【摘要】：隨著現(xiàn)階段我國“服務(wù)型政府”的逐步推進(jìn)，公共服務(wù)外包作為一種新的公共服務(wù)市場化模式越來越受到各級政府的青睞，并日益成為眾多公共服務(wù)市場化模式中最重要的一種。然而，我國公共服務(wù)外包蓬勃發(fā)展的同時(shí)，諸多問題也日益凸顯。由于公共服務(wù)外包市場體制不完善，在公共服務(wù)外包的交易過程中因接包方企業(yè)占有私有信息使得公共服務(wù)外包面臨著嚴(yán)峻的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題，最終導(dǎo)致公共服務(wù)外包的失敗。公共服務(wù)外包中道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的存在將導(dǎo)致公共服務(wù)外包面臨諸多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。通過建立科學(xué)合理的公共服務(wù)外包合作機(jī)制可以降低公共服務(wù)外包的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，促使接包方企業(yè)提升公共服務(wù)外包產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量，并促成政府和接包方企業(yè)雙方的長期合作關(guān)系。 針對公共服務(wù)外包信息不對稱的特性，本文剖析了其產(chǎn)生的原因以及可能引發(fā)的后果，并通過構(gòu)建公共服務(wù)外包質(zhì)量控制模型和合作關(guān)系穩(wěn)定性激勵(lì)模型來規(guī)避信息不對稱產(chǎn)生的種種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題。本文將公眾評價(jià)引入到質(zhì)量控制模型中，，通過在公共服務(wù)外包正式契約中設(shè)定懲罰因子，構(gòu)建了能促使接包方企業(yè)提升外包產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的激勵(lì)模型，有效激勵(lì)政府投入更多的監(jiān)督成本，接包方企業(yè)投入更多的生產(chǎn)成本，進(jìn)而達(dá)到提升公共服務(wù)外包產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的目的，對政府如何在正式契約的設(shè)計(jì)中實(shí)現(xiàn)對接包方企業(yè)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的控制具有指導(dǎo)意義；此外，本文在構(gòu)建合作關(guān)系穩(wěn)定性激勵(lì)模型時(shí)，將貼現(xiàn)因子作為考察交易雙方長期合作意愿的有效信號，得出了影響交易雙方長期合作意愿的相關(guān)影響因素，為政府和接包方企業(yè)建立長期穩(wěn)定的合作關(guān)系提供了科學(xué)方法。本文立足于發(fā)包方政府的視角，基于對公共服務(wù)外包特性的考察構(gòu)建兩個(gè)模型，為公共服務(wù)外包交易雙方構(gòu)建了科學(xué)的合作機(jī)制，為公共服務(wù)外包的治理提供了科學(xué)依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:With the gradual promotion of "service-oriented government" in our country at present, public service outsourcing, as a new market-oriented mode of public service, is more and more favored by governments at all levels. And increasingly become many public services market-oriented model of the most important. However, with the vigorous development of public service outsourcing in China, many problems are becoming more and more prominent. Because the market system of public service outsourcing is not perfect, the public service outsourcing is faced with serious moral hazard problem because the contractor owns private information in the transaction process of public service outsourcing, and finally leads to the failure of public service outsourcing. The existence of moral hazard in public service outsourcing will lead to many risks in public service outsourcing. Through the establishment of scientific and reasonable public service outsourcing cooperation mechanism, the moral hazard of public service outsourcing can be reduced, the contractor enterprises can improve the quality of public service outsourcing products, and the long-term cooperative relationship between the government and the contractor enterprises can be promoted. In view of the asymmetric characteristics of public service outsourcing information, this paper analyzes its causes and possible consequences. By constructing the quality control model of public service outsourcing and the incentive model of cooperative relationship stability, we can avoid all kinds of risk problems caused by information asymmetry. In this paper, the public evaluation is introduced into the quality control model. By setting the penalty factor in the formal contract of public service outsourcing, the incentive model which can promote the contractor enterprise to improve the quality of outsourced products is constructed. In order to improve the quality of public service outsourcing products, the government is effectively encouraged to invest more supervision costs, and the contractor enterprises invest more production costs to achieve the goal of improving the quality of public service outsourcing products. It is of guiding significance for the government to realize the product quality control in the design of formal contract. In addition, when constructing the stable incentive model of cooperative relationship, the discounted factor is used as an effective signal to investigate the long-term cooperative intention of the two parties, and the relevant factors affecting the long-term cooperative intention of the two parties are obtained. It provides a scientific method for the government and contractor enterprises to establish a long-term and stable cooperative relationship. Based on the perspective of the government of the issuer, this paper constructs two models based on the investigation of the characteristics of public service outsourcing, which constructs a scientific cooperative mechanism for the two sides of the public service outsourcing transaction, and provides a scientific basis for the governance of the public service outsourcing.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F719

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本文編號：2435534