【摘要】：食品安全問題是基本的民生問題,關(guān)乎千家萬戶。當今互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場發(fā)展迅速,互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣食品安全問題層出不窮,完善我國互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全治理機制已成為一個刻不容緩的課題。在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全問題的治理過程中,涉及到了中央政府、地方政府、第三方外賣平臺、平臺入駐商戶這幾個行為主體的經(jīng)濟活動。在已有的研究文獻中,對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全治理過程的研究尚不多見,且主要采用描述性分析。本文針對我國互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣行業(yè)的具體國情建立了相應(yīng)的模型,分階段的分析了影響互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全的相關(guān)因素。本文意在通過構(gòu)建互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場治理模型來分析影響互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全的具體因素。從文章總體結(jié)構(gòu)上來說,首先提出食品安全的相關(guān)概念及理論基礎(chǔ),并簡要介紹了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場的發(fā)展過程及運行機制。其次從政府、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣平臺及平臺入駐商戶之間的經(jīng)濟活動出發(fā),綜合運用博弈論、委托代理等相關(guān)理論,先后構(gòu)建中央政府與地方政府的委托代理模型、地方政府與互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣平臺的博弈模型以及準入和生產(chǎn)階段互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣平臺與平臺入駐商戶的博弈模型,分析治理過程中各參與者如何選擇自身的最優(yōu)行動,指出有關(guān)變量(例如處罰力度等)對互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全治理結(jié)果的影響。最后,在模型分析結(jié)果的基礎(chǔ)上,提出通過第三方平臺自身約束、政府主導(dǎo)、以及社會公眾基礎(chǔ)力量等共同作用來提升互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全治理效果,提出了加強對地方政府的監(jiān)督,完善責(zé)任追究機制、加強信用體系建設(shè)、健全互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場準入制度,提升行政監(jiān)管技術(shù)水平等政策建議。本文的創(chuàng)新點主要是運用信息不對稱理論以及博弈論分別構(gòu)建了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全治理過程的理論模型,并以經(jīng)濟學(xué)視角系統(tǒng)的分析了互聯(lián)網(wǎng)外賣市場食品安全問題產(chǎn)生的原因。本文的不足之處在于模型需要進一步完善。
[Abstract]:Food safety is a basic livelihood issue, related to thousands of households. Nowadays, the Internet take-out market is developing rapidly, and the problem of food safety of Internet take-out has emerged one after another. It has become an urgent task to improve the food safety management mechanism in China's Internet takeout market. In the process of managing food safety in Internet takeout market, it involves the economic activities of the central government, local government, third party take-out platform and platform. In the existing research literature, the research on food safety governance process in Internet takeaway market is rare, and mainly adopts descriptive analysis. According to the specific situation of Internet takeout industry in China, this paper establishes the corresponding model, and analyzes the related factors that affect the food safety of Internet takeout market in stages. This paper aims to analyze the specific factors affecting food safety in Internet takeout market by constructing a model of Internet takeout market governance. In terms of the overall structure of the article, the related concepts and theoretical basis of food safety are put forward, and the development process and operation mechanism of Internet take-out market are briefly introduced. Secondly, starting from the economic activities between the government, the Internet take-out platform and the merchants, and using the game theory, the principal-agent theory and other relevant theories, the principal-agent model of the central government and the local government has been constructed successively. The game model between the local government and the Internet take-out platform and the game model between the Internet take-out platform and the resident merchants in the access and production stages are analyzed to analyze how the participants choose their own optimal actions in the process of governance. The influence of relevant variables (such as punishment intensity) on food safety management results in internet takeout market is pointed out. Finally, on the basis of the results of the model analysis, this paper proposes to improve the effect of food safety governance in the take-out market of the Internet through the joint action of the third-party platform itself, the government leading, and the basic forces of the public. Some policy suggestions are put forward such as strengthening the supervision of local government, perfecting the mechanism of investigating responsibility, strengthening the construction of credit system, perfecting the system of Internet take-out market access, improving the technical level of administrative supervision and so on. The innovation of this paper is mainly to use information asymmetry theory and game theory to construct the theoretical model of food safety governance process in Internet take-out market. The reason of food safety problem in internet take-out market is analyzed systematically from the angle of economics. The deficiency of this paper is that the model needs to be further improved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.6;F719.3;F203

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