本文選題：保險(xiǎn)公司 + 高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制　； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：制定并實(shí)施科學(xué)、合理、有效的薪酬激勵(lì)制度,能夠有效降低代理成本,是實(shí)現(xiàn)公司高級(jí)管理者有效激勵(lì)與約束的重要手段,也是公司能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展并逐步壯大的主要因素之一。近幾年以來(lái),公司高管薪酬逐漸受到公眾的關(guān)注,尤其是金融領(lǐng)域的高管薪酬吸引了無(wú)數(shù)人的眼球。雖然現(xiàn)階段針對(duì)高管薪酬的研究已有很多,但是在學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)高管薪酬的關(guān)注熱度始終沒(méi)有降低,這一方面說(shuō)明高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制對(duì)于公司的發(fā)展具有極其重要的意義,一方面也說(shuō)明現(xiàn)有的研究仍不完善,尚未完全解決好現(xiàn)實(shí)中出現(xiàn)的問(wèn)題,需要結(jié)合實(shí)際進(jìn)行改進(jìn)和補(bǔ)充。 高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的發(fā)展與完善,與所處的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展環(huán)境分不開,也與監(jiān)管背景密不可分。高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)不但要依據(jù)公司發(fā)展實(shí)際,受到公司發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效等因素的影響,而且要與當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)相適應(yīng),受到行業(yè)發(fā)展、社會(huì)環(huán)境、監(jiān)管背景等因素的影響。高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的研究一直是學(xué)術(shù)界的研究熱點(diǎn),多數(shù)研究是從微觀入手,公司角度研究某種要素對(duì)高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的影響,很少分析宏觀背景、監(jiān)管措施對(duì)高管薪酬的影響。2009年金融危機(jī)促使國(guó)際社會(huì)重新審視諸多監(jiān)管問(wèn)題,并提出建立、實(shí)施有效的宏觀審慎監(jiān)管,而宏觀審慎監(jiān)管一個(gè)重要組成部分就是建立適當(dāng)逆周期監(jiān)管機(jī)制。本文力圖將高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)與宏觀背景相聯(lián)系,分析在逆周期監(jiān)管約束背景下高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的影響因素。 論文以我國(guó)上市保險(xiǎn)公司為研究對(duì)象,從理論上對(duì)逆周期監(jiān)管理論、薪酬激勵(lì)理論進(jìn)行歸納和概括,奠定論文的理論基礎(chǔ)；其次對(duì)國(guó)外高管薪酬激勵(lì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)進(jìn)行分析總結(jié),并闡述我國(guó)現(xiàn)階段保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的現(xiàn)狀和問(wèn)題,分析影響保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬的一般因素及高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制存在的順周期性對(duì)高管薪酬的影響。通過(guò)運(yùn)用科學(xué)的數(shù)理統(tǒng)計(jì)方法加以檢驗(yàn),探究逆周期監(jiān)管背景下,上市保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的影響因素,為進(jìn)一步完善上市保險(xiǎn)公司薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制提供參考建議。全文的章節(jié)安排如下： 第一章緒論,首先對(duì)論文的研究背景、研究意義及研究方法、研究思路等進(jìn)行介紹,其次分別對(duì)高管薪酬影響因素的文獻(xiàn)、逆周期監(jiān)管的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)、保險(xiǎn)業(yè)逆周期監(jiān)管與高管薪酬相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行歸納、總結(jié)。 第二章對(duì)論文中涉及到的有關(guān)高管、薪酬、逆周期監(jiān)管等概念進(jìn)行闡述,介紹逆周期監(jiān)管理論及高管薪酬激勵(lì)相關(guān)理論,并對(duì)其中的具體內(nèi)容做詳細(xì)介紹。為什么會(huì)提出逆周期監(jiān)管?什么是逆周期監(jiān)管?逆周期監(jiān)管的目標(biāo)及手段有哪些?薪酬激勵(lì)的基礎(chǔ)理論是什么?這些都是在本章所要回答的問(wèn)題。 第三章主要介紹保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)制度現(xiàn)狀。首先對(duì)國(guó)外公司高管薪酬的激勵(lì)制度進(jìn)行總結(jié),闡述國(guó)外公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的構(gòu)成,對(duì)國(guó)外高管薪酬水平進(jìn)行比較分析,同時(shí)也介紹國(guó)外政府部門對(duì)高管薪酬的調(diào)節(jié)作用。其次針對(duì)我國(guó)上市保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)制度現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析。介紹我國(guó)保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的構(gòu)成,通過(guò)分析上市保險(xiǎn)公司年報(bào)中披露的數(shù)據(jù),得出目前上市保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制所呈現(xiàn)出的問(wèn)題。 第四章分為三部分,第一部分主要對(duì)影響保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬的一般因素進(jìn)行分析。第二部分是結(jié)合保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的特點(diǎn),分析保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)高管薪酬的特點(diǎn)。第三部分是對(duì)保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬存在順周期效應(yīng)進(jìn)行分析。 第五章主要包括三部分的內(nèi)容。第一部分是介紹逆周期監(jiān)管對(duì)保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬產(chǎn)生的影響。第二部分則是對(duì)逆周期監(jiān)管背景下上市保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬影響因素的統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述,其中從三個(gè)維度進(jìn)行分析：(1)保費(fèi)收入對(duì)高管薪酬影響的統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述。(2)保險(xiǎn)公司投資收益率對(duì)高管薪酬影響的統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述。(3)保險(xiǎn)公司資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率對(duì)高管薪酬影響的統(tǒng)計(jì)性描述。第三個(gè)部分是進(jìn)行多元線性回歸分析,用以證明在第二部分中逆周期監(jiān)管背景下關(guān)于高管薪酬影響因素的相應(yīng)結(jié)論。 第六章主要是給出在逆周期監(jiān)管背景下,完善上市保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的個(gè)人建議。