知識產權權屬分配視角下企業(yè)研發(fā)外包的激勵機制設計
發(fā)布時間：2019-01-03 13:15
【摘要】：以外包商為參考點,針對研發(fā)外包中承包商同時存在信息泄露和隱藏努力程度的兩類道德風險問題,運用委托代理理論,建立了考慮知識產權權屬分配模式的研發(fā)外包激勵機制。研究表明,在允許知識產權許可的情況下,將知識產權所有權授權給承包商,不但會增加外包商的期望收益,還可以有效激勵承包商最優(yōu)努力水平,同時避免其信息泄露問題。
[Abstract]:Outside the contractor as the reference point, aiming at the two kinds of moral hazard problem that the contractor simultaneously exists the information leakage and the concealment effort degree in the R & D outsourcing, the principal-agent theory is used. The incentive mechanism of R & D outsourcing based on intellectual property right distribution model is established. The research shows that under the condition of allowing intellectual property to license, authorizing the ownership of intellectual property to the contractor will not only increase the expected income of the outsourcer, but also effectively stimulate the contractor's optimal level of effort, while avoiding the problem of information disclosure.
【作者單位】： 福州大學八方物流學院;
【基金】：福建省社科重點項目(2010A013)
【分類號】：F273.1;F719
[Abstract]:Outside the contractor as the reference point, aiming at the two kinds of moral hazard problem that the contractor simultaneously exists the information leakage and the concealment effort degree in the R & D outsourcing, the principal-agent theory is used. The incentive mechanism of R & D outsourcing based on intellectual property right distribution model is established. The research shows that under the condition of allowing intellectual property to license, authorizing the ownership of intellectual property to the contractor will not only increase the expected income of the outsourcer, but also effectively stimulate the contractor's optimal level of effort, while avoiding the problem of information disclosure.
【作者單位】： 福州大學八方物流學院;
【基金】：福建省社科重點項目(2010A013)
【分類號】：F273.1;F719
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前8條
1 朱新財;銀路;肖凡平;;基于委托代理機制的研發(fā)外包邊界[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2009年03期
2 吳勇;陳通;;信息泄漏情形下企業(yè)研發(fā)決策行為[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2011年04期
3 費方h，
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