【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會的持續(xù)發(fā)展,中國汽車市場的發(fā)展非常迅速,每年新增人均汽車保有量以及汽車生產(chǎn)數(shù)量都在穩(wěn)步上升,這些現(xiàn)象表明了之前中國改革發(fā)展的豐碩果實,同時也驗證了我國人民的生活水平達(dá)到了一個新的高度。但是,隨著機(jī)動車數(shù)量的不斷提高,交通事故造成的損失占意外傷害的損失比例一直居高不下,這樣的現(xiàn)象表明,機(jī)動車的使用在給予我們生活方便的同時,也為人們帶來了一些負(fù)面影響。交通事故賠償問題已經(jīng)逐步成為一個突出的社會問題,并由此使機(jī)動車輛保險得到了快速發(fā)展,并一躍成為了財產(chǎn)保險中的第一大險種。2014上半年,機(jī)動車輛保費收入已經(jīng)占到財產(chǎn)保險公司總保費收入的70%以上,機(jī)動車輛保險的經(jīng)營狀況好壞直接影響到財產(chǎn)保險公司生死存亡,但與之并存的車險欺詐問題已成為車險發(fā)展的瓶頸。保險欺詐的存在導(dǎo)致了汽車保險市場目前畸形的經(jīng)營狀況,必將導(dǎo)致汽車保險業(yè)務(wù)的發(fā)展發(fā)生巨大波動。信息不對稱致使保險欺詐成為了世界性的難題,這一難題已經(jīng)嚴(yán)重制約了保險公司的發(fā)展,而保險公司為了發(fā)展將這一風(fēng)險分散給了誠實的投保人,為此,誠實的投保人必須支付額外的費用,來為保險欺詐“買單”。據(jù)統(tǒng)計,因保險欺詐而額外支付的費用在不斷增加。據(jù)有關(guān)報道,國際保險業(yè)的欺詐平均損失大約在10%-30%；我國保險欺詐活動也大量增加,詐騙犯罪中保險欺詐大約占到20%。所以目前車險行業(yè)面臨的一個重大戰(zhàn)略課題就是：如何更加有效地防范汽車保險詐騙,以獲得行業(yè)的健康持續(xù)發(fā)展和更多的競爭優(yōu)勢。 本文以信息不對稱理論為主要的論證思想,通過對汽車保險的成因、表現(xiàn)形式及危害進(jìn)行分析,研究了車險詐騙的內(nèi)在邏輯,形成本文研究的邏輯起點。然后,通過介紹了相關(guān)規(guī)定和司法解釋,結(jié)合案例進(jìn)而對我國機(jī)動車輛保險詐騙管理的現(xiàn)狀和存在的問題進(jìn)行實證研究。同時,運用不完全信息動態(tài)博弈理論對保險公司與投保人之間的博弈關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。通過構(gòu)建不完全信息動態(tài)博弈模型,研究分析保險公司和投保人相互之間的博弈過程、最優(yōu)策略和重復(fù)博弈,并通過研究博弈均衡結(jié)果努力尋找機(jī)動車輛保險詐騙的解決途徑。最后,結(jié)合實證研究和模型分析的結(jié)果,并且借鑒發(fā)達(dá)國家在機(jī)動車輛保險詐騙防范方面的成功經(jīng)驗,對我國機(jī)動車輛保險詐騙管理體系進(jìn)行優(yōu)化并提出改進(jìn)建議。
[Abstract]:With the sustained development of economy and society, the auto market in China is developing very rapidly. Every year, the number of new cars per capita and the number of automobile production are rising steadily. These phenomena indicate the fruitful fruits of China's previous reform and development. At the same time, it also verifies that the living standard of our people has reached a new height. However, with the continuous increase of the number of motor vehicles, the loss caused by traffic accidents has been high in proportion to the loss of accidental injuries. This phenomenon shows that the use of motor vehicles gives us convenience in life at the same time. It also brings some negative effects to people. The problem of compensation for traffic accidents has gradually become a prominent social problem, and as a result, the motor vehicle insurance has developed rapidly, and has become the largest type of insurance in property insurance in the first half of 2014. The insurance premium income of motor vehicles has accounted for more than 70% of the total premium income of property insurance companies. The operating condition of motor vehicle insurance has a direct impact on the life and death of property insurance companies. However, the problem of vehicle insurance fraud has become the bottleneck of the development of auto insurance. The existence of insurance fraud has led to the malformation of the auto insurance market at present and will inevitably lead to huge fluctuations in the development of auto insurance business. Information asymmetry causes insurance fraud to become a worldwide problem, which has seriously restricted the development of insurance companies. In order to develop, insurance companies spread this risk to honest policyholders. An honest policyholder must pay an extra fee to pay for insurance fraud. According to statistics, the extra payment due to insurance fraud is increasing. According to relevant reports, the average loss of fraud in the international insurance industry is about 10 to 30 percent, and the number of insurance fraud activities in China has also increased substantially, accounting for about 20 percent of the fraud crimes. So at present an important strategic problem facing the auto insurance industry is how to prevent auto insurance fraud more effectively in order to obtain the healthy and sustainable development of the industry and more competitive advantages. This paper takes the information asymmetry theory as the main argumentation thought, through the analysis of the cause, the manifestation and the harm of the automobile insurance, studies the inherent logic of the automobile insurance fraud, and forms the logical starting point of this paper. Then, through the introduction of relevant regulations and judicial interpretation, combined with a case study of the motor vehicle insurance fraud management status and existing problems are empirically studied. At the same time, the dynamic game theory of incomplete information is used to study the game relationship between insurance company and policy holder. By constructing a dynamic game model of incomplete information, this paper studies and analyzes the game process, optimal strategy and repeated game between insurance company and policy holder, and tries to find a solution to the fraud of motor vehicle insurance by studying the equilibrium result of game. Finally, combining the results of empirical research and model analysis, and drawing on the successful experiences of developed countries in the prevention of motor vehicle insurance fraud, the paper optimizes the management system of motor vehicle insurance fraud in China and puts forward some suggestions for improvement.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.63

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