本文選題：雙邊市場 + 電子商務(wù)平臺　； 參考：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2010年博士論文

【摘要】：在經(jīng)濟(jì)交易活動中,有些市場交易活動必須在某個平臺(platform)上進(jìn)行,這個平臺通過一定的價格策略向交易雙方(如消費者和商戶)出售平臺產(chǎn)品或服務(wù),并努力促成它們在平臺上實現(xiàn)交易,我們把具有這種特征的產(chǎn)業(yè)市場歸屬于“雙邊市場(two-sided markets)"。具有上述特征產(chǎn)業(yè)市場中的平臺企業(yè)類型很多,如計算機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)生產(chǎn)商,向兩類消費群體(消費者和軟件開發(fā)商)提供計算機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)平臺,消費者使用計算機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)來運行軟件開發(fā)商的應(yīng)用程序,而軟件開發(fā)商也必須借助于計算機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)才能吸引消費者；再如電子商務(wù)平臺廠商,它為交易雙方提供交易服務(wù),交易雙方通過平臺相互了解,促進(jìn)交易的達(dá)成。 經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)所討論的不完全競爭市場大多基于傳統(tǒng)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)中單邊市場的理論,實際上在雙邊市場中,企業(yè)之間的競爭也會導(dǎo)致壟斷的發(fā)生。目前,反壟斷規(guī)制的政策都是針對傳統(tǒng)單邊市場中企業(yè)而制定的,對于具有雙邊市場特征的平臺廠商,由于理論的缺失,如果貿(mào)然依照單邊市場規(guī)制理論來判斷,則勢必會造成判斷的失誤�；诖�,本文主要研究內(nèi)容就是針對具有雙邊市場特征的電子商務(wù)平臺廠商的競爭與規(guī)制問題。 隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)信息產(chǎn)業(yè)的興起,中國電子商務(wù)得到了迅猛的發(fā)展,經(jīng)過10多年的發(fā)展已進(jìn)入高速增長期。從1999年8月易趣網(wǎng)的創(chuàng)立開始,我國的C2C市場就一直處于寡頭壟斷的格局中。目前該市場已不再是eBay易趣與淘寶網(wǎng)“兩強(qiáng)對峙”的情形,而主要由淘寶網(wǎng)、TOM易趣、騰訊拍拍和百度有啊四家企業(yè)組成的寡頭壟斷市場結(jié)構(gòu)。由此,展開對電子商務(wù)平臺運行的競爭機(jī)制和電子商務(wù)平臺產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)制研究,具有重要的現(xiàn)實意義。 從產(chǎn)業(yè)特征來看,電子商務(wù)平臺是具有典型的雙邊市場特征的產(chǎn)業(yè),但是它也有自己獨特的產(chǎn)業(yè)特點,比如說,第三方支付平臺也是具有雙邊市場特征的,有其核心業(yè)務(wù),但它往往會被企業(yè)是一體化于電子商務(wù)平臺。那么一體化效率是否高于非一體化,非一體化是否有利于市場競爭,其社會福利是否能夠改善,這些重大理論問題都有待于進(jìn)一步研究解釋。此外,交易積分制提高了消費者對網(wǎng)絡(luò)價值的評價,但由于網(wǎng)絡(luò)不能互聯(lián),增加了交易的多平臺接入傾向。交易積分制對消費者來說增加了轉(zhuǎn)移成本,對產(chǎn)業(yè)來講提高了進(jìn)入壁壘。從目前已有的文獻(xiàn)來看,對雙邊市場的研究大多拘泥于研究雙邊不對稱的價格結(jié)構(gòu)和定價機(jī)制,對于不同平臺之間的競爭與合作,特別是不同平臺之間的非一體模塊化生產(chǎn)還鮮有系統(tǒng)的研究。同時,已有對電子商務(wù)平臺的研究大多把它當(dāng)做一個普通網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè),研究內(nèi)容局限在產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)和盈利模式等方面。而把它當(dāng)做一個雙邊網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺的研究對象,以及對其競爭機(jī)制和規(guī)制對策的研究,目前還沒有出現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)的研究文獻(xiàn)。 本文選題正是在此背景下,遵循產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論的SCP研究范式,運用博弈論等分析工具和案例分析方法,探究電子商務(wù)平臺產(chǎn)業(yè)的運行機(jī)制和定價的內(nèi)在機(jī)理,分析其市場結(jié)構(gòu),研究廠商在市場競爭中的策略行為,并分析比較其企業(yè)績效和社會福利,最后對電子商務(wù)產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)制提出相應(yīng)的對策思路。