions: what factors restrict the equity incentive behavior of listed companies in China? Does the equity incentive of listed companies have a positive impact on the performance of enterprises? First of all, on the basis of analyzing the basic concepts and main modes of equity incentive, this paper reviews the main theoretical basis of equity incentive, and analyzes the current situation of equity incentive of listed companies in China. This paper reveals the main problems existing in the equity incentive of listed companies in China. On this basis, it constructs an analytical framework of the relationship between government intervention, equity incentive and enterprise performance. Based on the theoretical analysis of the relationship between government intervention and equity incentive of listed companies, and the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, the corresponding research hypotheses are put forward. Secondly, based on the situation in China, taking the listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research samples, the econometrics method is applied to the government intervention and the equity incentive of listed companies. Based on the regression analysis of the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, this paper makes an empirical study on the behavior of equity incentive and its influence on the performance of listed companies. The main conclusions are as follows. The higher the degree of government intervention, the lower the level of equity incentive of listed companies. The introduction of equity incentive of listed companies has its special institutional background in China. The existence of multi-task objectives of managers in listed companies affects the intensity of equity incentive. The existence of government intervention makes the listed companies not a value maximizer. Therefore, listed companies do not have a strong incentive to adopt equity incentives. Equity incentive plays a positive role in promoting corporate performance. Equity incentive is positively related to company performance, and equity incentive can be used to encourage management to make more efforts. This shows that even if the capital market in China is not mature, the implementation of equity incentives can still play a positive role, but want to improve the effect of equity incentives. Should also further perfect our country capital market. Finally, on the basis of theoretical and empirical research, from the perspective of weakening the government intervention, strengthening the market regulation mechanism and perfecting the corporate internal governance structure, the paper proposes to weaken the government intervention. Strengthening the regulation of capital market and talent market, standardizing the internal governance structure of enterprises, and strengthening the policy recommendations of enterprise performance evaluation standard are helpful to the perfection and function of equity incentive mechanism.
【學位授予單位】：大連理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.5

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