發(fā)布時間：2018-06-13 23:02

  本文選題：供應鏈金融 + 供應商�。� 參考：《華南理工大學》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：在供應鏈中，許多上游企業(yè)（供應商）往往是比較弱勢的中小企業(yè)，為了能與作為下游企業(yè)（核心企業(yè)）達成長期的交易，供應商經(jīng)常選擇賒銷方式銷售其商品給核心企業(yè)，這使得供應商資金大量被核心企業(yè)所占用，現(xiàn)金流成為供應商發(fā)展的瓶頸。同時加之，這些供應商成立時間短，企業(yè)積累不足，往往缺乏銀行授信能夠接受的抵押物，即硬信息，無法從銀行獲得貸款，這樣不僅影響供應鏈的穩(wěn)定性和競爭力，而且影響供應商無法進一步擴大生產(chǎn)。因此，供應商在供應鏈中仍將處于弱勢地位，只能采用賒銷交易其商品……。也就是說，這些企業(yè)陷入了賒銷—無現(xiàn)金—無抵押物—無法貸款—發(fā)展不起來—賒銷的惡性循環(huán)中。由此，本文研究如何在既定的信息約束和資產(chǎn)約束條件下，通過金融創(chuàng)新，建立既能保證銀行收益又能幫助中小企業(yè)進一步發(fā)展的金融創(chuàng)新模式，以解決中小企業(yè)融資難的問題，保證供應鏈的有效運行。 目前，管理學界對供應鏈金融的相關(guān)研究已經(jīng)開展得相當豐富，但本文還希望在以下五個方面有所拓展和創(chuàng)新： 第一，如何構(gòu)建博弈模型，分析供應鏈背景下核心企業(yè)參與擔保后，銀行對供應商的授信行為？ 第二，核心企業(yè)能力、供應商能力和供應鏈治理水平等供應鏈的特征與銀行授信決策之間存在關(guān)聯(lián)？如何實證這個關(guān)聯(lián)？ 第三，在核心企業(yè)能力、供應商能力和供應鏈治理水平與銀行對供應商授信水平的關(guān)系之間，，是否存在著某個不能被直接觀察到的，但可以依據(jù)銀行授信行為的先決條件（如信息透明度）及最終行為結(jié)果（包括授信額度、時間和信任度）本身能推斷出來的中介因素，即中介變量，這一中介變量是否就是銀行對供應商的認知？ 第四，核心企業(yè)介入供應商融資的程度，是否是一個調(diào)節(jié)變量？它如何調(diào)節(jié)核心企業(yè)能力、供應商能力和供應鏈治理水平與銀行對供應商認知之間關(guān)系的強弱？如何調(diào)節(jié)銀行對供應商認知與銀行授信水平之間關(guān)系的強弱？如何調(diào)節(jié)核心企業(yè)能力、供應商能力和供應鏈治理水平與銀行授信水平之間關(guān)系的強弱？ 第五，銀行授信模式，包括銀行授信過程中對信息需求從軟到硬的各種模式，即銀行授信從難到易的各種模式，是否是一個調(diào)節(jié)變量？它如何調(diào)節(jié)銀行對供應商認知與銀行授信水平之間關(guān)系的強弱？ 為解決上述問題，本論文構(gòu)建了核心企業(yè)參與擔保下銀行授信的博弈模型，并以此博弈模型為基礎(chǔ)，搭建了供應鏈特征與銀行授信決策之間關(guān)聯(lián)的理論模型框架，通過問卷調(diào)查獲得基礎(chǔ)數(shù)據(jù)，采用多元回歸分層線性模型、Bootstrap方法、Aiken和Wes（t1991）調(diào)節(jié)效應圖以及路徑分析等方法對該理論框架進行實證驗證。并得到如下實證研究結(jié)論： （1）核心企業(yè)能力通過銀行對供應商認知間接對銀行授信額度、授信時間和授信信任度產(chǎn)生顯著的正向影響；供應鏈治理水平通過銀行對供應商認知間接對銀行授信額度、授信時間和授信信任度產(chǎn)生顯著的正向影響；供應商能力通過銀行對供應商認知間接對銀行授信額度、授信時間和授信信任度產(chǎn)生顯著的正向影響。 （2）核心企業(yè)參與供應商融資模式通過銀行對供應商的認知間接對銀行授信額度、授信時間和授信信任度產(chǎn)生顯著的正向影響； （3）核心企業(yè)參與供應商融資模式強化了核心企業(yè)能力對銀行關(guān)于供應商認知的正向影響，進而強化了核心企業(yè)能力對銀行授信額度、授信時間和授信信任度的間接效應。 （4）銀行對供應商的認知對銀行授信額度、授信時間和授信信任度有顯著的正向影響。 （5）銀行授信的模式通過銀行對供應商的認知間接對銀行授信額度、授信時間和授信信任度產(chǎn)生顯著的正向影響。 上述結(jié)論對中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展、金融體制創(chuàng)新和供應鏈管理理論具有重要的理論和實踐意義。
[Abstract]:In the supply chain , many upstream enterprises ( suppliers ) are often relatively weak small and medium - sized enterprises . In order to deal with long - term transactions with downstream enterprises ( core enterprises ) , suppliers often choose to sell their commodities to the core enterprises in a credit way , which makes the cash flow of the suppliers to be taken as the bottleneck of the development of suppliers . At the same time , the suppliers can not obtain loans from the banks , which not only affect the stability and competitiveness of the supply chain , but also influence the supplier ' s inability to further expand production . Therefore , suppliers will still be in a weak position in the supply chain , and they can only be traded on credit . In other words , these enterprises fall into the vicious circle of credit - non - cash - no collateral - unable to lend - development is not up - credit sales . Therefore , this paper studies how to establish a financial innovation model which can guarantee the further development of SMEs through financial innovation under the established information constraints and asset constraints , so as to solve the problem of financing difficulty of small and medium - sized enterprises , and ensure the effective operation of supply chain .

