【摘要】：政府投資項目在推動國民經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展,滿足文化和國防需求等方面發(fā)揮著極為重要的作用。為了加快政府投資項目市場化的前進(jìn)方向,國務(wù)院于2004年提出對非經(jīng)營政府投資項目加快推行代建制。代建人作為這項制度創(chuàng)新的關(guān)鍵因素,有必要研究如何對代建人進(jìn)行激勵,提高代建人的項目管理水平。 本文首先研究了我國政府投資政策的演進(jìn)歷程,從計劃經(jīng)濟(jì)向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)變的過程中,代建制的提出符合市場化的前進(jìn)方向。在代建制初步引入階段,對代建人的激勵方法,強(qiáng)調(diào)的責(zé)任,忽視獎勵,缺乏可操作性；在快速成長階段,主要激勵方法是獎勵部分的項目結(jié)余資金。物質(zhì)獎勵和懲罰的效果都差強(qiáng)人意,所以本文探討對代建人的精神激勵。第二,通過構(gòu)建代建人的聲譽(yù)激勵模型,模擬政府對一個代建人進(jìn)行多次激勵的過程,識別影響代建人精神激勵的主要因素,并證明了引入聲譽(yù)機(jī)制之后對代建人的激勵效果有顯著的提升。第三,通過構(gòu)建代建人的錦標(biāo)制度模型,得出政府對多個代建人進(jìn)行聲譽(yù)激勵時應(yīng)注意代建人初始激勵、最優(yōu)工資和激勵閥值的確定,并證明了錦標(biāo)制度可以減少信息不對稱性和環(huán)境不確定因素對代建人聲譽(yù)激勵的影響。最后,本文構(gòu)建了虛擬的代建人激勵管理組織,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出代建人的長效激勵方法、聲譽(yù)傳播方法、科學(xué)評價方法和資質(zhì)認(rèn)證方法。按照流程化的機(jī)制設(shè)計思路,從激勵管理流程、激勵效果分析和激勵效果反饋這三個方面設(shè)計了代建人的激勵管理運(yùn)行機(jī)制,并提出代建人資質(zhì)認(rèn)證的原則、流程、審查和公示機(jī)制,作為代建人激勵管理機(jī)制的配套措施。 本文構(gòu)建了對代建人進(jìn)行精神激勵的模型,期望通過政府部門對代建人的精神激勵,提高代建人在政府投資代建項目中的努力程度,保證代建項目的順利實施,嚴(yán)格控制代建項目的投資、質(zhì)量和工期,促進(jìn)我國政府投資代建制的進(jìn)一步完善。
[Abstract]:Government investment projects play an extremely important role in promoting the development of national economy and meeting the needs of culture and national defense. In order to speed up the orientation of marketization of government investment projects, the State Council proposed in 2004 to speed up the implementation of the agency system for non-operating government investment projects. As the key factor of this system innovation, it is necessary to study how to motivate the agent to improve the project management level of the agent. This paper first studies the evolution course of government investment policy in our country. In the process of transition from planned economy to market economy, the agent system is put forward in accordance with the direction of marketization. In the initial introduction stage of agent construction, the incentive method of the agent emphasizes the responsibility, neglects the reward, and lacks maneuverability; in the rapid growth stage, the main incentive method is the project balance fund of the reward part. The effect of material reward and punishment is not satisfactory. Secondly, by constructing the reputation incentive model of the agent, the paper simulates the process of the government to motivate the agent many times, and identifies the main factors that affect the spiritual incentive of the agent. It also proves that the incentive effect of the agent is improved significantly after introducing reputation mechanism. Thirdly, by constructing the model of the agent's title system, it is concluded that the government should pay attention to the determination of the initial incentive, the optimal wage and the incentive threshold when the government encourages the reputation of the multi-agent. It is proved that the award system can reduce the influence of information asymmetry and environmental uncertainty on the reputation incentive of the agent. Finally, this paper constructs the virtual agent incentive management organization, and puts forward the long-term incentive method, reputation dissemination method, scientific evaluation method and qualification certification method. According to the thought of mechanism design, this paper designs the operating mechanism of incentive management from three aspects: incentive management flow, incentive effect analysis and incentive effect feedback, and puts forward the principle and process of agent qualification certification. Review and publicity mechanism, as a proxy incentive management mechanism supporting measures. In this paper, a model of spiritual incentive for agent is constructed, which is expected to improve the degree of effort of agent in government investment and guarantee the smooth implementation of agency project through the spirit incentive of government departments. Strictly control the investment, quality and time limit of the agent construction project, and promote the further improvement of our government investment agency system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F283

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