本文選題：公司治理 + 保險(xiǎn)公司　； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,保險(xiǎn)公司的治理問題日益引起學(xué)者們的重視。由于保險(xiǎn)公司在經(jīng)營、治理目標(biāo)以及治理原則上有其特殊性,決定了保險(xiǎn)公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)也與一般公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不同,對公司績效的影響也不同,應(yīng)單獨(dú)列出來研究。 從目前我國保險(xiǎn)公司治理情況來看,公司治理已完成了從無到有的變革,絕大部分保險(xiǎn)公司建立了現(xiàn)代公司治理機(jī)制,具備較為完整的董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)、股東大會(huì)等相關(guān)制度,這對保險(xiǎn)公司來說無疑是重大的進(jìn)步,治理機(jī)制的完善,對各保險(xiǎn)公司科學(xué)決策、高效執(zhí)行、保護(hù)股東權(quán)益以及提高公司績效均起到一定作用。但從橫向來看,現(xiàn)代公司治理在我國尚處于發(fā)展階段,尤其是在保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的運(yùn)用時(shí)間短,與歐美國家保險(xiǎn)公司治理水平存在較大的差距。國內(nèi)大部分保險(xiǎn)公司的治理架構(gòu)完整、制度齊全,但在實(shí)踐中往往形同虛設(shè),可以說是“形似而神不似”,公司治理機(jī)制對公司績效的影響有限。因此如何將形式上的治理機(jī)制轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閷?shí)質(zhì)性的治理機(jī)制,使保險(xiǎn)公司治理體系真正為保險(xiǎn)公司服務(wù),提高保險(xiǎn)公司的績效,是當(dāng)前我國保險(xiǎn)公司所面臨的重要問題。 本文通過實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的方式,利用搜集的數(shù)據(jù),主要研究分析了保險(xiǎn)公司治理中股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)特征、高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制對公司績效的影響,得出相應(yīng)的結(jié)論,最后從股權(quán)優(yōu)化、董事會(huì)優(yōu)化、高管激勵(lì)優(yōu)化以及信息披露四個(gè)方面對保險(xiǎn)公司治理的完善提出了相應(yīng)的建議,以期對我國保險(xiǎn)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)完善有所裨益。本文通過以下五個(gè)方面來展開相關(guān)研究： 第一部分,緒論。在本章中首先提出了本論文研究的目的和意義,然后說明了本文研究的內(nèi)容以及方法,接著給出了基本結(jié)構(gòu)與內(nèi)容安排,最后闡述了本文的創(chuàng)新及不足之處。 第二部分,闡述了公司治理及保險(xiǎn)公司治理的定義,介紹了四個(gè)理論依據(jù),然后介紹了公司績效及其評價(jià)方法。接著分析歸納了我國保險(xiǎn)公司治理的發(fā)展歷程,闡述了保險(xiǎn)公司治理的特殊性,指出了我國保險(xiǎn)公司治理的現(xiàn)實(shí)情況。 第三部分,闡述了保險(xiǎn)公司治理對公司績效的影響機(jī)制,分別說明了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)特征以及高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制對保險(xiǎn)公司績效的影響并提出了相應(yīng)的研究假設(shè)。 第四部分,本章為實(shí)證研究部分。本文的被解釋變量為保險(xiǎn)公司總資產(chǎn)收益率(ROA),解釋變量有股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及董事會(huì)特征等九個(gè),還根據(jù)保險(xiǎn)公司的特殊性提出了相應(yīng)的控制變量,運(yùn)用了主成分分析以及多元回歸的實(shí)證方法建立了相應(yīng)的理論模型。然后利用我國25家中資壽險(xiǎn)公司2012年的年度報(bào)告數(shù)據(jù),通過Excel軟件得出描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)結(jié)果,分析了數(shù)據(jù)反映的被解釋變量以及解釋變量的情況,接著根據(jù)選定的模型,利用SPSS和Eviews輔助軟件并得出了相應(yīng)的模型成果,根據(jù)回歸成果得出相應(yīng)的結(jié)論。最后對回歸結(jié)果的意義和原因進(jìn)行了闡述。 第五部分,研究結(jié)論、政策建議及研究展望部分。本章在上一章實(shí)證的基礎(chǔ)上得出結(jié)論,通過之前的理論、現(xiàn)實(shí)情況的梳理以及實(shí)證結(jié)果對我國保險(xiǎn)公司治理中存在的問題提出了有針對性的政策建議,主要分為四個(gè)方面：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化,董事會(huì)治理優(yōu)化,完善高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制以及信息披露制度優(yōu)化。最后對論文進(jìn)一步的研究展望做出說明。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the problem of the insurance company's governance has attracted more and more attention of the scholars. As the insurance company has its particularity in the management, the management goal and the governance principle, it decides that the insurance company's governance structure is different from the general corporate governance structure, and the influence on the company performance is different, and it should be listed separately.