At present , the research on supply chain finance has been quite rich in the management circle , but this paper also hopes to expand and innovate in the following five aspects :

First , how to build a game model , analyze the credit behavior of the bank to the supplier after the core enterprise participates in the guarantee under the background of the supply chain ?

Second , there is an association between the characteristics of supply chain such as core enterprise ability , supplier capacity and supply chain management level and bank credit decision - making . How to demonstrate this correlation ?

Thirdly , whether there is a relationship between the ability of the core enterprise , the ability of the supplier and the relationship between the supply chain management level and the bank ' s credit level to the supplier , there is an intermediary factor which cannot be directly observed , but can be inferred from the precondition of the bank credit behavior ( such as information transparency ) and the result of the final behavior ( including credit line , time and trust ) , that is , the intermediate variable , whether the intermediary variable is the bank ' s perception of the supplier ?

Fourth , whether the core enterprise is involved in the supplier financing is a regulation variable ? How does it adjust the core enterprise ability , the supplier ' s ability and the supply chain management level and the bank ' s weak relationship with the supplier ' s cognition ? How to adjust the bank ' s weak relationship between the supplier ' s cognition and the bank credit level ? How to adjust the relationship between the core enterprise ability , the supplier capacity and the supply chain management level and the bank credit level ?

The fifth , the bank credit model , including the bank credit process to the information demand from the soft to the hard various modes , that is , the bank credit from the difficult to easy various modes , is it a regulation variable ? How does it adjust the bank ' s strength to the relationship between the supplier ' s perception and the bank credit level ?

In order to solve the above - mentioned problems , this paper constructs a game model of bank credit under the participation of core enterprises , based on the game model , sets up the theoretical model frame associated with the supply chain characteristics and the bank credit decision - making , obtains basic data through questionnaire , uses multiple regression layered linear model , bootstrap method , Aiken and Wes ( t1991 ) adjustment effect map and path analysis , etc . , and obtains the following empirical research conclusion :

( 1 ) The ability of the core enterprise to indirectly influence the credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree of the bank through the bank to the supplier ' s cognition ;
The supply chain management level has a significant positive impact on the bank ' s credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .
Supplier ' s ability to indirectly influence the bank ' s credit line , credit hours and credit trust through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .

( 2 ) The core enterprise ' s participation in the supplier ' s financing model has a significant positive impact on the bank ' s credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .


( 3 ) The core enterprise ' s participation in the supplier financing model strengthened the positive influence of the core enterprise ability on the supplier ' s cognition , and then strengthened the indirect effect of the core enterprise ability on the bank credit line , the credit time and the trust degree .

( 4 ) The bank ' s perception of suppliers has significant positive impact on bank credit line , credit time and credit trust .

( 5 ) The bank credit model has a significant positive impact on the bank ' s credit line , the credit hours and the trust degree through the bank ' s perception of the supplier .

These conclusions have important theoretical and practical significance for the development of small and medium - sized enterprises , financial system innovation and supply chain management theory .
【學位授予單位】：華南理工大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.2;F275;F276.3

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 何廣文;李莉莉;;農(nóng)村小額信貸市場空間分析[J];銀行家;2005年11期

2 胡躍飛;;供應鏈金融與中小商業(yè)銀行的競爭策略[J];銀行家;2009年02期

3 胡躍飛;黃少卿;;供應鏈金融:背景、創(chuàng)新與概念界定[J];財經(jīng)問題研究;2009年08期

4 肖蘭華;楊剛強;;不對稱信息下農(nóng)村中小企業(yè)信貸融資配給問題及對策研究[J];財貿(mào)經(jīng)濟;2008年07期

5 馬九杰,郭宇輝,朱勇;縣域中小企業(yè)貸款違約行為與信用風險實證分析[J];管理世界;2004年05期

6 許文;遲國泰;楊萬武;;基于違約損失控制的商業(yè)銀行多期資產(chǎn)組合動態(tài)優(yōu)化模型[J];管理學報;2010年04期

7 王俊;金融體系與中小企業(yè)金融抑制[J];求索;2005年03期

8 林漢川,周暉;試論我國中小企業(yè)的行業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)與行業(yè)定位[J];改革;2003年04期

9 賀力平;克服金融機構(gòu)與中小企業(yè)之間的不對稱信息障礙[J];改革;1999年02期

10 樊綱;發(fā)展民間金融與金融體制改革[J];上海金融;2000年09期

相關(guān)博士學位論文 前2條

1 白馬鵬;供應鏈金融服務體系設計與優(yōu)化[D];天津大學;2008年

2 張意如;異質(zhì)性視角下團體貸款研究[D];南京理工大學;2009年

本文編號：2015850