本文選題：服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn) + 契約模型��； 參考：《大連理工大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),以知識(shí)交互為主要特征的現(xiàn)代服務(wù)業(yè)無(wú)論是在美國(guó)等發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,還是在中國(guó)、印度等發(fā)展中國(guó)家,都得到了快速增長(zhǎng)。但服務(wù)業(yè)的高效率并不容易實(shí)現(xiàn)�？蛻�(hù)企業(yè)不僅限于購(gòu)買(mǎi)和消費(fèi)服務(wù),而且還是服務(wù)提供商的業(yè)務(wù)伙伴。服務(wù)系統(tǒng)是一個(gè)價(jià)值共同創(chuàng)造和過(guò)程共同生產(chǎn)的系統(tǒng)�？蛻�(hù)合作是服務(wù)設(shè)計(jì)中一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的考慮因素,合作關(guān)系對(duì)服務(wù)質(zhì)量和服務(wù)績(jī)效具有很大的影響。因此,研究服務(wù)提供商與客戶(hù)企業(yè)的合作生產(chǎn)契約問(wèn)題具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文以單服務(wù)提供商和單客戶(hù)企業(yè)為代表,以博弈論為主要分析工具,運(yùn)用信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的方法,重點(diǎn)探討在不同類(lèi)型的服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)環(huán)境中,在雙方相對(duì)重要性、雙方的相對(duì)知識(shí)粘性、雙方合作程度等因素的影響下的服務(wù)契約選擇問(wèn)題。通過(guò)建立不同服務(wù)環(huán)境下的合作生產(chǎn)契約模型,為客戶(hù)參與服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)的契約決策提供依據(jù)。論文的主要研究?jī)?nèi)容如下： (1)服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)的本質(zhì)與機(jī)理。 通過(guò)國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)綜述：從概念上界定了客戶(hù)參與服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)的涵義；闡述了服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)過(guò)程基于知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移的本質(zhì)特征,分析了在知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移過(guò)程中知識(shí)粘性的存在及影響；回顧了相關(guān)契約理論,討論了服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)契約的研究現(xiàn)狀。從而,提出了本文的研究問(wèn)題、確立了本文的研究對(duì)象、選定了本文的研究視角和研究方法,并為本文模型的建立奠定了相應(yīng)的概念及理論基礎(chǔ)。 (2)服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系的分類(lèi)及特征。 在回顧了企業(yè)合作關(guān)系內(nèi)涵的基礎(chǔ)之上,基于服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)的知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移特征,提出了根據(jù)參與方的合作程度與參與方在合作關(guān)系中的控制地位兩個(gè)維度進(jìn)行服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系分類(lèi)的方式,包括：客戶(hù)主導(dǎo)的咨詢(xún)式服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系、提供商主導(dǎo)的銷(xiāo)售式服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系、和雙方協(xié)商的聯(lián)盟式服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系。并從合作程度、知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移、組織控制等方面分別分析了三類(lèi)基本服務(wù)關(guān)系的不同特征表現(xiàn),為本文規(guī)范模型的建立提供參數(shù)設(shè)定的依據(jù)。 (3)服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)Nash非合作博弈控制權(quán)分配模型。 服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)的不完全契約治理需要首先確定剩余控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。在考慮單方理性的情況下,首先給定合作生產(chǎn)程度,根據(jù)服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)過(guò)程基于知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移的本質(zhì)特征,引入知識(shí)粘性概念,構(gòu)建了Nash非合作博弈控制權(quán)分配模型,得出了非合作博弈情況下不考慮合作程度的影響時(shí),參與方的相對(duì)重要性、參與方的相對(duì)知識(shí)粘性共同影響剩余控制權(quán)分配的結(jié)論。然后,通過(guò)改進(jìn)Xue-Field的服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)Nash非合作動(dòng)態(tài)博弈控制權(quán)分配模型,考察了合作程度變化對(duì)控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。結(jié)論表明,合作程度增加會(huì)使由參與方相對(duì)重要性、參與方相對(duì)知識(shí)粘性決定的最優(yōu)控制權(quán)分配的條件得到放松,合作程度對(duì)合作關(guān)系具有正影響。因此,在非合作博弈情況下,參與方的相對(duì)重要性、參與方的相對(duì)知識(shí)粘性、雙方的合作程度共同影響剩余控制權(quán)的分配。 (4)服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)Nash合作博弈控制權(quán)分配模型。 在考慮團(tuán)隊(duì)理性的情況下,首先給定合作生產(chǎn)程度,根據(jù)服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)過(guò)程的知識(shí)轉(zhuǎn)移特征,引入知識(shí)粘性的概念,構(gòu)建了Nash合作博弈控制權(quán)分配模型,得出了合作博弈情況下不考慮合作程度的影響時(shí),參與方的相對(duì)重要性、參與方的相對(duì)知識(shí)粘性影響剩余控制權(quán)分配的結(jié)論。然后,在模型中改變合作程度的大小,以考察其對(duì)控制權(quán)分配的影響。結(jié)論表明,足夠大的合作生產(chǎn)程度會(huì)使參與方相對(duì)重要性和相對(duì)知識(shí)粘性決定的控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)移。因此,在合作博弈情況下,參與方的相對(duì)重要性、參與方的相對(duì)知識(shí)粘性、雙方合作程度共同影響剩余控制權(quán)的分配。 (5)不同服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系下的契約支付模型。 在總結(jié)了不同服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系控制權(quán)分配特征的基礎(chǔ)之上,建立了相應(yīng)的委托——代理模型,研究了不同服務(wù)環(huán)境下客戶(hù)企業(yè)對(duì)提供商的最優(yōu)契約支付問(wèn)題。結(jié)論表明,在客戶(hù)主導(dǎo)的咨詢(xún)式服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系中,客戶(hù)對(duì)提供商的最優(yōu)支付為基于提供商努力成本補(bǔ)償?shù)牡图?lì)強(qiáng)度契約；在提供商主導(dǎo)的銷(xiāo)售式服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系中,客戶(hù)對(duì)提供商的最優(yōu)支付為基于提供商努力結(jié)果進(jìn)行支付的高激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度契約；在雙方協(xié)商的聯(lián)盟式服務(wù)合作生產(chǎn)關(guān)系中,基于提供商和客戶(hù)將聯(lián)合擁有剩余控制權(quán)的分析,建立了雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型,論證了客戶(hù)對(duì)提供商的最優(yōu)支付為基于雙方績(jī)效的收益共享、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)的激勵(lì)型契約。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the modern service industry, which is mainly characterized by knowledge interaction, has been growing rapidly in both developed countries such as the United States, or in China, India and other developing countries. However, the efficiency of service industry is not easy to be realized. The system is a system of common production of value co creation and process. Customer cooperation is a key consideration in service design. Cooperation relationship has a great influence on the quality of service and service performance. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the cooperative production contract between service providers and customer enterprises.
