博弈視角下的浙江中小企業(yè)銀行融資問題分析
發(fā)布時間：2018-11-22 09:57
【摘要】：改革開放三十多年來,我國中小企業(yè)有了長足發(fā)展,己成為推動經(jīng)濟增長的主力軍。浙江的發(fā)展實踐證明,中小企業(yè)在增加就業(yè)、推進(jìn)結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型、促進(jìn)城鎮(zhèn)化以及增加農(nóng)民收入等方面具有大型企業(yè)無可比擬的優(yōu)勢。然而近年以來,受經(jīng)濟危機及會融體制等諸多因素影響,浙江中小企業(yè)的經(jīng)營和生存狀況受到極大沖擊,因資會鏈斷裂而發(fā)生的一系列悲劇性事件愈演愈烈。由于實體經(jīng)濟放緩、房地產(chǎn)市場降溫,且正規(guī)銀行貸款持續(xù)收緊,一些企業(yè)無法履行債務(wù),導(dǎo)致愈演愈烈的企業(yè)融資困境與問題。 中小企業(yè)的融資過程從根本上來說是非對稱信息條件下商業(yè)銀行與中小企業(yè)雙方的博弈過程。信息不對稱使中小企業(yè)融資遭遇銀行信貸配給,因此研究銀行與中小企業(yè)的融資關(guān)系具有重要現(xiàn)實意義。本文從信息不對稱的角度出發(fā),基于博弈視角分析中小企業(yè)與銀行之間的博弈,然后基于博弈結(jié)果提出相關(guān)解決措施,以謀求資源配置的帕累托最優(yōu)。 首先,本文以中小企業(yè)融資難為出發(fā)點,在明確中小企業(yè)界定的基礎(chǔ)上,分析了浙江省中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,并結(jié)合其實際特點,全面系統(tǒng)地分析了中小企業(yè)融資中存在的問題,深入探討了中小企業(yè)融資難的原因。 其次,本文對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)的信貸融資理論作了簡要的介紹,并按照信息是否完全分別建立博弈模型。通過對中小企業(yè)和銀行的融資博弈分析,指出造成中小企業(yè)融資困難的根本原因是抵押、擔(dān)保等社會懲罰約束機制不完善以及信息的非對稱性。 再次,通過對浙江LJ集團GK銀行的融資案例分析,將真實的企業(yè)財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)代入前文建立的博弈分析,得出的分析結(jié)果驗證了本文博弈模型的適用性。 最后,本文通過理論和博弈分析,結(jié)合當(dāng)前浙江省的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展趨勢,分別從提高中小企業(yè)素質(zhì)、完善融資體系和加大政府支持力度三個方面嘗試提出了緩解中小企業(yè)融資困境的途徑和方法。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up more than 30 years ago, the small and medium-sized enterprises of our country have made great progress and become the main force to promote economic growth. Zhejiang's development practice has proved that small and medium-sized enterprises have unparalleled advantages in increasing employment, promoting structural transformation, promoting urbanization and increasing farmers' income. However, in recent years, under the influence of economic crisis and financial system, the operation and survival of small and medium-sized enterprises in Zhejiang have been greatly impacted, and a series of tragic events have occurred because of the chain breakage of the investment committee. As the real economy slows, the real estate market cools, and formal bank loans continue to tighten, some companies are unable to meet their debts, leading to growing corporate financing difficulties and problems. The financing process of SMEs is fundamentally the game process between commercial banks and SMEs under the condition of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information makes SME financing encounter bank credit rationing, so it is of great practical significance to study the financing relationship between banks and SMEs. From the angle of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the game between small and medium-sized enterprises and banks from the perspective of game theory, and then puts forward some relevant solutions based on the result of game, in order to seek the Pareto optimal allocation of resources. First of all, based on the definition of SMEs, this paper analyzes the current situation of SMEs in Zhejiang Province, and combines the characteristics of SMEs. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, and probes into the reasons for the difficulties in financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondly, this paper gives a brief introduction to the domestic and foreign credit financing theories, and establishes the game model according to whether the information is complete or not. By analyzing the financing game between small and medium-sized enterprises and banks, it is pointed out that the fundamental causes of SMEs' financing difficulties are the imperfection of social punishment and restraint mechanism, such as mortgage, guarantee and information asymmetry. Thirdly, through the financing case analysis of GK Bank of Zhejiang LJ Group, the true enterprise financial data is substituted into the game analysis established earlier, and the result of the analysis proves the applicability of the game model in this paper. Finally, through the theory and game analysis, combining the current economic development trend of Zhejiang Province, respectively, from improving the quality of small and medium-sized enterprises, Improving the financing system and increasing the government support try to improve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F224.32;F276.3
本文編號：2348947
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up more than 30 years ago, the small and medium-sized enterprises of our country have made great progress and become the main force to promote economic growth. Zhejiang's development practice has proved that small and medium-sized enterprises have unparalleled advantages in increasing employment, promoting structural transformation, promoting urbanization and increasing farmers' income. However, in recent years, under the influence of economic crisis and financial system, the operation and survival of small and medium-sized enterprises in Zhejiang have been greatly impacted, and a series of tragic events have occurred because of the chain breakage of the investment committee. As the real economy slows, the real estate market cools, and formal bank loans continue to tighten, some companies are unable to meet their debts, leading to growing corporate financing difficulties and problems. The financing process of SMEs is fundamentally the game process between commercial banks and SMEs under the condition of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information makes SME financing encounter bank credit rationing, so it is of great practical significance to study the financing relationship between banks and SMEs. From the angle of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the game between small and medium-sized enterprises and banks from the perspective of game theory, and then puts forward some relevant solutions based on the result of game, in order to seek the Pareto optimal allocation of resources. First of all, based on the definition of SMEs, this paper analyzes the current situation of SMEs in Zhejiang Province, and combines the characteristics of SMEs. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, and probes into the reasons for the difficulties in financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondly, this paper gives a brief introduction to the domestic and foreign credit financing theories, and establishes the game model according to whether the information is complete or not. By analyzing the financing game between small and medium-sized enterprises and banks, it is pointed out that the fundamental causes of SMEs' financing difficulties are the imperfection of social punishment and restraint mechanism, such as mortgage, guarantee and information asymmetry. Thirdly, through the financing case analysis of GK Bank of Zhejiang LJ Group, the true enterprise financial data is substituted into the game analysis established earlier, and the result of the analysis proves the applicability of the game model in this paper. Finally, through the theory and game analysis, combining the current economic development trend of Zhejiang Province, respectively, from improving the quality of small and medium-sized enterprises, Improving the financing system and increasing the government support try to improve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F224.32;F276.3
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