發(fā)布時間：2018-06-11 09:56

  本文選題：服務(wù)水平 + 交貨提前期　； 參考：《渤海大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)和相關(guān)信息技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展,電子商務(wù)對實體零售業(yè)產(chǎn)生巨大沖擊。本文主要研究實體店服務(wù)水平和網(wǎng)絡(luò)交貨提前期影響下的雙渠道競爭,通過批發(fā)價與兩部收費制聯(lián)合契約及批發(fā)價和利益互享聯(lián)合契約協(xié)調(diào)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的渠道競爭。本文采用斯塔爾伯格博弈的方法研究分散單渠道、部分集成雙渠道、集成雙渠道三種供應(yīng)鏈渠道結(jié)構(gòu)。首先,分別考慮了服務(wù)和交貨提前期對雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中制造商和零售商的需求、價格、利潤的影響;其次,分析部分集成雙渠道在服務(wù)和交貨提前期影響下的渠道競爭;最后,采用批發(fā)價與兩部收費制聯(lián)合契約及批發(fā)價和利益互享聯(lián)合契約協(xié)調(diào)部分集成雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)生的渠道沖突。本文通過研究得到四個結(jié)論。第一,制造商增加網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道采取雙渠道銷售產(chǎn)品,可以提升供應(yīng)鏈的整體利潤。第二,實體零售商提升服務(wù),網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商縮短交貨提前期可以增加顧客的滿意度,從而使供應(yīng)鏈的利潤增加。第三,部分集成雙渠道中的制造商和零售商是相互獨立的,兩個渠道會產(chǎn)生渠道沖突,然而集成雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)且环N協(xié)調(diào)結(jié)構(gòu)沒有渠道沖突;第四,采用批發(fā)價契約初步解決部分集成雙渠道的渠道沖突,為了進一步消除雙重邊際效用使制造商和零售商能夠雙贏,在批發(fā)價契約的基礎(chǔ)上使用兩部收費制契約和利益互享契約進行協(xié)調(diào)。研究結(jié)果對部分集成雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈環(huán)境下,解決渠道沖突及雙重邊際效用有一定的理論意義與實踐價值。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of Internet and related information technology, electronic commerce has a huge impact on the retail industry. This paper mainly studies the double channel competition under the influence of physical store service level and network lead time, and coordinates the channel competition of double channel supply chain through wholesale price and two charge system joint contract and wholesale price and benefit mutual contract. In this paper, Stalberg game is used to study three kinds of supply chain channel structures: decentralized single channel, partially integrated dual channel and integrated dual channel. Firstly, the effects of service and lead time on the demand, price and profit of manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain are considered respectively; secondly, the competition between two integrated channels under the influence of service and lead time is analyzed. The joint contract of wholesale price and two-part charging system and the coordination part of wholesale price and mutual benefit contract are used to integrate the channel conflict produced by the two-channel supply chain. This paper draws four conclusions through research. First, manufacturers can increase the overall profit of the supply chain by increasing the network channels and selling products through two channels. Second, physical retailers improve service, and online retailers shorten lead time can increase customer satisfaction, thereby increasing the profit of the supply chain. Third, the manufacturers and retailers in the partially integrated dual channels are independent of each other, and the two channels will produce channel conflicts. However, the integrated dual channel supply chain is a coordination structure with no channel conflict. In order to eliminate the double marginal utility, the manufacturer and retailer can win a win-win situation by adopting wholesale price contract to solve the channel conflict of partial integration of two channels. On the basis of the wholesale price contract, the two fee system contracts and the mutual benefit contract are used to coordinate. The results are of theoretical and practical value for the solution of channel conflict and dual marginal utility in the environment of partially integrated dual channel supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：渤海大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：2004843