我國(guó)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)合約的非完備性研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-05-24 12:46
【摘要】：在過去三十年中,我國(guó)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)的發(fā)展經(jīng)歷了多重起伏。但因其在融資和改善管理等方面有著其他經(jīng)營(yíng)方式無(wú)法替代的作用,而逐漸被人們接受。從2013年開始,在中央政府的支持及各級(jí)地方政府的大力推廣下,基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)在我國(guó)呈現(xiàn)出了不可阻擋的發(fā)展勢(shì)頭。我們不能把基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)當(dāng)成解決政府融資難的萬(wàn)能藥,而應(yīng)以更加謹(jǐn)慎的態(tài)度對(duì)待,使其發(fā)揮出應(yīng)有的效果。為確保特許項(xiàng)目的成功運(yùn)作,應(yīng)提前把握項(xiàng)目運(yùn)行過程中的關(guān)鍵問題,如特許合約的非完備性問題�；A(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)的核心是特許合約。由于預(yù)見成本、締約成本和證實(shí)成本等因素,使得特許合約具有非完備性。特許合約的非完備性作為一個(gè)不可避免的問題伴隨著基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)項(xiàng)目運(yùn)行的全過程,給項(xiàng)目的順利運(yùn)行增大了難度。本文以不完全合約理論為基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的特點(diǎn),重點(diǎn)分析了特許合約的性質(zhì)、合約非完備性的表現(xiàn)形式、產(chǎn)生原因及治理路徑。并在最后對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)案例進(jìn)行了分析,力求對(duì)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)合約的非完備性做一個(gè)全面、深入的研究,為實(shí)踐提供理論依據(jù)。本文分為六章,第一章介紹了基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)的研究背景及意義、相關(guān)概念界定、研究?jī)?nèi)容與方法及國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)研究綜述。第二章分為兩部分。第一部分,從特許人與被特許人之間的地位關(guān)系、標(biāo)的物的特殊性及特許項(xiàng)目的目標(biāo)三方面的分析出發(fā),認(rèn)為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許合約更加符合行政合約的特點(diǎn),應(yīng)屬于行政合約而非民事合約的范疇。第二部分,分析了特許合約非完備性的表現(xiàn)形式有如下三類:合約內(nèi)容不完善、第三方驗(yàn)證困難及無(wú)法預(yù)期的事件。第三方驗(yàn)證困難包括不可觀察的信息和可觀察卻不可驗(yàn)證的信息。無(wú)法預(yù)期的事件則包括自然環(huán)境變化、政治制度和法律變化、經(jīng)濟(jì)和科技沖擊等。作為一紙協(xié)議,特許合約根本無(wú)法囊括特許經(jīng)營(yíng)項(xiàng)目的所有活動(dòng)內(nèi)容。第三章從共性和中國(guó)特性兩方面分別闡述了基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)合約非完備性產(chǎn)生的原因。一般原因有信息不對(duì)稱和有限理性、政企地位不對(duì)等、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目的特殊性及合約期限的長(zhǎng)期性等。由于各國(guó)國(guó)情不同,我國(guó)特許經(jīng)營(yíng)合約非完備性產(chǎn)生的原因與一般原因有所不同,有著自己的特點(diǎn)。具體分析我國(guó)的原因有特許經(jīng)營(yíng)模式的發(fā)展不成熟、政府承諾失信、監(jiān)管體制不完善、法律體系不健全等。第四章從三個(gè)方面討論了特許合約非完備性的治理路徑:合理設(shè)計(jì)合約、約束監(jiān)管部門的行為、優(yōu)化法治環(huán)境。第一,合理設(shè)計(jì)合約。本文認(rèn)為設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)合理的合約最主要的是制定合理的激勵(lì)機(jī)制和收益分配原則。第二,約束監(jiān)管部門的行為。合約的簽訂和執(zhí)行都屬于政府的監(jiān)管范圍,沒有政府的誠(chéng)信監(jiān)管,內(nèi)容再完備的合約最終也將歸于不完備。通過建立一個(gè)不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,分析得出監(jiān)管部門和私營(yíng)企業(yè)的行為選擇并非出于偶爾,而是雙方經(jīng)過N期重復(fù)博弈后各自追求利益最大化的結(jié)果。第三,優(yōu)化法治環(huán)境。法治環(huán)境包括監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)及相關(guān)的法律體系。作為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施特許經(jīng)營(yíng)發(fā)展的外部條件,法治環(huán)境是導(dǎo)致特許合約具有非完備性的原因之一,同時(shí)也是特許合約非完備性的有效治理路徑之一。第五章結(jié)合現(xiàn)實(shí)案例進(jìn)行分析和總結(jié),證實(shí)了特許合約若未得到妥善處理,將導(dǎo)致整個(gè)項(xiàng)目的失敗;若能得到妥善處理,則最終會(huì)促進(jìn)多方共贏的實(shí)現(xiàn)。第六章對(duì)全文進(jìn)行了總結(jié),并闡述了有待進(jìn)一步研究的問題。
[Abstract]:Over the past three decades, the development of our country's infrastructure concession has experienced multiple ups and downs. However, it has been accepted as a result of its irreplaceable role in financing and improving management. Starting in 2013, with the support of the central government and the great extension of local governments at all levels, the infrastructure concession operation has shown an unstoppable development momentum in our country. We cannot make the concession operation of the infrastructure as a panacea for solving the financing difficulties of the government, and should be treated with a more cautious attitude so as to play the due effect. In order to ensure the successful operation of the concession project, the key problems in the project operation should be grasped in advance, such as the non-completeness of the concession contract. The core of the infrastructure concession operation is the concession contract. As a result of the foreseeable costs, the costs of contracting and the cost of substantiation, the concession contract has a non-completeness. As an inevitable problem, the non-completeness of the concession contract is accompanied by the whole process of the operation of the infrastructure concession operation project, which increases the difficulty for the smooth operation of the project. Based on the theory of incomplete contract and the characteristics of infrastructure, this paper analyzes the nature of the contract, the form of non-completeness of the contract, the cause and the management path. In the end, the paper analyzes the real case, and tries to provide a comprehensive and in-depth study on the non-completeness of the contract of the infrastructure concession, and provide the theoretical basis for the practice. This paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the research background and significance of the infrastructure concession