本文選題：國(guó)有企業(yè) + 激勵(lì)機(jī)制��； 參考：《福州大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)自1992年開啟經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革以來(lái),以加入世貿(mào)組織、國(guó)企改革和房地產(chǎn)改革等為標(biāo)志性事件的一系列市場(chǎng)化改革,為中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)最近十年的繁榮奠定了堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)。然而,當(dāng)以擴(kuò)大企業(yè)自主權(quán)和增加利潤(rùn)留成為核心的國(guó)企改革所產(chǎn)生的唾手可得的改革紅利逐漸被采摘殆盡的時(shí)候,我們不得不開始反思原有的GDP掛帥、單一效率導(dǎo)向的發(fā)展模式是否已經(jīng)走到了盡頭。我國(guó)的國(guó)有企業(yè)改革應(yīng)當(dāng)朝著兩個(gè)主要的目標(biāo)推進(jìn)；一是效率目標(biāo),即改善市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu),完善市場(chǎng)體制,使更具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和效率,使市場(chǎng)更加透明、公平、有效；二是民生目標(biāo),即如何使國(guó)有企業(yè)在盈利之外承擔(dān)更廣泛的社會(huì)責(zé)任,使國(guó)有資本更好地惠及國(guó)民。國(guó)有企業(yè)先后經(jīng)歷了擴(kuò)大企業(yè)自主權(quán)、從經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)向所有權(quán)過渡、推進(jìn)建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度和深化國(guó)家控股股份公司(特別是上市公司)內(nèi)部改革等四個(gè)階段。過去二十年間,以單一效率目標(biāo)為主導(dǎo)的國(guó)有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)式改革片面強(qiáng)調(diào)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益,忽視了社會(huì)主義制度下的國(guó)有企業(yè)應(yīng)該承擔(dān)的社會(huì)責(zé)任。當(dāng)國(guó)有企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)化改革走進(jìn)新階段,如何使國(guó)有企業(yè)在盈利之外承擔(dān)廣泛的社會(huì)責(zé)任成為政府監(jiān)管者考慮的新議題。前期以擴(kuò)大企業(yè)自主權(quán)和提高利潤(rùn)分成為核心的國(guó)企市場(chǎng)化改革,已經(jīng)逐漸把相當(dāng)部分的資產(chǎn)使用權(quán)和控制權(quán)從政府轉(zhuǎn)移給國(guó)有企業(yè),特別是國(guó)企的經(jīng)營(yíng)者。本論文首先列出了目前效率目標(biāo)下國(guó)企內(nèi)部針對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者存在的代理人問題,包括道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、逆向選擇、內(nèi)部人控制等,然后在國(guó)有企業(yè)被賦予追求效率和保障民生兩個(gè)目標(biāo)的前提下運(yùn)用激勵(lì)理論下的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型研究如何對(duì)國(guó)企經(jīng)營(yíng)者實(shí)施合適的激勵(lì)水平。針對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益和社會(huì)效益之間存在的辯證關(guān)系,本文分別在互替和互補(bǔ)兩種情形下探討了激勵(lì)國(guó)企經(jīng)營(yíng)者追求經(jīng)濟(jì)效益和社會(huì)效益的次優(yōu)成本,認(rèn)為政府作為理性的委托人,在實(shí)際操作中會(huì)針對(duì)各國(guó)有企業(yè)面臨的不同情形在激勵(lì)成本與總收益(既包括經(jīng)濟(jì)效益和社會(huì)效益)之間做出比較,然后決定國(guó)企經(jīng)營(yíng)者的激勵(lì)水平。隨后我們通過選取合適的經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效指標(biāo)和社會(huì)績(jī)效指標(biāo)對(duì)國(guó)企經(jīng)營(yíng)者的激勵(lì)水平進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,結(jié)果顯示一項(xiàng)綜合反映經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效和社會(huì)績(jī)效的指標(biāo),每股社會(huì)貢獻(xiàn)值可以很好的解釋行業(yè)內(nèi)國(guó)企經(jīng)營(yíng)者薪酬分布。最后,本文在以上模型推導(dǎo)和實(shí)證分析的基礎(chǔ)上,針對(duì)改善國(guó)企經(jīng)營(yíng)者激勵(lì)機(jī)制提出了制度性建議。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of China's economic system began in 1992, a series of market-oriented reforms, such as China's accession to the WTO, the reform of state-owned enterprises and the reform of real estate, have laid a solid foundation for the prosperity of China's economy in the past ten years. However, as the easy dividend from the SOE reform, which focuses on expanding corporate autonomy and increasing profit retention, is gradually being harvested, we have to begin to rethink the old GDP. Whether the single efficiency-oriented development model has come to an end. The reform of state-owned enterprises in China should be advanced towards two main objectives: one is to improve the market structure, to perfect the market system, to make the market more competitive and efficient, and to make the market more transparent, fair and effective; and the second is the goal of people's livelihood. That is, how to make state-owned enterprises bear more social responsibility beyond profit, so that state-owned capital can benefit the people better. State-owned enterprises have experienced four stages: enlarging the autonomy of enterprises, transforming from management right to ownership, promoting the establishment of modern enterprise system and deepening the internal reform of state-controlled joint-stock companies (especially listed companies). In the past two decades, the property right reform of state-owned enterprises, which is dominated by a single goal of efficiency, has emphasized the economic benefits one-sidedly, and neglected the social responsibility of the state-owned enterprises under the socialist system. When the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises enters a new stage, how to make state-owned enterprises bear extensive social responsibility in addition to profits has become a new issue for government regulators to consider. In the early stage, the state-owned enterprises, whose core is to expand their autonomy and improve their profits, have gradually transferred a considerable part of the right to use and control of assets from the government to the state-owned enterprises, especially the managers of state-owned enterprises. This paper first lists the agent problems in state-owned enterprises for managers under the current efficiency target, including moral hazard, adverse selection, insider control and so on. Then on the premise that state-owned enterprises are endowed with the two goals of pursuing efficiency and safeguarding people's livelihood, the moral hazard model based on incentive theory is used to study how to implement the appropriate incentive level for state-owned enterprise managers. In view of the dialectical relationship between economic and social benefits, this paper discusses the suboptimal cost of encouraging SOE operators to pursue economic and social benefits under the circumstances of mutual substitution and complementarity, and thinks that the government is the rational client. In practice, the incentive cost and total income (including economic and social benefits) will be compared according to the different situations faced by state-owned enterprises, and then the incentive level of state-owned enterprise managers will be determined. Then we choose appropriate economic performance indicators and social performance indicators to analyze the incentive level of state-owned enterprise managers, the results show that a comprehensive reflection of economic performance and social performance indicators. Social contribution per share can explain the salary distribution of SOE operators in the industry. Finally, based on the above model derivation and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward some institutional suggestions to improve the incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：福州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F276.1

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