This paper, taking the single service provider and single customer enterprise as the representative, uses the game theory as the main analysis tool, uses the methods of information economics and industrial economics to discuss the services under the influence of the relative importance of both sides, the relative knowledge stickiness of both sides and the degree of cooperation between the two parties in the different types of service cooperative production environment. Contract selection problem. Through the establishment of a cooperative production contract model under different service environment, it provides the basis for the customer to participate in the contract decision of the service cooperation production. The main contents of this paper are as follows:
(1) the essence and mechanism of service cooperative production.
Through the literature review at home and abroad, the meaning of customer participation in the cooperative production is defined from the conceptual boundary, and the essential characteristics of the cooperative production process based on knowledge transfer are expounded, the existence and influence of knowledge stickiness in the process of knowledge transfer are analyzed, and the related contract theory is reviewed, and the research on the cooperative production contract is discussed. In this way, we put forward the research problem of this paper, established the research object of this article, selected the research perspective and research method of this article, and laid the corresponding concept and theoretical foundation for the establishment of this model.
(2) the classification and characteristics of service cooperative production relations.
On the basis of reviewing the connotation of enterprise cooperation relationship, based on the knowledge transfer characteristics of service cooperative production, this paper puts forward two ways to classify service cooperative production relations according to the degree of cooperation of the participants and the control status of the participants in the cooperative relationship, including the cooperative production relationship of customer LED consulting service. The supplier led sales service cooperative production relationship and the Alliance Service cooperative production relationship negotiated with both sides, and analyzed the different characteristics of the three basic service relations from the aspects of cooperation degree, knowledge transfer and organization control, and provided the basis for setting up parameters for the establishment of this standard model.
(3) the cooperative game allocation model of Nash in cooperative cooperative production.
The incomplete contract governance of service cooperative production must first determine the residual control structure. Under the case of unilateral rationality, first given the degree of cooperative production, according to the essential characteristics of knowledge transfer based on the cooperative production process of service, the concept of knowledge stickiness is introduced, and the Nash non cooperative game control right allocation model is constructed. In the case of cooperative game, the relative importance of the participants and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participants are not considered when the degree of cooperation is affected, and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participant influences the allocation of residual control. Then, the control right structure is investigated by improving the Xue-Field's service cooperation to produce Nash non cooperative dynamic game control allocation model. The conclusion shows that the increasing cooperation degree will make the participants relative importance, the optimal control allocation of the participants' relative knowledge stickiness is relaxed and the degree of cooperation has a positive influence on the cooperative relationship. Therefore, in the case of non cooperative game, the relative importance of the participants and the relative knowledge stickiness of the participants are both sides. The degree of cooperation affects the allocation of residual control rights.
(4) the cooperative game allocation model for cooperative Nash production.
Considering team rationality, first given the degree of cooperative production, according to the knowledge transfer characteristics of the cooperative production process, and introducing the concept of knowledge stickiness, the Nash cooperative game control allocation model is constructed, and the relative importance of the participants and the participants in the cooperative game are obtained without considering the influence of cooperation. The conclusion is that the extent of the degree of cooperation is changed in the model in order to examine the influence on the allocation of control rights in the model. The conclusion shows that the large enough cooperative production degree will transfer the control structure of the relative importance and relative knowledge stickiness of the participants. Therefore, the cooperative game situation is in the case of cooperative game. The relative importance of participants, the relative knowledge stickiness of participants, and the degree of cooperation between two parties affect the allocation of residual control rights together.
(5) contract payment model under the cooperative production relationship of different services.
On the basis of summarizing the distribution characteristics of the control rights of different service cooperative production relations, a corresponding principal-agent model is established, and the problem of the optimal contract payment for the supplier under the different service environment is studied. The conclusion shows that the customer is optimal to the provider in the customer led consultative service cooperative production relationship. Payment is a low incentive intensity contract based on the provider's effort cost compensation; in the supplier led sales service cooperative production relationship, the customer's optimal payment to the provider is a high incentive strength contract based on the result of the provider's effort; in the alliance based cooperative production relationship negotiated by both parties, the provider is based on the provider With the analysis of the remaining control rights, a bilateral moral hazard model is established, which demonstrates that the customer's optimal payment to the provider is an incentive contract based on the benefit sharing of both parties' performance and the risk sharing.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F719

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