From the current situation of our country's insurance company governance, corporate governance has completed a change from scratch. Most insurance companies have established a modern corporate governance mechanism, with a relatively complete board of directors, board of supervisors, shareholders meeting and other related systems, which is undoubtedly a major progress for the insurance company, the improvement of the governance mechanism, and the protection of the various insurance companies. It plays a certain role in scientific decision-making, efficient implementation, protection of shareholders' rights and interests and improving the performance of the company. However, from the horizontal point of view, the modern corporate governance is still in the development stage in our country, especially in the insurance industry, it has a short time to use in the insurance industry, and there is a big gap with the governance level of the European and American insurance companies. The governance structure is complete and the system is complete, but in practice, it is often in the same shape, which can be said to be "similar to the gods", and the corporate governance mechanism has a limited impact on the company performance. Therefore, how to transform the governance mechanism of the formal governance into a substantial governance mechanism so that the insurance company management system can serve the insurance companies and improve the insurance public. The performance of the company is an important problem facing China's insurance companies.
In this paper, through the empirical test, using the collected data, this paper mainly analyzes the influence of the ownership structure, the board characteristics, the executive incentive mechanism on the company performance in the insurance company governance, and draws the corresponding conclusions. Finally, the insurance company is governed by four aspects of the equity optimization, the optimization of the board of directors, the optimization of the executive excitation and the information disclosure. In order to improve the governance structure of insurance companies in China, this paper puts forward corresponding suggestions to improve the governance structure of our insurance companies. The following five aspects are involved in this study.
The first part is introduction. In this chapter, the purpose and significance of the study are first presented, then the contents and methods of this study are explained, and then the basic structure and content arrangement are given, and the innovation and inadequacies of this paper are expounded at the end.
The second part expounds the definition of corporate governance and the management of insurance companies, introduces four theoretical bases, then introduces the company performance and its evaluation methods, then analyzes and summarizes the development process of the management of the insurance companies in China, expounds the particularity of the insurance company governance, and points out the reality of the management of the insurance companies in China.
In the third part, the influence mechanism of the insurance company governance on the performance of the company is expounded, and the influence of the ownership structure, the board characteristics and the executive incentive mechanism on the performance of the insurance company is explained respectively, and the corresponding research hypothesis is put forward.
The fourth part, this chapter is an empirical study. The explanatory variables of this article are the total asset return rate (ROA) of the insurance company, the explanatory variables have the ownership structure and the characteristics of the board of directors, etc. nine, and according to the particularity of the insurance company, the corresponding control variables are put forward, and the corresponding method of the principal component analysis and multiple regression is used to establish the corresponding method. And then, using the annual report data of 25 Chinese Chinese life insurance companies in 2012, the descriptive statistical results are obtained through Excel software, and the explanatory variables and the explanatory variables are analyzed. Then, according to the selected model, the corresponding model results are obtained by using SPSS and Eviews auxiliary software. The conclusion is drawn from the regression results. Finally, the significance and reasons of the regression results are expounded.
The fifth part, research conclusions, policy recommendations and research prospects. This chapter draws conclusions on the basis of the previous chapter. Through the previous theory, the reality of the combing and empirical results of the problems existing in the management of China's insurance companies put forward some targeted policy recommendations, mainly divided into four aspects: the optimization of ownership structure, The optimization of board governance, the improvement of executive incentive mechanism and the optimization of information disclosure system are finally explained.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.3;F272.5;F271

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