【摘要】：隨著十二五規(guī)劃對(duì)建立我國(guó)藍(lán)色經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)的建議的提出,海洋產(chǎn)業(yè)正逐步發(fā)展為我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的支柱產(chǎn)業(yè),作為身處海洋大國(guó)的我們,也要重視起海洋蘊(yùn)含的資源所帶來的巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展空間。但是面臨世界環(huán)境的惡化,全球氣溫變暖,資源枯竭等越來越多的問題,海洋災(zāi)害的發(fā)生頻率也在不斷加快,給人們帶來巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失。所以,海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)的實(shí)施,是人們分散和轉(zhuǎn)移海洋災(zāi)害風(fēng)險(xiǎn)所必須采取的手段和方法。我國(guó)海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)模式主要是由投保人投保,政府主導(dǎo),商業(yè)性保險(xiǎn)公司協(xié)作的模式,但是由于理性經(jīng)濟(jì)人的存在,各參與保險(xiǎn)的主體之間因?yàn)樽陨砝孀畲蠡尿?qū)使,導(dǎo)致海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式存在不穩(wěn)定性。因此,對(duì)我國(guó)海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式進(jìn)行研究,將再保險(xiǎn)公司引入海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式,可以有效的提高海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式的合作效率,也可以達(dá)到長(zhǎng)期穩(wěn)定合作。本文綜合各海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與主體的行為特征,以聯(lián)盟博弈為分析工具,利用核和核心進(jìn)行海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式下各主體之間的利益分配,并將海洋災(zāi)害再保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)引入到保險(xiǎn)模式中,運(yùn)用Shapley值進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,并以此建立長(zhǎng)期、穩(wěn)定參與的海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)模式,促進(jìn)我國(guó)海洋經(jīng)濟(jì)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。文章首先海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)所具有的雙重準(zhǔn)公共物品和正外部性屬性進(jìn)行了描述,提出我國(guó)海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)存在的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題,導(dǎo)致了保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)失靈,運(yùn)行效率低下,也對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行了歸納,比較了國(guó)內(nèi)外災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)的現(xiàn)狀和海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)的基本模式,分析了災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)的特征。然后,通過對(duì)海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)模式中保險(xiǎn)參與主體的行為特征進(jìn)行識(shí)別,確定了文章的主要分析方法。以聯(lián)盟博弈為基礎(chǔ)對(duì)投保人、政府和保險(xiǎn)公司參與的海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)模式進(jìn)行了利益分配核和核心的求解,發(fā)現(xiàn)在這種模式下,海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)基于理性人的假定,存在多個(gè)利益最優(yōu)分配或是不存在均衡的利益分配,進(jìn)而將海洋災(zāi)害再保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)納入海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式中,利用聯(lián)盟博弈Shapley值進(jìn)行分析,結(jié)果表明,將海洋災(zāi)害再保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)納入海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式中,更有利于提高保險(xiǎn)的合作收益和穩(wěn)定性。最后,本文針對(duì)實(shí)證分析結(jié)果,對(duì)我國(guó)現(xiàn)行的海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式提出建議,使各主體進(jìn)行有效參與,提高海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式的可行性和持續(xù)性。論文主要從以下幾個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了創(chuàng)新性探討：從投保人、政府和商業(yè)性保險(xiǎn)公司角度出發(fā),對(duì)其參與海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)模式的行為特征進(jìn)行了識(shí)別,并以此確定了海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式的分析方法。引入了海洋災(zāi)害再保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu),同經(jīng)典的海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)模式相比較,將再保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)引入到海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)中,可以保證海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)模式的運(yùn)行更有效,更有利于海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與主體的利益分配。對(duì)海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式進(jìn)行分析中,運(yùn)用了以聯(lián)盟博弈為基礎(chǔ)的核心、和Shapley值分析方法,使針對(duì)我國(guó)海洋災(zāi)害保險(xiǎn)參與模式的建議提出具有依據(jù)性。
[Abstract]:With the proposal of the 12th Five-Year Plan for the establishment of China's Blue Economic Zone, the marine industry is gradually developing into a pillar industry of China's national economic development. As a large marine country, we should also pay attention to the huge economic development space brought by the marine resources. But facing the deterioration of the world environment, the global temperature changes. More and more problems such as warmth, exhaustion of resources and so on, the frequency of marine disasters is also accelerating, bringing huge economic losses to people. Therefore, the implementation of marine disaster insurance is the means and methods that people must adopt to disperse and transfer the risk of marine disasters. Leading, commercial insurance company cooperation model, but due to the existence of rational economic people, the main participants in the insurance because of their own interests to maximize the driving, resulting in marine disaster insurance participation model instability. Insurance participation model can effectively improve the cooperation efficiency of marine disaster insurance participation model, and can also achieve long-term stable cooperation. This paper synthesizes the behavior characteristics of the marine disaster insurance participants, and uses the coalition game as the analysis tool, uses the core and core to distribute the interests among the participants in marine disaster insurance participation model. Then, the marine disaster reinsurance institution is introduced into the insurance mode, and the Shapley value is used to make an empirical analysis, and a long-term and stable participation marine disaster insurance mode is established to promote the sustainable development of marine economy in China. Adverse selection and moral hazard existing in the marine disaster insurance market of our country are put forward, which leads to the failure of the insurance market and the inefficiency of its operation. The domestic and foreign disaster insurance markets are also summarized. The current situation of the domestic and foreign disaster insurance markets and the basic modes of marine disaster insurance are compared, and the characteristics of the disaster insurance market are analyzed. Then, by identifying the behavior characteristics of the insurance participants in the marine disaster insurance model, the main analysis method is determined. Based on the coalition game theory, the core of interest distribution and the core of the marine disaster insurance model involving the policy holder, the government and the insurance company are solved. It is found that under this model, marine disaster insurance is the key to marine disaster insurance. Based on the hypothesis of rational person, there are multiple interests optimal allocation or no balanced interests allocation. Then marine disaster reinsurance institutions are included in the marine disaster insurance participation model. The Shapley value of alliance game is used to analyze the risk. The results show that marine disaster reinsurance institutions are included in the marine disaster insurance participation model, and more importantly, marine disaster reinsurance institutions are included in the marine disaster insurance participation model. Finally, based on the results of the empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the current participation model of marine disaster insurance in China, so as to make the main bodies participate effectively and improve the feasibility and sustainability of the participation model of marine disaster insurance. From the angle of policy-holder, government and commercial insurance company, this paper identifies the behavior characteristics of marine disaster insurance mode, and determines the analysis method of marine disaster insurance participation mode. In marine disaster insurance, the operation of marine disaster insurance model can be guaranteed to be more effective and more conducive to the distribution of the interests of marine disaster insurance participants. The proposal put forward is based on nature.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F842.64;F224

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