本文旨在為電子商務(wù)平臺產(chǎn)業(yè)運行機(jī)制和競爭策略的研究做出理論探索,也為電子商務(wù)平臺產(chǎn)業(yè)規(guī)制政策提供理論支持,這是本文研究的重大意義,也是價值所在。 全文主體共分八章,主要研究內(nèi)容和成果概述如下： 第一章緒論,主要介紹了本文研究的背景和意義,通過提出問題,確定了研究內(nèi)容、研究方法和研究的基本框架。最后提出了本文的創(chuàng)新點。 第二章對雙邊市場的基本理論進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的理論綜述。首先對基本概念進(jìn)行了界定,接著從外部性理論入手,介紹了直接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性和間接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性以及和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)傳統(tǒng)外部性的區(qū)別。在特征與分類中,從需求和供給等方面闡述了雙邊市場的基本特征。通過平臺廠商的定價策略和平臺偏好差異化與平臺競爭引出目前反壟斷規(guī)制的內(nèi)容,從理論研究的角度看,尚缺乏一個判斷雙邊市場反壟斷的理論體系。接下來是本文對雙邊市場的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)解釋,也是本部分的一個創(chuàng)新。本文運用制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理對雙邊市場的產(chǎn)生、市場和平臺的關(guān)系、以及平臺的集中交易進(jìn)行了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的分析,解釋了交易雙方為什么會集中在平臺上,平臺如何保證生產(chǎn)以及平臺服務(wù)由誰生產(chǎn)的問題。最后本部分對雙邊市場的市場結(jié)構(gòu)類型進(jìn)行了科學(xué)的劃分,分別是基本結(jié)構(gòu)、存在中間商的結(jié)構(gòu)、用戶多平臺接入結(jié)構(gòu)、平臺互聯(lián)互通結(jié)構(gòu)、多平臺服務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)。 第三章對雙邊市場平臺定價模式進(jìn)行了分析和研究。通過對已有的壟斷競爭定價模型分析和總結(jié),得出無論是壟斷平臺還是競爭平臺,其價格結(jié)構(gòu)的設(shè)計目的是一致的,都是為了吸引雙邊的成員到平臺上來。隨后,本部分研究從影響電子商務(wù)平臺定價模式的需求價格彈性、用戶多平臺接入行為、網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度、平臺競爭、信譽(yù)和模塊化治理等方面入手,對電子商務(wù)平臺廠商價格效應(yīng)做出分析,為后續(xù)模型假設(shè)做出理論的鋪墊。 第四章研究了電子商務(wù)廠商橫向差異化競爭和互聯(lián)互通對福利的影響。本部分首先用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論解釋了間接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性和直接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)意義,區(qū)分了金錢外部性和技術(shù)外部性,并指出無論網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性直接還是間接,在雙邊市場上,通過平臺交易都可以內(nèi)在于價格機(jī)制。本部分通過壟斷和競爭的數(shù)理模型對電子商務(wù)廠商定價做出辨析,得出網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性差異是導(dǎo)致電子商務(wù)平臺雙邊價格結(jié)構(gòu)不均衡的主要因素,一邊可能高于邊際成本定價,另一半可能會給予補(bǔ)貼。通過電子商務(wù)平臺廠商的社會福利比較分析,本章研究表明：競爭平臺之間網(wǎng)絡(luò)的互聯(lián)互通,實現(xiàn)用戶之間跨平臺交易,可以降低市場進(jìn)入壁壘,使市場重新恢復(fù)到競爭性壟斷的市場結(jié)構(gòu),有助于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新和社會福利改善,這是本部分的一個創(chuàng)新之處。 第五章從轉(zhuǎn)移成本的角度研究了電子商務(wù)平臺廠商中存在用戶多平臺接入行為的廠商競爭機(jī)制。本章系統(tǒng)分析了電子商務(wù)平臺兼容的兩個層次,這是本部分的一個創(chuàng)新點。