內(nèi)部控制信息披露與真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理關(guān)聯(lián)性研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-10-09 18:32
【摘要】：高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)部控制信息披露有助于抑制公司內(nèi)部人操縱財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告信息、披露虛假財(cái)務(wù)信息,從而進(jìn)行盈余管理的行為。目前,由于內(nèi)部控制信息披露制度的不斷完善,單純依靠傳統(tǒng)會(huì)計(jì)造假方式或操控應(yīng)計(jì)制利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行盈余管理的方式已經(jīng)得到一定限制,而不少上市公司高管為了滿足其特定的盈余管理需求,愈發(fā)傾向于采用更為隱蔽的方式,即真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理來(lái)操控利潤(rùn)。但目前國(guó)內(nèi)外針對(duì)內(nèi)部控制信息披露是否能抑制真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理的這一新問(wèn)題卻研究較少。 本文將對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)內(nèi)部控制信息披露與真實(shí)活動(dòng)的盈余管理的研究成果進(jìn)行總結(jié)和歸納,以我國(guó)A股上市房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)為樣本,對(duì)其2010-2012年度相關(guān)財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)整理、回歸分析和相關(guān)性研究；并將民營(yíng)企業(yè)和國(guó)有企業(yè)進(jìn)行分樣本研究,比較民營(yíng)與國(guó)有上市公司之間內(nèi)部控制信息披露對(duì)盈余管理監(jiān)督效果的差異,這也是對(duì)內(nèi)部控制信息披露與真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理關(guān)系這一研究問(wèn)題成果的豐富和補(bǔ)充。本文發(fā)現(xiàn),目前我國(guó)上市房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的重視程度逐年增加,對(duì)于內(nèi)部控制自我評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告的披露制度已相對(duì)完善,但內(nèi)部控制鑒證報(bào)告披露情況仍然不佳。內(nèi)部控制自我評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告的披露與真實(shí)活動(dòng)的盈余管理程度顯著負(fù)相關(guān),能夠有效的抑制盈余管理情況的發(fā)生；但內(nèi)部控制鑒證報(bào)告與上市房企真實(shí)盈余管理水平呈正相關(guān),出現(xiàn)這種情況,本文認(rèn)為是由于樣本公司披露內(nèi)部控制鑒證報(bào)告的數(shù)量較少,外部注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師提供的鑒證報(bào)告并非真實(shí)有效,因而無(wú)法發(fā)揮抑制盈余管理的作用。此外,本文在進(jìn)行國(guó)有和民營(yíng)上市房企分樣本研究時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn),無(wú)論是國(guó)有還是民營(yíng)上市房企,其內(nèi)部控制自我評(píng)價(jià)報(bào)告和鑒證報(bào)告對(duì)盈余管理的影響都與全樣本相同,對(duì)內(nèi)部控制鑒證報(bào)告都不夠重視,這點(diǎn)在公司的所有制形式方面并沒(méi)有影響。但國(guó)有上市房企的真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理均值遠(yuǎn)高于私有上市房企,這是由于國(guó)有企業(yè)代管者沒(méi)有剩余索取權(quán),使其缺乏監(jiān)管動(dòng)機(jī)去監(jiān)督管理層,容易產(chǎn)生內(nèi)部人控制的問(wèn)題,管理層就更容易做出有利于自身利益而損害股東利益的決策,繼而導(dǎo)致了上市公司真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理程度的增加。最后,根據(jù)實(shí)證分析結(jié)果和針對(duì)我國(guó)國(guó)情,提出相應(yīng)完善資本市場(chǎng)上市公司內(nèi)部控制信息披露的政策建議和相關(guān)措施。
[Abstract]:The high quality disclosure of internal control information is helpful to restrain the company insiders from manipulating financial report information and disclosing false financial information so as to carry on the behavior of earnings management. At present, due to the continuous improvement of the internal control information disclosure system, the way of earnings management based solely on the traditional accounting fraud or the manipulation of accrual profits has been limited to a certain extent. In order to meet the demand of earnings management, many executives of listed companies are more inclined to adopt a more covert way, that is, real earnings management to control profits. However, there is little research at home and abroad on whether disclosure of internal control information can restrain the earnings management of real activities. This paper will summarize and summarize the research results of internal control information disclosure and earnings management of real activities at home and abroad, take A share listed real estate enterprises as samples, and make statistical analysis on the relevant financial data of China A-share listed real estate enterprises in 2010-2012. Regression analysis and correlation study, and the private enterprises and state-owned enterprises are divided into samples to compare the difference of the effect of internal control information disclosure on earnings management supervision between private and state-owned listed companies. It also enriches and complements the research on the relationship between internal control information disclosure and real earnings management. This paper finds that the degree of attention to the internal control of listed real estate enterprises is increasing year by year, and the disclosure system of internal control self-evaluation report has been relatively perfect, but the disclosure of internal control authentication report is still poor. The disclosure of internal control self-evaluation report has a significant negative correlation with the degree of earnings management of real activities, which can effectively restrain the occurrence of earnings management, but the internal control identification report has a positive correlation with the real earnings management level of listed housing enterprises. In this case, this paper thinks that because the sample companies disclose the number of internal control authentication reports is relatively small, the external certified public accountant provided the authentication report is not true and effective, so it can not play the role of restraining earnings management. In addition, in the study of state-owned and private listed housing enterprises, it is found that both state-owned and private listed housing enterprises have the same impact on