本文關(guān)鍵詞：雙渠道下制造商返利策略選擇與渠道協(xié)調(diào)合同設(shè)計(jì)　出處：《廈門大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 雙渠道 制造商返利 返利選擇 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避 渠道協(xié)調(diào)

【摘要】：電子商務(wù)和第三方物流的快速發(fā)展,使得越來(lái)越多的制造商在傳統(tǒng)渠道的基礎(chǔ)上開(kāi)設(shè)電子渠道,運(yùn)用電子渠道與傳統(tǒng)零售渠道相結(jié)合的雙渠道分銷模式銷售產(chǎn)品以擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,這已經(jīng)成為眾多商家關(guān)注的首要問(wèn)題之一。然而,這種雙渠道運(yùn)營(yíng)不僅加劇制造商與零售商之間的沖突,還導(dǎo)致電子渠道與傳統(tǒng)渠道之間的沖突。在電子商務(wù)銷售機(jī)會(huì)和巨大利潤(rùn)面前,大部分的制造商都不愿意放棄電子渠道,而是不斷尋求與零售商的合作方式,設(shè)法消除與零售商的正面沖突以達(dá)到雙贏的局面。事實(shí)上,制造商返利是改善制造商和零售商合作關(guān)系的一種方式,通過(guò)返利可以激發(fā)零售商銷售的積極性,提高企業(yè)的運(yùn)作效率。然而,在雙渠道環(huán)境下制造商返利策略的選擇不僅受到傳統(tǒng)渠道中制造商和零售商關(guān)系的影響,還受到電子渠道和傳統(tǒng)渠道關(guān)系的影響。所以,雙渠道下制造商返利策略的分析將更加復(fù)雜。鑒于這些,本論文對(duì)雙渠道下的制造商返利模式進(jìn)行研究。 首先,在顧客返利具有兌現(xiàn)成本的假設(shè)下,構(gòu)建了雙渠道下制造商和零售商之間的Stackelberg博弈模型,通過(guò)價(jià)格傳遞效率和制造商利潤(rùn)最大化兩個(gè)方面對(duì)比制造商返利策略的選擇。研究結(jié)果表明,制造商開(kāi)設(shè)電子渠道,通過(guò)降低電子渠道產(chǎn)品價(jià)格,能夠提高返利策略的價(jià)格傳遞；并且在雙渠道下制造商若基于價(jià)格傳遞效率來(lái)選擇返利策略,應(yīng)充分了解市場(chǎng)交叉彈性,在高交叉彈性下選擇銷售返利,低交叉彈性下選擇顧客返利；制造商若基于自身利益最大化選擇返利策略,高顧客兌換率下制造商將選擇銷售返利,低顧客兌換率下選擇顧客返利。 其次,通過(guò)引入零售商風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避,進(jìn)一步探討雙渠道下零售商風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避對(duì)制造商返利選擇的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),雙渠道背景下制造商有效識(shí)別零售商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避態(tài)度能夠避免過(guò)度返利補(bǔ)償。此外,制造商無(wú)論從價(jià)格傳遞效率出發(fā)還是從自身利潤(rùn)最大化出發(fā)選擇返利策略,在零售商低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避時(shí)都應(yīng)選擇顧客返利,在零售商高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避時(shí)應(yīng)選擇銷售返利,但兩種情形下基準(zhǔn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度的閾值有所不同。 最后,基于兩部定價(jià)思想,探討在銷售返利和顧客返利下制造商雙渠道協(xié)調(diào)合同的設(shè)計(jì)。研究表明,兩部定價(jià)和服務(wù)補(bǔ)償合同的組合運(yùn)用能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)制造商返利策略(即銷售返利和顧客返利)下雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈有效協(xié)調(diào),但在銷售返利下需要對(duì)兩部定價(jià)合同進(jìn)行改進(jìn)。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of electronic commerce and the third party logistics, more and more manufacturers to open electronic channels based on traditional channels, the use of dual channel electronic channel and traditional retail channels combined the distribution pattern of sales product to expand market competitiveness, it has become one of the primary problems of many businesses concerned. However, this kind of dual channel operation not only aggravate the conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer, but also lead to conflicts between electronic channels and traditional channels. In the face of e-commerce sales opportunities and huge profits, most of the manufacturers are not willing to give up the electronic channels, but continue to seek cooperation with retailers, try to eliminate confrontation with retailers in order to achieve a win-win situation in fact., manufacturer rebate is a way to improve the cooperation between manufacturer and retailer, the retailer can stimulate the sales rebate The enthusiasm, improve the operational efficiency of the enterprise. However, the manufacturer rebate in dual channel environment selection is not only influenced by the relationship between manufacturers and retailers in the traditional channels, but also affected by the electronic channel and traditional channel relationship. Therefore, the dual channel manufacturers back analysis and strategy will be more complicated. In view of these studies. The thesis of the dual channel of manufacturer rebate.
First of all, the customer has cash rebate cost under the assumption that the constructed Stackelberg game model between the two channels of manufacturer and retailer, the price transmission efficiency and to maximize the profits of manufacturers are compared in two aspects of manufacturer rebate strategies. The results show that the manufacturers offering electronic channels, electronic channels by reducing the price of products, can improve the rebate the strategy of price transmission; and in the dual channel manufacturer if the price transfer efficiency to select rebate strategy based on cross elasticity should fully understand the market, choose a sales rebate in high cross elasticity, low cross elasticity rebate customer choice; if manufacturers to maximize their own interests selection strategy based on customer rebate, high exchange rate under the manufacturer will choose sales rebate, low customer exchange rate under customer rebates.
Secondly, through the introduction of risk averse retailer, to further explore the dual channel retailer under risk aversion impacts on the choice of manufacturer rebate. The study found that the dual channel under the background of risk averse retailer manufacturer identification to avoid excessive rebate compensation. In addition, manufacturers in terms of price transfer efficiency of choice or rebates from their own profit maximization based on low risk aversion retailers should choose customer rebates, retailers in high risk aversion should choose a sales rebate, but two case benchmark risk aversion thresholds are different.
Finally, the two part pricing based on the design of double channel coordination contract manufacturers in the rebate and consumer rebate. Research shows that the combination of the two pricing and service compensation contract can achieve manufacturer rebate policies (i.e. rebate and consumer rebate) effective coordination of dual channel supply chain, but under retailer rebate the two part pricing contract was improved.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F713.3

