發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-31 13:22

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 反收購(gòu) 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng) 資產(chǎn)重組　出處：《河北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自2012年以來我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)入明顯的下行通道,不斷降低的資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率與貨幣寬松政策共同造就了資金較多而優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)較少的“資產(chǎn)荒”局面。“資產(chǎn)荒”問題使得金融機(jī)構(gòu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好逐漸增強(qiáng),不斷通過配置高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的資產(chǎn)來增加盈利。另一方面,金融混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)不斷增速,銀行理財(cái)資金繞道進(jìn)入股市,保險(xiǎn)資金也在資本市場(chǎng)頻頻舉牌,混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)使得金融牌照價(jià)值大幅走高,一些保險(xiǎn)企業(yè)甚至成為了控股公司投融資的利器。在這一系列因素的疊加下,催生了以融資難度降低、資金脫實(shí)向虛、優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)吸引力增強(qiáng)為特征的第六次收購(gòu)浪潮。在這次浪潮中,以弱吞強(qiáng)、杠桿收購(gòu)為特征的惡意收購(gòu)事件不斷涌現(xiàn)。尤其是2015年7月開始的萬科股權(quán)之爭(zhēng)事件牽動(dòng)著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)所有人的神經(jīng)。面對(duì)大環(huán)境下惡意收購(gòu)的不斷增多、混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)帶來的金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不斷增加等問題,以萬科股權(quán)之爭(zhēng)事件為切入點(diǎn)進(jìn)行深入的案例分析,將對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司的公司治理及反收購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略設(shè)計(jì)提供借鑒,對(duì)金融業(yè)新形勢(shì)下的協(xié)同監(jiān)管也有積極意義。本文首先對(duì)中西方關(guān)于反收購(gòu)理論的發(fā)展歷程進(jìn)行了回顧,通過綜合整理國(guó)內(nèi)外關(guān)于反收購(gòu)的前沿理論成果,對(duì)案例分析提供理論支持。在具體案例分析的過程中,以時(shí)間進(jìn)程和資金流動(dòng)兩條線索同時(shí)對(duì)案例進(jìn)行梳理,在運(yùn)用理論分析的同時(shí)注重結(jié)合我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)獨(dú)特的法律環(huán)境和制度環(huán)境,通過對(duì)收購(gòu)與反收購(gòu)雙方的動(dòng)機(jī)、策略進(jìn)行分析與點(diǎn)評(píng),設(shè)計(jì)出具有中國(guó)特色、符合中國(guó)國(guó)情的反收購(gòu)方案。最后,由個(gè)案分析上升到對(duì)上市公司治理的啟示以及宏觀監(jiān)管政策制定的建議層面,將個(gè)案中普遍適用的原理進(jìn)行推廣。在萬科股權(quán)之爭(zhēng)的案例中,惡意收購(gòu)方寶能系利用保險(xiǎn)資金、銀行配資、股權(quán)質(zhì)押、收益互換、融資融券等多種手段以杠桿收購(gòu)的方式搶購(gòu)萬科股份成為了萬科第一大股東。寶能系利用了眾多金融工具,資金流動(dòng)較為隱蔽,杠桿比例也較高,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)極大。萬科管理層在事件中,利用資產(chǎn)重組、拉攏股東、增加員工持股等方式反擊寶能系,手段很多,但效果有限,直至監(jiān)管層的介入才基本平息股權(quán)紛爭(zhēng)。這也反映出了我國(guó)上市公司普遍風(fēng)險(xiǎn)意識(shí)不強(qiáng)、忽略中小股東利益、公司治理存在缺陷等問題。在金融機(jī)構(gòu)混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)加速、資產(chǎn)荒與資金脫實(shí)向虛不斷加劇的新形勢(shì)下,我國(guó)上市公司在反收購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略設(shè)計(jì)上應(yīng)該更加注重預(yù)防措施的建立,以預(yù)防為主,攻擊為輔,同時(shí)在公司治理上將股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和股東利益問題解決好,將惡意收購(gòu)扼殺在搖籃之中。金融監(jiān)管部門也應(yīng)加強(qiáng)對(duì)混業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)與金融創(chuàng)新的監(jiān)管,在制度設(shè)計(jì)上為優(yōu)秀的上市公司發(fā)展保駕護(hù)航。
[Abstract]:Since 2012, China's economy has entered an obvious downward channel. The declining rate of return on assets and monetary easing policy together created a "shortage of assets" with more capital and less high-quality assets. The problem of "asset shortage" makes financial institutions' risk appetite gradually increase. On the other hand, the financial mixed operation continues to grow, the bank financial management funds detour into the stock market, insurance funds are also frequently held in the capital market. Mixed operation makes the value of financial license greatly higher, and some insurance companies even become a sharp weapon for holding companies to invest and finance. Under the superposition of this series of factors, the difficulty of financing is reduced, and the funds are devoid of reality. A wave of 6th acquisitions characterized by an increase in the attractiveness of quality companies. In this wave, it is weak and strong. The hostile takeover events characterized by leveraged buyouts continue to emerge, especially the Vanke stock ownership dispute that began on July 2015, which affects the nerves of all people in the capital market of our country. In the face of the increasing hostile takeover under the general environment. More. The financial risk caused by mixed operation is increasing and so on. Taking Vanke's stock right dispute as the starting point, the in-depth case analysis will provide reference for the corporate governance and anti-takeover strategy design of listed companies in China. This paper first reviews the development of anti-takeover theory in China and the West, and summarizes the frontier theoretical achievements of anti-takeover at home and abroad. To provide theoretical support for case analysis. In the process of specific case analysis, the case is combed with two clues: time process and capital flow. In the use of theoretical analysis at the same time pay attention to the unique legal and institutional environment of China's capital market, through the acquisition and anti-takeover of both sides of the motivation, strategy analysis and comments, the design has Chinese characteristics. Finally, from case analysis to the enlightenment to the listed company governance and macro-regulatory policy recommendations. In the case of Vanke equity dispute, the malicious takeover of Fang Baoneng is the use of insurance funds, bank allocation, equity pledge, income swaps. Margin financing and other means of leveraged buy-out to buy Vanke shares became the largest shareholder of Vanke. Baoneng used many financial instruments, the capital flow is more hidden, leverage ratio is also high. Great risk. Vanke management in the incident, the use of asset restructuring, attract shareholders, increase employee ownership and other ways to counter Baoneng system, many means, but the effect is limited. Until the intervention of the regulatory level before the basic settlement of the stock dispute, which also reflects the general risk awareness of listed companies in China is not strong, ignoring the interests of small and medium shareholders. There are some defects in corporate governance. Under the new situation of accelerating the mixed operation of financial institutions, the shortage of assets and the shortage of funds are becoming more and more serious. China's listed companies in the anti-takeover strategy design should pay more attention to the establishment of preventive measures, mainly to prevent, attack as a supplementary, at the same time in corporate governance will be the equity structure and shareholders' interests to solve the problem. The financial supervision department should also strengthen the supervision of mixed operation and financial innovation, and guarantee the development of outstanding listed companies in the system design.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F299.233.4

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