operation, the definition of the relevant concepts, the content and methods of the research and the review of the relevant literature at home and abroad. The second chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, from the analysis of the status relationship between the franchisee and the franchisee, the particularity of the subject matter and the objective of the franchise project, it is considered that the infrastructure concession contract is more in line with the characteristics of the administrative contract, and it should be the category of the administrative contract rather than the civil contract. The second part analyzes the non-completeness of the concession contract in three categories: the contract content is not perfect, the third-party verification is difficult and the unexpected event can not be expected. Third-party validation difficulties include non-observable information and observable and non-verifiable information. Unpredictable events include natural environment changes, political systems and legal changes, economic and scientific shocks, and the like. As a paper agreement, the concession contract cannot cover all the activities of the franchise. In the third chapter, the reasons of the non-completeness of the infrastructure concession contract are set forth from the aspects of the general character and the Chinese character. The general causes are information asymmetry and limited reason, the non-equivalence of the status of the government and the enterprise, the particularity of the infrastructure project and the long-term nature of the contract term. Due to the different national conditions, the reason of the non-complete nature of the franchise contract in our country is different from the general reason, and has its own characteristics. The analysis of the reason of our country is that the development of the franchise model is not mature, the government promises to lose the letter, the supervision system is not perfect, the legal system is not perfect, etc. The fourth chapter discusses the governing path of the non-completeness of the concession contract from three aspects: the reasonable design of the contract, the restriction of the behavior of the supervision department and the optimization of the rule of law environment. First, a reasonable design contract. In this paper, it is considered that the most important of the design of a reasonable contract is to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism and the principle of income distribution. Second, the behavior of the regulatory authorities is restricted. The signing and execution of the contract are within the scope of the government's supervision, without the integrity supervision of the government, and the complete contract will eventually be incomplete. Through the establishment of an incomplete information dynamic game model, it is concluded that the behavior choice of the regulatory and private enterprises is not for the occasional, but the result of the mutual interest maximization after the two parties through the N-phase repeated game. Third, optimize the rule of law environment. The rule of law environment includes the regulatory body and the related legal system. As an external condition of the development of the concession operation of the infrastructure, the rule of law environment is one of the reasons leading to the non-completeness of the concession contract, and is also one of the effective management paths for the non-completeness of the concession contract. The fifth chapter analyzes and summarizes the practical cases, and proves that if the concession contract is not properly handled, it will lead to the failure of the whole project; if it is properly handled, the multi-party win-win will be promoted. The sixth chapter summarizes the full text, and expounds the problems to be further studied.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F281
本文編號(hào)：2484868
[Abstract]:Over the past three decades, the development of our country's infrastructure concession has experienced multiple ups and downs. However, it has been accepted as a result of its irreplaceable role in financing and improving management. Starting in 2013, with the support of the central government and the great extension of local governments at all levels, the infrastructure concession operation has shown an unstoppable development momentum in our country. We cannot make the concession operation of the infrastructure as a panacea for solving the financing difficulties of the government, and should be treated with a more cautious attitude so as to play the due effect. In order to ensure the successful operation of the concession project, the key problems in the project operation should be grasped in advance, such as the non-completeness of the concession contract. The core of the infrastructure concession operation is the concession contract. As a result of the