本文選題：混合寡頭 + 橫向合并　； 參考：《山東大學》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：橫向合并是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)成長與擴張的主要途徑之一,由于其潛在的單邊效應與協(xié)調效應對消費者福利與社會總福利的影響,一直以來是學術界與世界各國反壟斷當局關注的重點。自上世紀九十年代起,在不斷深化改革、產業(yè)結構調整、國有企業(yè)改革等諸多因素的影響下,我國興起了一陣以橫向兼并為主的并購浪潮。進入二十一世紀尤其是自十八屆三中全會以來,中央政府提出了“要積極發(fā)展混合所有制經(jīng)濟,使得所有制資本取長補短、相互促進、共同發(fā)展”。由此發(fā)展混合所有制經(jīng)濟成為深化經(jīng)濟體制改革的重要內容。可以預見,混合所有制經(jīng)濟未來將成為我國國民經(jīng)濟運行的重要組成部分,而涉及混合所有制企業(yè)的橫向合并也將成為橫向合并研究新的方向之一。正是在這樣的大背景下,本文以古諾寡占競爭模型與斯塔克伯格寡占競爭模型為基本理論模型,借鑒國內外混合寡頭研究的相關成果,并在橫向合并中引入了協(xié)同效應這一概念,構建了基于混合寡頭博弈的橫向合并模型,從動態(tài)博弈和靜態(tài)博弈的兩個角度考察了混合寡頭橫向合并的的福利效應,并在此基礎上探討針對此類合并的反壟斷控制。在研究思路上,本文遵循“理論框架—模擬分析—政策建議”的框架展開研究。全文共分為四章,第一章為導論,介紹了本文的選題背景和研究意義、相關的國內外文獻綜述、本文研究思路和框架以及本文的創(chuàng)新點與不足,其中文獻綜述部分重點介紹了基于博弈模型的橫向合并的相關研究與混合寡頭的相關研究,為本文后續(xù)的理論模型構建打下一定的理論基礎。第二章考察了基于靜態(tài)博弈模型的混合寡頭橫向合并,構建了基于古諾寡占競爭模型的混合寡頭橫向合并的模型,在求解均衡解的基礎上研究了市場競爭結構及企業(yè)的所有制結構對企業(yè)間橫向合并福利結果的影響。發(fā)現(xiàn)即使存在能夠降低企業(yè)生產成本的協(xié)同效應,合并仍將導致消費者福利的下降,合并引起的社會總福利改變則隨混合所有制企業(yè)中私有產權比重的上升呈現(xiàn)倒U型特征。第三章則考察了基于動態(tài)博弈模型的混合寡頭橫向合并,構建了基于斯塔克伯格寡占競爭模型的混合寡頭橫向合并的模型,在求均衡解的基礎上同樣研究了市場結構及企業(yè)產權結構對企業(yè)間橫向合并福利結果的影響,研究結果仍發(fā)現(xiàn)合并會導致消費者福利的下降。在合并引起的社會總福利變化的考察上,“強強聯(lián)合”的合并情形下存在一定的社會總福利改進空間,“弱弱聯(lián)合”的改進空間則比較小。第四章在第二、三章研究的基礎上探討了反壟斷橫向合并的反壟斷控制標準,在政策建議中提出反壟斷機構應充分考慮產權因素對合并福利結果的影響,并在此基礎上形成適用于不同產權類型企業(yè)間橫向合并相對統(tǒng)一的反壟斷控制標準。
[Abstract]:Horizontal merger is one of the main ways for the growth and expansion of modern enterprises. Because of its potential unilateral effect and coordination effect on consumer welfare and total social welfare, it has always been the focus of attention of the academic circles and the antitrust authorities all over the world. Since 1990s, under the influence of many factors, such as deepening the reform, adjusting the industrial structure and reforming the state-owned enterprises, there has been a wave of mergers and acquisitions in China. In the 21 century, especially since the third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the central government put forward that "it is necessary to actively develop the mixed ownership economy so as to make the ownership capital complement each other, promote each other, and develop together". From this development mixed ownership economy becomes the important content that deepens economic system reform. It can be predicted that the future of mixed ownership economy will become an important part of our national economy, and the horizontal merger involving mixed ownership enterprises will become one of the new directions of horizontal merger research. Under this background, this paper takes Cournot oligopoly competition model and Stackberg oligopoly competition model as the basic theoretical model, and draws lessons from the related achievements of mixed oligopoly research at home and abroad. The concept of synergetic effect is introduced into the horizontal merger, and the horizontal merger model based on mixed oligopoly game is constructed, and the welfare effect of crosswise merger of mixed oligarchs is investigated from two aspects of dynamic game and static game. On this basis, this paper discusses the anti-monopoly control for this kind of merger. The research follows the framework of "theoretical framework-simulation analysis-policy recommendations". This paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. It introduces the background and significance of this paper, the related literature review at home and abroad, the research ideas and framework of this paper, as well as the innovative points and shortcomings of this paper. In the part of literature review, the related research of horizontal merger based on game model and the research of mixed oligopoly are introduced, which lays a theoretical foundation for the subsequent theoretical model construction in this paper. In the second chapter, the horizontal merger of mixed oligarchs based on static game model is investigated, and the model of crosswise merger of mixed oligarchs based on Cournot oligopoly competition model is constructed. On the basis of solving the equilibrium solution, the influence of market competition structure and enterprise ownership structure on the results of horizontal merger welfare among enterprises is studied. It is found that even if there is a synergistic effect that can reduce the production cost of the enterprise, the merger will still lead to the decline of consumer welfare, and the change of the total social welfare caused by the merger will show an inverted U-shaped feature with the increase of the proportion of private property rights in the mixed ownership enterprises. In the third chapter, the horizontal merger of mixed oligarchs based on dynamic game model is investigated, and the model of horizontal merger of mixed oligarchs based on Stackberg oligopoly competition model is constructed. On the basis of the equilibrium solution, the paper also studies the influence of market structure and enterprise property right structure on the benefits of horizontal merger between enterprises. The results show that the merger will lead to the decline of consumer welfare. In the study of the changes of the total social welfare caused by the merger, there is a certain space for the improvement of the total social welfare in the case of the merger of "strong and strong", but the improvement of "weak and weak" is relatively small. The fourth chapter discusses the antitrust control standard of antitrust horizontal merger on the basis of the second and third chapters, and puts forward that the antitrust agency should fully consider the influence of the property right factor on the result of the merger welfare in the policy suggestion. On this basis, the anti-monopoly control standard which is applicable to the horizontal merger of different property right enterprises is formed.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F276.8;F224.32

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