建議上市保險(xiǎn)公司在逆周期監(jiān)管背景下,逐步調(diào)整薪酬結(jié)構(gòu),加強(qiáng)高管與公司長(zhǎng)期績(jī)效的關(guān)聯(lián),引入薪酬延付機(jī)制,發(fā)展多元化的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)模式,同時(shí)要進(jìn)一步完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),對(duì)于監(jiān)管部門,要進(jìn)一步完善法律法規(guī),加強(qiáng)上市保險(xiǎn)公司的信息披露制度,加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管力量。 第七章是對(duì)全文進(jìn)行總結(jié),并闡述研究局限和未來(lái)研究方向。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于： (1)本文以保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制為研究對(duì)象,彌補(bǔ)了國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)于行業(yè)薪酬研究偏少的不足。將薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制與宏觀背景相聯(lián)系,研究逆周期監(jiān)管背景對(duì)于保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的影響。 (2)本文在具體指標(biāo)的選取上有所創(chuàng)新。在總結(jié)前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,綜合的分析了影響高管薪酬的一般影響因素,從保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)存在的順周期效應(yīng)著手,分析保險(xiǎn)公司薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)中有可能產(chǎn)生順周期效應(yīng)的因素,在理論上為研究逆周期監(jiān)管背景下保險(xiǎn)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制影響因素提供了參考價(jià)值。 研究局限和未來(lái)研究方向： (1)實(shí)證分析中高管薪酬的影響因素主要選擇了有可能造成順周期效應(yīng)的因素,并沒(méi)有考慮影響高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的一般影響因素,如公司規(guī)模、發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)等,也沒(méi)有考慮高管人員的個(gè)人因素,例如學(xué)歷,年齡等因素,這些因素可能對(duì)高管薪酬也具有影響作用,使研究結(jié)果有一定的局限,在今后的研究中可以拓寬變量指標(biāo)的選擇。 (2)本文研究的薪酬只是現(xiàn)金報(bào)酬,由于我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的水平還比較低,本文沒(méi)有考慮高管人員持股和股票期權(quán)等長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)方式的影響。隨著以后我國(guó)加大對(duì)高管的股權(quán)激勵(lì),不斷完善薪酬結(jié)構(gòu),可以將其納入模型。 (3)數(shù)據(jù)選擇方面具有局限性,由于上市保險(xiǎn)公司只有中國(guó)人壽、中國(guó)平安、中國(guó)太保、新華保險(xiǎn)4家,且新華保險(xiǎn)在2011年才上市,實(shí)證研究中存在樣本數(shù)量偏少的局限。
[Abstract]:Making and implementing a scientific, reasonable and effective salary incentive system can effectively reduce the agency cost. It is an important means to realize the effective incentive and constraint of the senior managers. It is also one of the main factors that the company can achieve long-term development and gradually grow. In recent years, the executive pay of the company has been paid more and more attention by the public, especially in the past few years. Executive pay in the financial field has attracted numerous people. Although there are a lot of research on executive compensation at the present stage, the concern about executive pay has not been reduced in the academic world. This shows that the executive compensation incentive mechanism is of great significance to the development of the company, on the one hand, it also explains the existing research. The research is still not perfect and has not yet completely solved the problems in reality. It needs to be improved and supplemented in combination with reality.
The development and perfection of executive compensation incentive mechanism can not be separated from the environment of economic development and closely related to the regulatory background. The design of executive compensation incentive mechanism should not only be influenced by the development strategy of the company, the corporate governance structure, the management performance and so on, but also should be adapted to the current economic situation. The influence of industry development, social environment, supervision background and other factors. The research of executive compensation incentive mechanism has always been the research hot spot in the academic circle. Most of the research is from the micro point of view, the company angle studies the influence of some elements on the executive compensation incentive mechanism, rarely analyzes the macro view background, the effect of regulatory measures on executive compensation.2009 years The financial crisis has prompted the international community to reexamine a number of regulatory issues, and put forward the establishment of effective macro prudential supervision, and an important part of the macro prudential regulation is the establishment of a proper reverse cycle regulatory mechanism. This paper tries to link the design of executive compensation incentive mechanism with the macro background and analyze the constraints on the back cycle regulation. The influencing factors of executive compensation incentive mechanism design.