earnings management as the internal control self-evaluation report and authentication report. The lack of attention to internal control forensics does not affect the form of ownership of the company. However, the average value of real activity surplus management of state-owned listed housing enterprises is much higher than that of private listed housing enterprises. This is because the escrow of state-owned enterprises does not have the residual claim right, which makes them lack the incentive to supervise the management, so it is easy to have the problem of insider control. It is easier for managers to make decisions that are beneficial to their own interests and harm the interests of shareholders, which leads to an increase in the degree of earnings management in real activities of listed companies. Finally, according to the results of empirical analysis and the situation of our country, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions and relevant measures to improve the disclosure of internal control information of listed companies in the capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275
本文編號(hào)：2260346
[Abstract]:The high quality disclosure of internal control information is helpful to restrain the company insiders from manipulating financial report information and disclosing false financial information so as to carry on the behavior of earnings management. At present, due to the continuous improvement of the internal control information disclosure system, the way of earnings management based solely on the traditional accounting fraud or the manipulation of accrual profits has been limited to a certain extent. In order to meet the demand of earnings management, many executives of listed companies are more inclined to adopt a more covert way, that is, real earnings management to control profits. However, there is little research at home and abroad on whether disclosure of internal control information can restrain the earnings management of real activities. This paper will summarize and summarize the research results of internal control information disclosure and earnings management of real activities at home and abroad, take A share listed real estate enterprises as samples, and make statistical analysis on the relevant financial data of China A-share listed real estate enterprises in 2010-2012. Regression analysis and correlation study, and the private enterprises and state-owned enterprises are divided into samples to compare the difference of the effect of internal control information disclosure on earnings management supervision between private and state-owned listed companies. It also enriches and complements the research on the relationship between internal control information disclosure and real earnings management. This paper finds that the degree of attention to the internal control of listed real estate enterprises is increasing year by year, and the disclosure system of internal control self-evaluation report has been relatively perfect, but the disclosure of internal control authentication report is still poor. The disclosure of internal control self-evaluation report has a significant negative correlation with the degree of earnings management of real activities, which can effectively restrain the occurrence of earnings management, but the internal control identification report has a positive correlation with the real earnings management level of listed housing enterprises. In this case, this paper thinks that because the sample companies disclose the number of internal control authentication reports is relatively small, the external certified public accountant provided the authentication report is not true and effective, so it can not play the role of restraining earnings management. In addition, in the study of state-owned and private listed housing enterprises, it is found that both state-owned and private listed housing enterprises have the same impact on earnings management as the internal control self-evaluation report and authentication report. The lack of attention to internal control forensics does not affect the form of ownership of the company. However, the average value of real activity surplus management of state-owned listed housing enterprises is much higher than that of private listed housing enterprises. This is because the escrow of state-owned enterprises does not have the residual claim right, which makes them lack the incentive to supervise the management, so it is easy to have the problem of insider control. It is easier for managers to make decisions that are beneficial to their own interests and harm the interests of shareholders, which leads to an increase in the degree of earnings management in real activities of listed companies. Finally, according to the results of empirical analysis and the situation of our country, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions and relevant measures to improve the disclosure of internal control information of listed companies in the capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275
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，本文編號(hào)：2260346
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