本文關(guān)鍵詞： 董事會(huì)多元化 股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 代理沖突 信息不對(duì)稱　出處：《廣西大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作為金融市場(chǎng)上普遍存在且影響力廣泛的一種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素,在造成投資者巨大財(cái)富損失的同時(shí),也嚴(yán)重?cái)_亂了整個(gè)資本市場(chǎng)的健康運(yùn)行。公司內(nèi)部人利用信息不對(duì)稱,選擇隱瞞負(fù)面消息的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為是造成股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重要原因。可見,降低股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可以從改善公司內(nèi)部治理的角度進(jìn)行。在代理理論框架下,董事會(huì)多元化作為公司治理的一種替代機(jī)制,能夠提高監(jiān)督效率,緩解內(nèi)外部人的信息不對(duì)稱。因此,本文試圖探究上市公司董事會(huì)多元化能否顯著降低其未來股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。本文以2006—2012年我國(guó)A股上市公司為樣本,研究了董事會(huì)多元化對(duì)公司未來股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文還進(jìn)行了相關(guān)影響機(jī)制的實(shí)證分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)上市公司董事會(huì)多元化與其未來股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著負(fù)相關(guān),表明董事會(huì)多元化有利于降低公司未來股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。(2)公司所在地區(qū)的外部法律環(huán)境越好,董事會(huì)多元化與股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系越弱,表明董事會(huì)多元化可以在外部法律環(huán)境較差的地區(qū)充分發(fā)揮保護(hù)投資者的作用。(3)在國(guó)有企業(yè)中,董事會(huì)多元化與股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系更為明顯;而民營(yíng)企業(yè)董事會(huì)多元化與股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)負(fù)相關(guān),但不顯著。(4)與董事會(huì)監(jiān)督相關(guān)的代理沖突是董事會(huì)多元化作用于公司未來股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一個(gè)潛在機(jī)制。本文的研究結(jié)論對(duì)公司改善內(nèi)部治理、降低未來股價(jià)崩盤風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及穩(wěn)定資本市場(chǎng)具有重要現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:As a widespread and influential risk factor in the financial market, the risk of stock price collapse causes huge loss of wealth to investors at the same time. It also seriously disrupts the healthy operation of the whole capital market. The opportunistic behavior of the company insiders who take advantage of information asymmetry and choose to conceal negative information is an important reason for the risk of stock price collapse. Reducing the risk of stock price collapse can be carried out from the perspective of improving corporate internal governance. Under the framework of agency theory, the diversification of the board of directors as an alternative mechanism of corporate governance can improve the efficiency of supervision. To ease the information asymmetry of internal and external people. This paper attempts to explore whether the diversification of the board of directors of listed companies can significantly reduce the risk of future stock price collapse. This paper takes China's A-share listed companies as a sample from 2006 to 2012. This paper studies the influence of board diversification on the risk of future stock price collapse. The empirical analysis shows that the diversification of the board of directors of the listed companies is negatively correlated with the risk of future stock price collapse. It shows that the better the external legal environment of the company is, the weaker the negative correlation between the diversification of the board of directors and the risk of stock price collapse is. It shows that the diversification of the board of directors can give full play to the role of investor protection in the areas with poor external legal environment) in state-owned enterprises, the negative correlation between the diversification of the board of directors and the risk of stock price collapse is more obvious; The diversification of private enterprise board is negatively correlated with the risk of stock price collapse. However, the agency conflict related to board supervision is a potential mechanism for the diversification of board of directors on the risk of future stock price collapse. The conclusion of this paper is to improve the internal governance of the company. Reducing the risk of future share price collapse and stabilizing capital markets are of great practical significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F832.51

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