我國民營制造業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬與公司績效相關(guān)性研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-06-25 03:14
本文選題:民營制造業(yè) + 高管薪酬; 參考:《哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文
【摘要】:自2008年金融危機以來,上市公司高管的“天價薪酬”現(xiàn)象引起了企業(yè)界和學(xué)術(shù)界的熱烈討論,高管薪酬與公司績效之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系也成為學(xué)術(shù)界談?wù)摰慕裹c。以行業(yè)劃分為切入點成為該類研究的主要方向,并且取得了不錯的研究成果。但是,研究對象的選取主要集中在金融、房地產(chǎn)和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)行業(yè),對民營制造業(yè)的關(guān)注較少。本文試圖深入研究和探討民營制造業(yè)高管薪酬與公司績效的關(guān)系,從而提出一個新的研究思路,并且為高管薪酬體系的建立提供一定的理論指導(dǎo)。文章在分析了國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀和相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)之上,對二者的關(guān)系進行了探討。首先,定義了公司績效和高管薪酬等變量的含義,在構(gòu)建公司績效指標時,使用因子分析法對12個指標進行分析,建立了一個反映公司績效的綜合指標,以此作為研究公司績效的代表變量。其次,以高管薪酬為被解釋變量進行實證分析。在研究公司績效對高管薪酬的影響時,文章構(gòu)建了單因素回歸模型3-1;在研究公司績效、高管持股比例等因素對高管薪酬的影響時,文章構(gòu)建了多元回歸模型3-2;而且得出了高管薪酬與公司績效存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系等結(jié)論,并根據(jù)結(jié)論提出了相應(yīng)的建議。再次,以公司績效為被解釋變量進行實證分析。在研究高管薪酬對公司績效的影響時,文章構(gòu)建了單因素回歸模型4-1;在研究高管薪酬、高管持股比例等因素對公司績效的影響時,文章構(gòu)建了多元回歸模型4-2;同時得出了公司績效與高管薪酬存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系等結(jié)論,并對結(jié)果中不合理之處給出了本文的建議。最后,為了保證研究結(jié)果的穩(wěn)健性,本文同時使用凈資產(chǎn)收益率作為公司績效的代表變量帶入回歸模型,對比分析結(jié)果顯示本研究結(jié)果穩(wěn)健性較高,同時也得出使用凈資產(chǎn)收益率作為公司績效指標時存在的一些問題。
[Abstract]:Since the financial crisis of 2008, the phenomenon of "sky-high compensation" of executives in listed companies has aroused heated discussion in the business and academic circles, and the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has also become the focus of academic discussion. Industry division is the main research direction of this kind of research, and good research results have been obtained. However, the study focuses on the financial, real estate and Internet industries, with little attention to the private manufacturing industry. This paper attempts to deeply study and discuss the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in the private manufacturing industry, so as to put forward a new research idea, and provide some theoretical guidance for the establishment of executive compensation system. Based on the analysis of domestic and foreign research status and related theories, the relationship between the two is discussed in this paper. Firstly, it defines the meaning of the variables such as corporate performance and executive compensation. When constructing the corporate performance indicators, it uses factor analysis method to analyze 12 indicators, and establishes a comprehensive index to reflect corporate performance. This study as a representative of corporate performance variables. Secondly, the executive compensation as explained variables for empirical analysis. When we study the effect of company performance on executive compensation, we construct a single factor regression model 3-1. when we study the effect of company performance, executive shareholding ratio and other factors on executive compensation, we construct a single-factor regression model. This paper constructs a multivariate regression model 3-2, and draws the conclusion that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, and puts forward the corresponding suggestions according to the conclusion. Thirdly, empirical analysis is carried out with firm performance as the explanatory variable. When we study the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance, we construct a single factor regression model 4-1. when we study the effects of executive compensation, executive shareholding ratio and other factors on corporate performance, the paper constructs a single-factor regression model. This paper constructs a multivariate regression model 4-2, and draws the conclusion that there is a significant positive correlation between corporate performance and executive compensation, and puts forward some suggestions on the irrationality of the results. Finally, in order to ensure the robustness of the research results, this paper also uses the ROE as the representative variable of corporate performance into the regression model. The comparative analysis results show that the results of this study are more robust. At the same time, we also get some problems when using ROE as a performance indicator.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:F272.92;F275
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