第一層次是交易數(shù)據(jù)庫的共享,第二層次的兼容是在第一層次交易數(shù)據(jù)庫共享的基礎(chǔ)上實現(xiàn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)互連,用戶可以跨平臺交易。通過對不同轉(zhuǎn)移成本下電子商務(wù)平臺定價及利潤的分析得出,當(dāng)轉(zhuǎn)移成本存在時,用戶單平臺接入效用要大于多平臺接入效用,高級用戶將被鎖定在原平臺上。從整個市場來看,被劃為兩個層次,即壟斷市場和寡頭市場。在第一層次兼容條件下,交易信用所形成的轉(zhuǎn)移成本將不存在。此時,對網(wǎng)絡(luò)評價較高的用戶將選擇多平臺接入。在實現(xiàn)兩個層次兼容的條件下,用戶可以跨平臺交易,用戶將不存在多平臺接入行為。從社會福利角度來分析,后者要大于前者。 第六章主要研究電子商務(wù)平臺模塊化網(wǎng)絡(luò)治理的可能性。利用交易費用理論分析了電子商務(wù)平臺非一體化治理的條件和可能性,認(rèn)為電子商務(wù)搜索平臺是其系統(tǒng)的主導(dǎo)企業(yè),其模塊供應(yīng)商應(yīng)當(dāng)是支付平臺、銀聯(lián)和物流平臺。在主導(dǎo)企業(yè)電子商務(wù)搜索平臺制定規(guī)則和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)下,價值模塊之間進(jìn)行“背對背”的競爭。研究表明,模塊化比一體化有效率,對于消費者來說模塊化能帶來更多消費者剩余。電子商務(wù)平臺選擇一體化而非模塊化的原因是系統(tǒng)模塊之間的間接網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部效應(yīng),即能夠為廠商帶來更大的進(jìn)入壁壘和市場勢力。 第七章主要研究電子商務(wù)平臺的規(guī)制與對策。從結(jié)構(gòu)壁壘和行為壁壘兩個影響因素提出了規(guī)制電子商務(wù)平臺的建議。一是互聯(lián)互通。作為以促進(jìn)交易為主要目的平臺服務(wù),由于網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部效應(yīng)和不兼容因素使雙邊客戶不能跨平臺交易,成為制約競爭和降低社會福利的主要因素。因此,互聯(lián)互通可以降低市場進(jìn)入壁壘,使市場重新恢復(fù)到競爭性壟斷的市場結(jié)構(gòu),有助于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新和社會福利改善。是模塊化網(wǎng)絡(luò)生產(chǎn)。一體化會提高市場的進(jìn)入壁壘,在位廠商可以采取交叉補(bǔ)貼打擊潛在進(jìn)入者。而采用非一體化生產(chǎn)可以提高生產(chǎn)效率,降低進(jìn)入壁壘,促進(jìn)競爭,有利于消費者剩余的提高和改善社會福利。 第八章簡要歸納了本文的基本結(jié)論,提出了不足之處,并對后續(xù)研究進(jìn)行了展望。
[Abstract]:In economic transactions, some market trading activities must be carried out on a platform (platform). The platform sells platform products or services to both parties (such as consumers and merchants) through a certain price strategy, and tries to facilitate their transactions on the platform. We attribute the industrial market with this feature to "double". Two-sided markets ". There are many types of platform enterprises in the industrial market, such as computer operating system manufacturers, providing computer operating system platform to two types of consumer groups (consumers and software developers), and consumers using computer operating systems to run software developers' applications, and the software is open. The dealer also has to use the computer operating system to attract consumers, as well as the e-commerce platform manufacturer, which provides transaction services for both parties, and the parties understand each other through the platform to promote the achievement of the transaction.
