本文關(guān)鍵詞：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理跟投激勵(lì)契約機(jī)制研究　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資作為鏈接資本、技術(shù)、人才的權(quán)益投資方式，對(duì)于提高全要素生產(chǎn)效率，實(shí)現(xiàn)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型具有重要意義。然而風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資是一項(xiàng)具有嚴(yán)重逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的過(guò)程，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理對(duì)于項(xiàng)目的成敗乃至行業(yè)的發(fā)展起著舉足輕重的作用。因此，如何有效的激勵(lì)和約束風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理,應(yīng)當(dāng)成為我國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資發(fā)展的重要命題之一。 在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資內(nèi)部激勵(lì)契約機(jī)制上，以往的理論研究往往將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理統(tǒng)稱為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家，基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家的第一重委托代理關(guān)系、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家和創(chuàng)業(yè)者的第二重委托代理關(guān)系展開激勵(lì)約束問(wèn)題的研究。但實(shí)際上風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理有別于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資企業(yè)與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理的第三重委托代理關(guān)系仍有待研究。有鑒于此，筆者基于這第三重委托代理關(guān)系，有機(jī)結(jié)合了監(jiān)督機(jī)制和激勵(lì)機(jī)制搭建跟投激勵(lì)契約模型定量分析內(nèi)部契約機(jī)制，，探討如何解決代理問(wèn)題。 本研究首先梳理了研究背景及意義、國(guó)內(nèi)外研究文獻(xiàn)綜述，以及論文的研究?jī)?nèi)容、研究目的和研究方法。然后，從委托代理關(guān)系出發(fā)，闡述了相關(guān)概念，梳理分析了項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理跟投激勵(lì)機(jī)制的優(yōu)勢(shì)和作用，并基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資特性闡述了三重委托代理運(yùn)作機(jī)制。其次，搭建了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理跟投激勵(lì)契約模型進(jìn)行定量分析，得出了如下結(jié)論：1、信息對(duì)稱情況下，項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理最優(yōu)努力水平的選擇和期望項(xiàng)目收益與其工作能力正相關(guān)，而與績(jī)效薪酬系數(shù)、跟投比例無(wú)關(guān)；2、信息不對(duì)稱情況下，項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理的工作能力、績(jī)效薪酬系數(shù)、跟投比例均與其愿意付出的項(xiàng)目額外努力水平和期望項(xiàng)目收益呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系；3、信息不對(duì)稱情況下，項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理的工作能力越強(qiáng)、項(xiàng)目收益的不確定性越小、努力成本系數(shù)越小、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避系數(shù)ɡ越小，其愿意承擔(dān)更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；4、信息不對(duì)稱情況下，項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避時(shí)，引入可觀測(cè)變量有助于激勵(lì)項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理更加努力工作并承擔(dān)更大項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，進(jìn)而提高期望項(xiàng)目收益，降低總代理成本；5、信息不對(duì)稱情況，在不同條件下，跟投比例滿足不同區(qū)間時(shí)，采用跟投激勵(lì)機(jī)制有助于提高委托代理雙方的項(xiàng)目?jī)羰找嫫谕担?、跟投比例和績(jī)效薪酬系數(shù)與委托代理雙方的項(xiàng)目?jī)羰找嫫谕翟诓煌瑮l件下呈現(xiàn)不同的關(guān)系。最后，總結(jié)歸納研究結(jié)論和實(shí)踐借鑒意義，提出了研究的局限性和未來(lái)展望。
[Abstract]:Venture capital as a link of capital, technology, talent equity investments, to improve total factor productivity, realize the industrial structure transformation has important significance. However, risk investment is a kind of serious adverse selection and moral hazard of venture investment project manager plays an important role in the development of the success of the project and it industry. And how effective incentive and restraint of venture investment project manager should become one of the important proposition of the development of venture capital in China.
The internal incentive contract mechanism in risk investment, the previous theoretical studies tend to be manager of venture capitalists and venture investment project called venture capitalists, the first principal-agent relationship between venture investors and venture capitalists based on venture capitalists and entrepreneurs of the dual principal-agent relationship of the incentive problem but in fact. Project manager is different from venture capitalists, venture investment enterprises and venture investment project managers third principal-agent relations remains to be studied. In view of this, the author based on the third principal-agent relationship, the organic combination of the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism to build internal investment contract mechanism analysis quantitative incentive contract model, discusses how to solve the agency problem.
This paper summarize the research background and significance, literature review, and research papers, research purpose and research methods. Then, from the point of view of the principal-agent relationship, explains the related concepts, this paper analyzed the project manager with the investment incentive mechanism advantages and effects and risk investment based on the characteristics described three the principal-agent mechanism. Secondly, build the project manager with the investment incentive contract model for quantitative analysis, the conclusions are the following: 1, under symmetric information, the optimal effort level of the project manager selection and the expectations of the project revenue and work ability are positively correlated, and the coefficient of performance pay, has nothing to do with the proportion of investment; 2, under the circumstance of asymmetric information, the project manager's ability, the coefficient of performance pay, with the investment proportion and are willing to pay the extra effort level and expectations of project project revenue Cheng Zhengxiang Close relationship; 3, under the circumstance of asymmetric information, the project manager's ability is stronger, income uncertainty is small, the effort cost coefficient is small, and the smaller the risk aversion coefficient, which are willing to take more risks; 4, under the circumstance of asymmetric information, the project manager for risk aversion, introduction the observed variables helps motivate project manager to work harder and take more risks, and improve the expectations of the project revenue, reduce total agency costs; 5, the situation of information asymmetry, under different conditions, with the proportion of investment to meet the different interval when used with the investment incentive mechanism is helpful to improve both the principal and the agent of the project of net income the expected value of 6, with the proportion of investment projects; and the coefficient of performance pay and both the principal and the agent's net income expectations show different relationship in different conditions. Finally, summarize the research conclusion and practical significance, put forward The limitations and future prospects of the study.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.48

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