The thesis takes China listed insurance companies as the research object, summarizes and summarizes the theory of reverse cycle supervision and compensation incentive theory, and lays the theoretical foundation for the thesis. Secondly, it analyzes and summarizes the experience of executive compensation incentive in foreign countries, and expounds the current situation and problems of the salary incentive mechanism of the senior executives in our country. The general factors that affect the executive compensation of the insurance company and the effect of the CIS cyclical on the executive compensation in the executive compensation incentive mechanism. Through the use of scientific mathematical statistics to examine and explore the influencing factors of the salary incentive mechanism of the listed insurance companies under the background of the reverse cycle supervision, to further improve the salary of the listed insurance companies. The full text is arranged as follows:
The first chapter is introduction, first of all, the paper introduces the research background, research significance and research methods, research ideas and so on. Secondly, the literature on the influencing factors of executive compensation, the related literature of reverse cycle supervision, the literature of the inverse cycle supervision of insurance industry and executive compensation are summarized and summarized.
The second chapter expounds the concepts related to senior executives, compensation and reverse cycle supervision, and introduces the theory of reverse cycle supervision and the related theories of executive compensation incentive, and gives a detailed introduction to the specific contents of them. Why do they propose reverse cycle regulation? What is the reverse cycle supervision? What are the goals and means of the reverse cycle supervision? What are the basic theories of reward motivation? These are the questions to be answered in this chapter.
The third chapter mainly introduces the current situation of the executive compensation incentive system of the insurance company. First, it summarizes the incentive system of the executive compensation of foreign companies, expounds the composition of the compensation incentive mechanism of foreign company executives, compares and analyses the salary level of foreign executives, and also introduces the regulation effect of foreign government departments on executive compensation. The present situation of the executive compensation incentive system of the listed insurance companies in China is analyzed. The composition of the incentive mechanism of the executive compensation of the insurance companies in China is introduced. Through the analysis of the data disclosed in the annual reports of the listed insurance companies, the problems present in the incentive mechanism of the executive compensation of the listed insurance companies are obtained.
The fourth chapter is divided into three parts. The first part mainly analyzes the general factors that affect the compensation of the insurance company executives. The second part is the characteristics of the insurance industry. The third part is the analysis of the CIS cycle effect of the executive compensation in the insurance company.
The fifth chapter mainly includes the content of three parts. The first part is the introduction of the impact of reverse cycle regulation on the executive compensation of the insurance company. The second part is a statistical description of the factors affecting the executive compensation of the listed insurance companies under the background of the reverse cycle supervision, which is analyzed from three dimensions: (1) the impact of premium income on executive compensation Statistical description of (2) the statistical description of the impact of the insurance company's investment return on executive compensation. (3) the statistical description of the impact of the insurance company's asset liability ratio on executive compensation. The third part is the multiple linear regression analysis to prove the factors affecting the executive compensation in the second part of the reverse cycle supervision. It should be concluded.
The sixth chapter is the personal suggestion to improve the salary incentive mechanism of the listed insurance company executives under the backdrop of reverse cycle supervision. It is suggested that the listed insurance companies adjust the salary structure gradually, strengthen the relationship between the senior executives and the company's long-term performance, introduce pay delay mechanism and develop a diversified salary structure mode. At the same time, we should further improve the corporate governance structure. For the regulatory department, we should further improve the laws and regulations, strengthen the information disclosure system of the listed insurance companies and strengthen the regulatory force.
The seventh chapter is the summary of the full text, and describes the research limitations and future research directions.
The innovation of this article lies in:
(1) this paper takes the salary incentive mechanism of the insurance industry as the research object, and makes up for the shortage of domestic compensation research in the industry. It links the salary incentive mechanism with the macro background to study the influence of the reverse cycle supervision background on the compensation incentive mechanism of the insurance company executives.
(2) this article is innovative in the selection of specific indicators. On the basis of summarizing the previous research, the general factors affecting the executive compensation are analyzed comprehensively. From the CIS cycle effect of the insurance industry, this paper analyzes the factors that may produce the CIS cycle effect in the design of the compensation incentive mechanism of the insurance company and studies the inverse theory in theory. Under the background of supervision, it provides reference value for insurance company executive compensation incentive mechanism.
Research limitations and future research directions:
(1) in the empirical analysis, the influencing factors of executive compensation mainly choose the factors that may cause the CIS cycle effect, and do not consider the general factors affecting the executive compensation incentive mechanism, such as the size of the company, the development strategy, the corporate governance structure and so on, and do not consider the personal factors of the executives, such as education, age and other factors. It may also have an impact on executive pay, which limits the research results and broadens the choice of variable indicators in future research.
(2) the salary of this study is only cash reward. Because of the low level of equity incentive in China, this paper does not consider the influence of long term incentive methods, such as executive stock ownership and stock option. With the increase of equity incentive in our country and the continuous improvement of the salary structure, it can be incorporated into the model.
(3) the selection of data has limitations, because the listed insurance companies only have China life, China's safety, China's Tai Bao and Xinhua Insurance 4, and Xinhua insurance is not listed in 2011. There is a limited number of samples in the empirical study.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F842.3

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