本文選題：機動車輛保險　切入點：代理人與保險人　出處：《廣西大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自20世紀(jì)80代中國保險業(yè)復(fù)業(yè)以來,保險行業(yè)得到了快速而有效的發(fā)展,據(jù)權(quán)威機構(gòu)統(tǒng)計保費收入以每年30%的速度增長,機動車輛保險作為保險的重要組成部分,其占保險市場的比例越來越大,到2013年底機動車輛保險占財險總額的比例達到70%以上。然而伴隨著機動車輛保險市場和經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,很多嚴峻的問題也隨之出現(xiàn),根據(jù)保監(jiān)會的一些數(shù)據(jù)顯示,機動車輛保險市場存在著嚴重的保險欺詐現(xiàn)象,我國的保險欺詐金額占保險賠付總額的比例超過20%。這種欺詐行為不僅影響保險公司的利益,同樣也影響投保人和受益人的利益。如今的保險市場由于保險代理人和保險人之間信息存在嚴重的不對稱,加之保險公司又沒有良好且有效的保險代理人激勵機制,導(dǎo)致我國機動車輛保險市場出現(xiàn)嚴重的混亂,保險代理人和保險人之間的欺詐行為就是其中最典型的現(xiàn)象之一,這種行為嚴重的影響了機動車輛保險市場的穩(wěn)定和發(fā)展。鑒于此,本文將機動車保險代理人與保險人之間的欺詐博弈作為研究對象。 本文首先從我國機動車輛保險的實際出發(fā),分析機動車輛保險的特點及我國機動車輛保險市場中代理人和保險人之間的欺詐形式,欺詐動機,以及欺詐所造成的危害。再結(jié)合相關(guān)博弈論的知識和方法,通過對博弈假設(shè)條件的分析,建立相關(guān)的博弈模型,最后對博弈模型的分析,得出保險代理人和保險人博弈均衡結(jié)果,依據(jù)博弈模型的結(jié)果提出反欺詐的博弈策略。最后根據(jù)反欺詐的博弈策略進一步研究出保險人對保險代理人的有效而合理的約束和激勵機制。希望能為機動車輛保險市場上代理人和保險人提供一些參考性的意見,從而保障機動車輛保險市場的健康穩(wěn)定的運行。
[Abstract]:Since the resumption of insurance industry in the 20th century, the insurance industry has developed rapidly and effectively. According to the statistics of authoritative organizations, the premium income increases by 30% per year, and motor vehicle insurance is an important part of insurance.By the end of 2013, motor vehicle insurance accounted for more than 70 percent of the total insurance coverage.However, with the development of motor vehicle insurance market and economy, many serious problems also appear. According to some data of CIRC, there is serious insurance fraud in motor vehicle insurance market.The insurance fraud amount in our country accounts for more than 20% of the total insurance indemnity.This fraud not only affects the interests of insurance companies, but also affects the interests of policyholders and beneficiaries.Due to the serious asymmetry of information between insurance agents and insurers and the lack of a good and effective incentive mechanism for insurance agents in the insurance market today, there is a serious confusion in the motor vehicle insurance market in China.The fraud between insurance agents and insurers is one of the most typical phenomena, which seriously affects the stability and development of the motor vehicle insurance market.In view of this, this paper regards the fraud game between the motor vehicle insurance agent and the insurer as the research object.This paper first analyzes the characteristics of motor vehicle insurance and the form of fraud between agents and insurers in China's motor vehicle insurance market, the motive of fraud, and the harm caused by fraud.Combined with the knowledge and methods of game theory, through the analysis of the hypothetical conditions of the game, the relevant game model is established. Finally, the game model is analyzed, and the equilibrium result of insurance agent and insurer game is obtained.According to the result of game model, the game strategy of anti-fraud is put forward.Finally, according to the game strategy of anti-fraud, the effective and reasonable restraint and incentive mechanism of insurer to insurance agent is further studied.It is hoped that it can provide some reference advice for the agents and insurers in the motor vehicle insurance market so as to ensure the healthy and stable operation of the motor vehicle insurance market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.4;F224.32

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本文編號：1727501