【摘要】：隨著企業(yè)間競爭的加劇、產(chǎn)品技術(shù)創(chuàng)新以及全球化的加速發(fā)展,在企業(yè)內(nèi)部資源有限的情況下,企業(yè)可以選擇將次要的或非核心的業(yè)務(wù)外包給市場上的其他組織,最大限度地整合利用外部的專業(yè)資源,充分發(fā)揮和提高企業(yè)的核心競爭能力。但是企業(yè)將內(nèi)部業(yè)務(wù)外包出去之后,企業(yè)將不能很好地了解和觀測業(yè)務(wù)外包服務(wù)企業(yè)的某些行為,在這種情況下,業(yè)務(wù)外包服務(wù)企業(yè)可能會利用這種信息的不對稱采取有利于自身利益而不利于外包企業(yè)利益的一些行為,給外包企業(yè)造成損失。所以業(yè)務(wù)外包企業(yè)如何激勵外包服務(wù)企業(yè)保證雙方合作的成功,達(dá)到雙贏具有重要的研究意義。 目前對業(yè)務(wù)外包企業(yè)激勵外包服務(wù)企業(yè)的研究,多是針對某一具體的外包業(yè)務(wù),例如人力資源管理外包、研發(fā)外包、物流外包等建立博弈模型,分析是否需要激勵；或是對影響激勵的因素的研究。缺乏對具體激勵手段,如激勵獎金的研究,基于此本文引入激勵獎金,構(gòu)建業(yè)務(wù)外包企業(yè)與外包服務(wù)企業(yè)之間的長期合作的重復(fù)博弈模型與進(jìn)化博弈模型,計算得出激勵獎金的取值范圍,并分析其影響因素。 本論文的主要工作和成果如下： 基于顯性激勵因素激勵獎金與隱性激勵因素聲譽(yù),建立完全理性條件下的重復(fù)博弈模型,分析激勵獎金的影響因素及其取值范圍。研究結(jié)果表明,聲譽(yù)對業(yè)務(wù)外包服務(wù)企業(yè)存在激勵作用,且激勵獎金的影響因素包括業(yè)務(wù)外包服務(wù)企業(yè)努力時獲得高產(chǎn)出的概率,不努力時獲得高產(chǎn)出的概率,貼現(xiàn)系數(shù)以及其在聲譽(yù)的掩蓋下選擇不努力而沒有被外包企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)的概率四個因素,同時計算得處了業(yè)務(wù)外包企業(yè)為激勵外包服務(wù)企業(yè)所提供的激勵獎金的具體范圍。最后運用分析結(jié)果對Y企業(yè)的培訓(xùn)業(yè)務(wù)外包進(jìn)行實例分析,對影響Y企業(yè)的培訓(xùn)外包的因素進(jìn)行了探討并計算出不同因素影響下的激勵獎金的極值。 基于激勵獎金建立有限理性的條件下的進(jìn)化博弈模型,分析業(yè)務(wù)外包企業(yè)與外包服務(wù)企業(yè)在長期博弈過程中的兩者的策略選擇及穩(wěn)定性。研究結(jié)果表明,有限理性條件下,業(yè)務(wù)外包企業(yè)與外包服務(wù)企業(yè)在長期多次合作過程中學(xué)習(xí)和調(diào)整策略的結(jié)果是業(yè)務(wù)外包企業(yè)會采取較低的激勵獎金,而外包服務(wù)企業(yè)會選擇不努力個作。并運用分析結(jié)果,對M公司的物流業(yè)務(wù)外包進(jìn)行實例研究,分析了有限理性下的M公司與物流業(yè)務(wù)外包服務(wù)企業(yè)A公司在長期合作中學(xué)習(xí)和調(diào)整策略的結(jié)果。
[Abstract]:With the intensification of competition between enterprises, the rapid development of product technology innovation and globalization, enterprises can choose to outsource secondary or non-core business to other organizations in the market with limited internal resources. Maximize the integration and utilization of external professional resources, give full play to and improve the core competitiveness of enterprises. However, after the enterprise outsourced the internal business, the enterprise would not be able to understand and observe the behavior of the outsourcing service enterprise very well. In this case, the enterprise will not be able to understand and observe the behavior of the outsourcing service enterprise. Outsourcing service enterprises may take advantage of this information asymmetry to take some actions that are beneficial to their own interests but not beneficial to the interests of outsourcing enterprises, which will cause losses to outsourcing enterprises. Therefore, how to encourage outsourcing service enterprises to ensure the success of cooperation and achieve win-win is of great significance. At present, the research on incentive outsourcing service enterprises of outsourcing enterprises mainly aims at a specific outsourcing business, such as human resource management outsourcing, R & D outsourcing, logistics outsourcing and so on, to establish a game model to analyze whether incentive is needed or not. Or the study of the factors that affect the motivation. Based on the lack of research on specific incentive measures such as incentive bonus, this paper introduces incentive bonus to construct the repetitive game model and evolutionary game model of long-term cooperation between outsourcing enterprises and outsourcing service enterprises. The value range of incentive bonus is calculated and its influencing factors are analyzed. The main work and achievements of this paper are as follows: based on the reputations of explicit incentive factors and implicit motivational factors, a repeated game model is established under the condition of complete rationality, and the influencing factors of incentive bonuses and their range of values are analyzed. The results show that reputation has an incentive effect on outsourcing service enterprises, and the influencing factors of incentive bonus include the probability of obtaining high output when the outsourcing service enterprise strives, and the probability of obtaining high output when no effort is made. Under the cover of reputation, the discount coefficient and the probability that they choose not to work hard but are not found by outsourcing enterprises are four factors. At the same time, the specific scope of incentive bonus offered by outsourcing enterprises to encourage outsourcing service enterprises is calculated. Finally, the analysis results are used to analyze the training outsourcing of Y enterprise, and the factors that affect the training outsourcing of Y enterprise are discussed, and the extreme value of incentive bonus under the influence of different factors is calculated. Based on incentive bonus, the evolutionary game model under the condition of limited rationality is established, and the strategic choice and stability of outsourcing enterprises and outsourcing service enterprises in the long-term game process are analyzed. The results show that under the condition of limited rationality, outsourcing enterprises and outsourcing service enterprises learn and adjust strategies in the process of long-term cooperation, and the result is that outsourcing enterprises will adopt lower incentive bonuses. And outsourcing service enterprises will choose not to work hard. Based on the analysis results, this paper makes a case study on logistics outsourcing of M Company, and analyzes the results of learning and adjusting strategies in the long-term cooperation between M Company and Logistics Outsourcing Service Enterprise A under the limited rationality.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F719;F224.32

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