本文選題：土地出讓競(jìng)爭(zhēng) + 工業(yè)用地　； 參考：《廈門(mén)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自我國(guó)實(shí)行改革開(kāi)放以來(lái),工業(yè)化進(jìn)一步發(fā)展,城市化也開(kāi)始起步；與此同時(shí),對(duì)土地的需求也不斷攀升,各地的土地出讓規(guī)模發(fā)展極為迅速。出于多種原因,地方政府之間出現(xiàn)了針對(duì)土地出讓的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為,可能導(dǎo)致一系列問(wèn)題的產(chǎn)生。其中,地方政府如何受到其他競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性政府的影響,如何產(chǎn)生策略性互動(dòng)行為,這一點(diǎn)值得予以關(guān)注和研究。此外,我國(guó)在土地出讓的實(shí)際操作中存在著截然不同的出讓方式——協(xié)議出讓和“招拍掛”。在兩種出讓方式下,土地出讓金的差別非常大。前者主要適用于工業(yè)用地,后者主要適用于商業(yè)、居住用地。地方政府針對(duì)這兩種土地出讓的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為也會(huì)產(chǎn)生區(qū)別。本文基于這一出發(fā)點(diǎn),嚴(yán)格區(qū)分了工業(yè)用地和居住用地兩種類(lèi)型,分別研究地方政府針對(duì)這兩種土地出讓的策略性互動(dòng)行為。由于目前關(guān)于地方政府土地出讓競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的文獻(xiàn)研究多數(shù)不曾區(qū)分土地種類(lèi),而且尚未從策略性互動(dòng)的角度解釋地方政府土地出讓競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為,因此本文的研究具有其現(xiàn)實(shí)和理論意義。 筆者先對(duì)土地出讓制度進(jìn)行了一個(gè)梳理,然后通過(guò)闡述土地財(cái)政問(wèn)題的內(nèi)涵和外延以及分析不同土地出讓方式下土地財(cái)政產(chǎn)生的原因,對(duì)引起土地出讓競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象的土地財(cái)政問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了一個(gè)淺議。理論分析的最后是對(duì)不同類(lèi)型土地出讓競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的策略互動(dòng)反應(yīng)做了一個(gè)定性的闡釋和分析。在實(shí)證分析部分,筆者對(duì)理論分析所得出的策略互動(dòng)反應(yīng)結(jié)果進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證,得出結(jié)論為：工業(yè)用地出讓競(jìng)爭(zhēng)最終會(huì)導(dǎo)致“競(jìng)次”的結(jié)果；而居住用地出讓的策略互動(dòng)結(jié)果比較模糊,居住用地出讓行為同時(shí)受到房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)景氣程度的顯著正向影響。在理論分析和實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,筆者得到了硬化土地出讓金預(yù)算約束、將土地出讓和征用逐步市場(chǎng)化、利用房地產(chǎn)稅加強(qiáng)調(diào)控房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)以及合理地方政府收支等啟示。
[Abstract]:Since the implementation of reform and opening up in China, industrialization has further developed, urbanization has also begun to start; at the same time, the demand for land has been rising, and the scale of land transfer has developed very rapidly. For a variety of reasons, competition among local governments for land sales may lead to a series of problems. Among them, how the local government is influenced by other competitive governments and how to produce strategic interaction is worthy of attention and study. In addition, there are quite different ways to transfer land in our country-agreement and auction. In the two ways of transfer, the land transfer fee is very different. The former mainly applies to industrial land, the latter mainly applies to commercial and residential land. Competition between local governments for these two types of land sales will also make a difference. Based on this starting point, this paper strictly distinguishes two types of industrial land and residential land, and studies the strategic interactive behavior of local government to these two kinds of land transfer. Because most of the literature on the competition of local government land transfer has not distinguished the land types, and has not explained the competition behavior of local government land transfer from the angle of strategic interaction. Therefore, the study of this paper has its practical and theoretical significance. The author firstly combs the land transfer system, and then analyzes the causes of the land finance under different land transfer modes by expounding the connotation and extension of the land finance problem. This paper makes a brief discussion on the land finance problem which causes the competition of land transfer. The last part of the theoretical analysis is a qualitative explanation and analysis of the strategic interaction under different types of land transfer competition. In the part of empirical analysis, the author verifies the result of strategic interaction in the theoretical analysis, and concludes that: the competition of industrial land transfer will eventually lead to the result of "competition"; However, the interactive results of residential land transfer strategy are vague, and the residential land transfer behavior is significantly positively affected by the prosperity of real estate market at the same time. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test, the author obtains the enlightenment such as hardening the budget constraint of land transfer, gradually marketization of land transfer and requisition, strengthening the regulation of real estate market by using real estate tax, and reasonable local government income and expenditure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門(mén)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F301.2

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