foreseeable costs, the costs of contracting and the cost of substantiation, the concession contract has a non-completeness. As an inevitable problem, the non-completeness of the concession contract is accompanied by the whole process of the operation of the infrastructure concession operation project, which increases the difficulty for the smooth operation of the project. Based on the theory of incomplete contract and the characteristics of infrastructure, this paper analyzes the nature of the contract, the form of non-completeness of the contract, the cause and the management path. In the end, the paper analyzes the real case, and tries to provide a comprehensive and in-depth study on the non-completeness of the contract of the infrastructure concession, and provide the theoretical basis for the practice. This paper is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the research background and significance of the infrastructure concession operation, the definition of the relevant concepts, the content and methods of the research and the review of the relevant literature at home and abroad. The second chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, from the analysis of the status relationship between the franchisee and the franchisee, the particularity of the subject matter and the objective of the franchise project, it is considered that the infrastructure concession contract is more in line with the characteristics of the administrative contract, and it should be the category of the administrative contract rather than the civil contract. The second part analyzes the non-completeness of the concession contract in three categories: the contract content is not perfect, the third-party verification is difficult and the unexpected event can not be expected. Third-party validation difficulties include non-observable information and observable and non-verifiable information. Unpredictable events include natural environment changes, political systems and legal changes, economic and scientific shocks, and the like. As a paper agreement, the concession contract cannot cover all the activities of the franchise. In the third chapter, the reasons of the non-completeness of the infrastructure concession contract are set forth from the aspects of the general character and the Chinese character. The general causes are information asymmetry and limited reason, the non-equivalence of the status of the government and the enterprise, the particularity of the infrastructure project and the long-term nature of the contract term. Due to the different national conditions, the reason of the non-complete nature of the franchise contract in our country is different from the general reason, and has its own characteristics. The analysis of the reason of our country is that the development of the franchise model is not mature, the government promises to lose the letter, the supervision system is not perfect, the legal system is not perfect, etc. The fourth chapter discusses the governing path of the non-completeness of the concession contract from three aspects: the reasonable design of the contract, the restriction of the behavior of the supervision department and the optimization of the rule of law environment. First, a reasonable design contract. In this paper, it is considered that the most important of the design of a reasonable contract is to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism and the principle of income distribution. Second, the behavior of the regulatory authorities is restricted. The signing and execution of the contract are within the scope of the government's supervision, without the integrity supervision of the government, and the complete contract will eventually be incomplete. Through the establishment of an incomplete information dynamic game model, it is concluded that the behavior choice of the regulatory and private enterprises is not for the occasional, but the result of the mutual interest maximization after the two parties through the N-phase repeated game. Third, optimize the rule of law environment. The rule of law environment includes the regulatory body and the related legal system. As an external condition of the development of the concession operation of the infrastructure, the rule of law environment is one of the reasons leading to the non-completeness of the concession contract, and is also one of the effective management paths for the non-completeness of the concession contract. The fifth chapter analyzes and summarizes the practical cases, and proves that if the concession contract is not properly handled, it will lead to the failure of the whole project; if it is properly handled, the multi-party win-win will be promoted. The sixth chapter summarizes the full text, and expounds the problems to be further studied.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F281
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