The incomplete competitive market discussed by economics is mostly based on the theory of unilateral market in the traditional industrial economy. In fact, in the bilateral market, the competition between enterprises will lead to the occurrence of monopoly. At present, the policy of antitrust regulation is formulated for the enterprises in the traditional unilateral market and for the platform factory with the characteristics of bilateral market. Because of the lack of theory, it is bound to make a mistake in judgment if it is judged according to the theory of unilateral market regulation. Based on this, the main content of this paper is to deal with the competition and regulation of the e-commerce platform manufacturers with bilateral market characteristics.
With the rise of the Internet information industry, China's e-commerce has developed rapidly and has entered a high speed growth period after 10 years of development. Since the establishment of eBay net in August 1999, the C2C market in China has been in the pattern of oligopoly. At present, the market is no longer the situation of eBay eBay and the "strong confrontation" between the Taobao network and the Taobao net. It is mainly made up of the oligopoly market structure composed of Taobao, TOM eBay, Tencent patting and Baidu, which consists of four enterprises. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to carry out the research on the competition mechanism of the operation of the e-commerce platform and the industrial regulation of the e-commerce platform.
According to the characteristics of the industry, e-commerce platform is an industry with typical bilateral market characteristics, but it also has its own unique industrial characteristics. For example, the third party payment platform is also characterized by bilateral market and its core business, but it will often be integrated into the e-commerce platform by the enterprise. Whether it is higher than non integration, whether non integration is beneficial to market competition, and whether its social welfare can be improved, these important theoretical problems need further study and explanation. In addition, the transaction integration system improves the consumer's evaluation of the network value. But because the network cannot be interconnected, it increases the multi platform access tendency of the transaction. For the consumers, the transfer cost is increased, and the barriers to entry are raised for the industry. From the existing literature, the research on bilateral markets is mostly confined to the study of bilateral asymmetric price structure and pricing mechanism. For the competition and cooperation between different platforms, specifically, it is a non integrated modular production between different platforms. There are few systematic studies. At the same time, most of the research on e-commerce platform is regarded as an ordinary network enterprise, and the research content is limited to the industrial structure and profit model. As a research object of a bilateral network platform, and the research on its competition mechanism and Regulation Countermeasures, there is no system at present. Research literature.
This article is under this background, following the SCP research paradigm of industrial organization theory, using analysis tools such as game theory and case analysis to explore the operating mechanism and internal mechanism of the e-business platform industry, analyze its market structure, study the strategic behavior of the manufacturers in the market competition, and analyze and compare their enterprise performance. And the social welfare, finally to the electronic commerce industry regulation put forward the corresponding countermeasures. This article aims to make theoretical exploration for the research of the operation mechanism and competition strategy of the e-commerce platform industry, and also provide theoretical support for the industrial regulation policy of the e-commerce platform. This is the great significance and value of this paper.
The main body of the thesis is divided into eight chapters. The main research contents and achievements are summarized as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background and significance of the study. By putting forward the questions, the research content, the research method and the basic framework of the research are determined. Finally, the innovation points of this paper are put forward.
The second chapter gives a detailed theoretical overview of the basic theories of the bilateral market. First, the basic concepts are defined, and then from the external theory, the direct network externality and indirect network externality and the difference between the traditional externality of economics and the economics are introduced. In the characteristics and classification, the two sides are expounded from the aspects of demand and supply. The basic characteristics of the market. Through the pricing strategy of platform vendors and the differentiation of platform preference and platform competition, the content of antitrust regulation is drawn up. From the perspective of theoretical research, there is still a lack of a theoretical system to judge the antitrust of bilateral markets. This paper uses the principle of institutional economics to analyze the production of bilateral markets, the relationship between the market and platform, and the centralized trading of the platform. This paper explains why the two parties are concentrated on the platform, how the platform ensures production and the production of platform services. Finally, this part of the market is a market knot in the bilateral market. The structure type is divided into the basic structure, the structure of the middleman, the multi platform access structure of the user, the interconnected structure of the platform, the multi platform service structure.
The third chapter analyzes and studies the pricing model of bilateral market platform. Through the analysis and summary of the existing model of monopoly competition pricing, it is concluded that the design aim of the price structure is consistent, whether it is a monopoly platform or a competitive platform. All of them are to attract bilateral members to the platform. Then, this part of the study from the influence of electricity. The price elasticity of the pricing model of the sub business platform, the user multi platform access behavior, the strength of the network externality, the platform competition, the reputation and the modularized governance, make an analysis of the price effect of the e-commerce platform manufacturer, and make the paving for the hypothesis of the follow-up model.
