【摘要】：在電子商務(wù)的驅(qū)動(dòng)下,電子直銷模式與傳統(tǒng)零售模式相結(jié)合的雙渠道銷售模式受到許多制造公司的青睞,如Dell、Nike等紛紛采用雙渠道來搶占市場,提高企業(yè)利潤。但另一渠道的引入會(huì)沖擊原有銷售渠道,引發(fā)渠道沖突。隨著客戶需求的多樣化和市場競爭日趨激烈,合適的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)以及有效的渠道協(xié)調(diào)對(duì)制造商甚至整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈而言至關(guān)重要。在這種情況下,本文建立了基于可替代產(chǎn)品競爭的雙渠道制造商產(chǎn)品定價(jià)模型,綜合運(yùn)用了消費(fèi)者效用理論、博弈模型。首先,本文針對(duì)傳統(tǒng)零售市場中存在同類已有產(chǎn)品競爭的情況,拓展了Salop環(huán)形城市模型,建立了競爭環(huán)境下制造商的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)決策模型,進(jìn)而分析了雙渠道分別是分散控制或集中決策時(shí)的最佳價(jià)格,并探討了雙渠道下的集中決策與分散決策下各價(jià)格及各產(chǎn)品需求關(guān)于產(chǎn)品可替代程度的變化。然后,在此基礎(chǔ)上本文探究了供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題。首先對(duì)雙渠道分散決策和集中決策下的供應(yīng)鏈利潤進(jìn)行對(duì)比,發(fā)現(xiàn)雙渠道分散決策下存在雙重邊際化效應(yīng)出現(xiàn),然后構(gòu)建基于收益共享契約下的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)模型,得到基于收益共享契約下的制造商產(chǎn)品定價(jià)決策,并探討基于收益共享契約下的Pareto改進(jìn)問題。最后,通過數(shù)值分析驗(yàn)證了協(xié)調(diào)策略的有效性,發(fā)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈效率隨產(chǎn)品替代程度遞增,而協(xié)調(diào)效果隨產(chǎn)品替代程度先變差后變好。本文以電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下的雙渠道產(chǎn)品制造商為分析對(duì)象,并將市場存在己有同類產(chǎn)品競爭的情形納入了研究范圍,在雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈和供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)盟研究的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行了進(jìn)一步的深入,本研究相關(guān)結(jié)論拓展了雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈研究構(gòu)建的模型,可以為企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)決策提供了理論參考,可以為企業(yè)的組織運(yùn)行和產(chǎn)品推銷及其他有關(guān)方面研究提供參考,具備一定的工程參考價(jià)值與學(xué)術(shù)意義。
[Abstract]:Driven by electronic commerce, the dual-channel sales mode, which combines electronic direct marketing mode with traditional retail mode, is favored by many manufacturing companies, such as Dell,Nike and so on, which use two channels to seize the market and improve the profit of enterprises. But the introduction of another channel will impact the original sales channels, resulting in channel conflicts. With the diversification of customer demand and the increasingly fierce market competition, appropriate product pricing and effective channel coordination are very important for manufacturers and even the whole supply chain. In this case, a two-channel manufacturer product pricing model based on alternative product competition is established, and the consumer utility theory and game model are used synthetically. First of all, in view of the existence of similar existing product competition in the traditional retail market, this paper expands the Salop circular city model, establishes the manufacturer's product pricing decision model under the competitive environment, and then analyzes the best price when the two channels are decentralized control or centralized decision respectively, and discusses the changes of the price and the demand of each product under the centralized decision and the decentralized decision. Then, on this basis, this paper explores the problem of supply chain coordination. Firstly, the profit of supply chain under dual-channel decentralized decision and centralized decision-making is compared, and it is found that there is a double marginalization effect under dual-channel decentralized decision-making. Then, the product pricing model based on revenue-sharing contract is constructed, the manufacturer's product pricing decision based on revenue-sharing contract is obtained, and the improvement of Pareto based on revenue-sharing contract is discussed. Finally, the effectiveness of the coordination strategy is verified by numerical analysis, and it is found that the efficiency of supply chain increases with the degree of product substitution, and the coordination effect becomes worse at first and then better with the degree of product substitution. In this paper, the dual-channel product manufacturers under the environment of electronic commerce are taken as the analysis object, and the existence of similar product competition in the market is brought into the scope of the research. On the basis of the research on the dual-channel supply chain and supply chain alliance, the relevant conclusions of this study expand the model of the dual-channel supply chain research, which can provide a theoretical reference for the product pricing decision of enterprises. It can provide reference for the organization and operation of enterprises, product marketing and other related research, and has certain engineering reference value and academic significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F274
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本文編號(hào)：2500556