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 熊中楷;李根道;唐彥昌;李薇;;網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境下考慮動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)的渠道協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2007年03期

2 陳樹(shù)楨;熊中楷;李根道;文海鴻;;考慮創(chuàng)新補(bǔ)償?shù)碾p渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2011年02期

3 但斌;徐廣業(yè);張旭梅;;電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的補(bǔ)償策略研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2012年01期

4 禹愛(ài)民;劉麗文;;隨機(jī)需求和聯(lián)合促銷下雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與協(xié)調(diào)[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2012年01期

5 盛昭瀚;徐峰;;地區(qū)差異化背景下制造商雙渠道定價(jià)策略研究[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2010年06期

6 楊躍翔;夏國(guó)平;衛(wèi)昆;;雙渠道兩階段供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)均衡模型[J];計(jì)算機(jī)集成制造系統(tǒng);2006年09期

7 陳祥鋒,朱邊立;Markovian模型在供應(yīng)鏈合同管理中的應(yīng)用[J];科研管理;2002年02期

8 胡東波;翟雯瑤;;雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)策略與協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制研究綜述[J];科技管理研究;2013年02期

9 張輝;;零售商雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策及協(xié)調(diào)性研究[J];科技與管理;2013年04期

10 陳云;王浣塵;沈惠璋;;電子商務(wù)零售商與傳統(tǒng)零售商的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)研究[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐;2006年01期

，

本文編號(hào)：1401322