The fourth chapter studies the effects of horizontal differentiation competition and interconnection on the welfare of e-commerce manufacturers. This part first explains the economic significance of indirect network externality and direct network externality by economic theory, differentiates the externality of money and the externality of technology, and points out that whether the network externality is direct or indirect, it is bilateral. On the market, the price mechanism can be within the platform through the platform transaction. This part analyzes the pricing of e-commerce manufacturers through the mathematical model of monopoly and competition. It is concluded that the difference of the network externality is the main factor that leads to the imbalance of the bilateral price structure of the e-commerce platform, and one side may be higher than the marginal cost pricing, the other half may be given. Through the comparative analysis of the social welfare of the e-commerce platform manufacturers, this chapter shows that the interconnection and intercommunication between the competitive platforms and the realization of cross platform transactions between the users can reduce the barriers to market entry, restore the market to a competitive monopoly market structure, and help improve the technological innovation and social welfare. An innovation in this part.
In the fifth chapter, from the point of view of transfer cost, this chapter studies the competitive mechanism of multi platform users in e-commerce platform. This chapter systematically analyzes the two levels of the compatibility of e-commerce platform. This is an innovation in this part. The first level is the sharing of the transaction database, and the compatibility of the second levels is at the first level. On the basis of transaction database sharing, network interconnection can be realized. Users can cross platform transaction. Through the analysis of the pricing and profit of the e-commerce platform under different transfer costs, it is concluded that when the transfer cost exists, the user single platform access utility is greater than the multi platform access utility, and the high level users will be locked on the original platform. It is divided into two levels, namely, the monopoly market and the oligopoly market. Under the first level compatible conditions, the transfer cost of the transaction credit will not exist. At this time, the users with higher network evaluation will choose multi platform access. Under the condition of realizing the compatibility of two levels, the users can trade across the platform, and the users will not have multiple platforms. Access behavior. From the perspective of social welfare, the latter is larger than the former.
The sixth chapter mainly studies the possibility of the modular network governance of e-commerce platform. Using the transaction cost theory, the conditions and possibilities of the non integrated governance of the e-commerce platform are analyzed. It is considered that the e-business search platform is the leading enterprise of its system, and its module suppliers should be the payment platform, the UnionPay and the logistics platform. Under the rules and standards of e-commerce search platform, the competition between value modules is "back to back". Research shows that modularization is more efficient than integration, and modularization can bring more consumer surplus for consumers. The reason for the integration of e-commerce platform and not modularization is the indirect network between the system modules. Part effect, that is, can bring greater barriers to entry and market forces for manufacturers.
The seventh chapter mainly studies the regulation and Countermeasures of e-commerce platform. From the two influencing factors of structure barrier and behavior barrier, it puts forward some suggestions on the regulation of e-commerce platform. One is interconnection and interoperability. As a platform to promote trading as the main purpose platform, because of the external and incompatible factors, the bilateral customers can not cross platform transaction, As the main factor restricting competition and reducing social welfare, interoperability can reduce the barriers to market entry, restore the market to a competitive monopoly market structure, help improve technological innovation and improve social welfare. It is a modular network production. Integration will improve market entry barriers, and the incumbent can take a cross supplement. The use of unintegrated production can improve production efficiency, reduce entry barriers, promote competition, improve consumer surplus and improve social welfare.
The eighth chapter briefly summarizes the basic conclusions of this paper, puts forward the shortcomings, and makes a prospect for future research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F224;F724.6

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 傅瑜;中國互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺企業(yè)競爭策略與市場結(jié)構(gòu)研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2013年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 徐立;網(wǎng)絡(luò)雙邊市場搭售行為的法律規(guī)制問題研究[D];西南財經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

2 姚盆;我國證券交易所的交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性研究[D];天津財經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

3 倪可心;基于交叉網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的雙邊市場定價行為研究[D];東北財經(jīng)大學(xué);2013年

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本文編號：2004048