本文選題：經(jīng)濟適用住房 + 定價機制��； 參考：《昆明理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)濟適用住房存廢之爭的學(xué)術(shù)討論和社會輿論日益激烈,尤其是經(jīng)濟適用住房的定價問題廣受質(zhì)疑。研究的目的旨在探索經(jīng)濟適用住房的定價機制。研究主要采用理論與實證研究、定性與定量研究相結(jié)合的方法。研究擬采用微分博弈模型,模擬經(jīng)濟適用住房定價參與主體的經(jīng)濟行為,闡釋經(jīng)濟適用住房定價機制的合理性。研究結(jié)果是經(jīng)濟適用住房價格的形成機制,取決于地方政府和房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商之間長期的博弈過程,政府不可能無限補償,開發(fā)商也不樂意建造大量的經(jīng)濟適用住房,其價格逐步趨于均衡,模擬結(jié)果符合實際。研究結(jié)論是地方政府采取的激勵強度和房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商的利潤追求動力驅(qū)動了經(jīng)濟適用住房的定價過程,經(jīng)濟適用住房不能廢棄,并且供給量需要維持在一定的水平,切實保障對經(jīng)濟適用住房邊際效用高的群體購買,才能減少公共住房福利損失。 經(jīng)濟適用住房是中國當(dāng)前住房保障體系的重要組成部分,但在具體建設(shè)和條件交易過程中,存在各種各樣的弊端,突出表現(xiàn)在：經(jīng)濟適用住房供應(yīng)量不足、建設(shè)面積超標(biāo)、購買資格審核不嚴(yán)、建設(shè)資金不足以及銷售價格失控等。地方政府與房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商博弈的經(jīng)濟行為,影響到經(jīng)濟適用住房的定價和供給量。其中經(jīng)濟適用住房的售價問題,直接涉及到所有有資格的購買者,經(jīng)濟適用住房保障功能難以有效發(fā)揮。 研究采用Stackelberg微分博弈模型,演繹了經(jīng)濟適用住房定價、供給量和政府補償?shù)氖諗口厔�。文章基于國�?nèi)外的研究最新進展,首先分析了全國經(jīng)濟適用住房供給、需求和價格水平現(xiàn)狀,得出其現(xiàn)存問題及原因,并闡述經(jīng)濟適用住房定價的理論基礎(chǔ)；其次基于理論層面的Stackelberg寡頭競爭和價格領(lǐng)先競爭模型基礎(chǔ)之上,重新假定了模型的假設(shè)條件,改進并構(gòu)建了新的Stackelberg微分博弈定價模型,模擬參與其定價過程中各局中人的博弈策略空間；最后通過案例對比研究,分別采用新建立的Stackelberg微分博弈模型和關(guān)聯(lián)度模型,模擬高度發(fā)達地區(qū),發(fā)達地區(qū),一般地區(qū),欠發(fā)達地區(qū)和貧窮地區(qū),得出不同地區(qū)社會經(jīng)濟發(fā)展水平下,相對合理的經(jīng)濟適用住房價格水平,并提出合理且具操作性的建議。 研究經(jīng)濟適用住房的定價機制是非常必要和有意義的。在理論上,豐富和拓展了現(xiàn)有的房地產(chǎn)市場價格理論；在實踐上,為限定經(jīng)濟適用住房價格的地方政府提供切實可行的決策依據(jù),為開發(fā)建設(shè)經(jīng)濟適用住房的房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商提供策略支持,為購買經(jīng)濟適用住房的購房消費者提供較準(zhǔn)確的價格信息,同時對某一地區(qū)經(jīng)濟適用住房的定價具有一定的參考價值,更好地解決中低收入家庭的住房困難問題。
[Abstract]:The academic discussion and the social public opinion about the debate of economic and applicable housing are becoming more and more intense, especially the pricing of affordable housing has been questioned widely. The purpose of the study is to explore the pricing mechanism of affordable housing. Theoretical and empirical studies, qualitative and quantitative research are used in this study. In this paper, the differential game model is used to simulate the economic behavior of the participants in the affordable housing pricing, and to explain the rationality of the pricing mechanism of the affordable housing. The result is that the formation mechanism of affordable housing price depends on the long-term game process between local government and real estate developers. The government can not compensate indefinitely, and developers are not willing to build a large number of affordable housing. Its price tends to be balanced step by step, the simulation result accords with the reality. The conclusion is that the incentive intensity adopted by the local government and the profit pursuit power of the real estate developers drive the pricing process of the affordable housing, the affordable housing can not be abandoned, and the supply needs to be maintained at a certain level. In order to reduce the loss of public housing welfare, the group with high marginal utility of affordable housing can be effectively guaranteed. Affordable housing is an important part of the current housing security system in China. However, in the process of concrete construction and conditional trading, there are various disadvantages, such as insufficient supply of affordable housing, excessive construction area, The purchase qualification examination is not strict, the construction fund is insufficient and the sale price is out of control and so on. The economic behavior of local governments and real estate developers affects the pricing and supply of affordable housing. The price of affordable housing is directly related to all eligible buyers, and the function of affordable housing security is difficult to play effectively. In this paper, Stackelberg differential game model is used to deduce the convergence trend of affordable housing pricing, supply and government compensation. Based on the latest research progress at home and abroad, this paper first analyzes the current situation of the supply, demand and price level of affordable housing in the whole country, finds out the existing problems and reasons, and expounds the theoretical basis of the pricing of affordable housing. Secondly, on the basis of Stackelberg oligopoly and price-leading competition models, the assumption conditions of the model are re-assumed, and a new Stackelberg differential game pricing model is improved and constructed. Finally, through the comparative study of cases, the newly established Stackelberg differential game model and the correlation degree model are adopted to simulate the highly developed regions and the general areas. In the underdeveloped areas and the poor areas, the relatively reasonable price level of affordable housing is obtained under the social and economic development level of different regions, and the reasonable and operable suggestions are put forward. It is necessary and meaningful to study the pricing mechanism of affordable housing. Theoretically, it enriches and expands the existing real estate market price theory. In practice, it provides a practical basis for local governments to limit the price of affordable housing. It provides strategic support for the development and construction of affordable housing developers, provides more accurate price information for the buyers of affordable housing, and has a certain reference value for the pricing of affordable housing in a certain area. Better solve the housing difficulties of middle and low income families.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：昆明理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F299.23

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本文編號：2040434