本文選題：信息不對稱　切入點：道德風險　出處：《保險研究》2013年12期

【摘要】：本文的目的是考察國內(nèi)車險市場中是否存在信息不對稱現(xiàn)象,并試圖分離道德風險和逆向選擇的影響,即分離出二者對信息不對稱的貢獻。利用國內(nèi)一家大型財險公司某省份2008~2009年商業(yè)第三者責任險數(shù)據(jù),論文通過Probit模型驗證了信息不對稱的存在;同時,論文利用分組控制住了逆向選擇(風險異質(zhì)性)的影響,并利用對照組剔除了學習效應(yīng)的貢獻,證明商業(yè)第三者責任險市場中不存在道德風險;因此該市場的信息不對稱完全是由逆向選擇貢獻的。
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is information asymmetry in the domestic auto insurance market, and try to separate the influence of moral hazard and adverse selection. That is to say, the contribution of the two to information asymmetry is separated. Using the commercial third party liability insurance data from 2008 to 2009 of a large property insurance company in China, the paper verifies the existence of information asymmetry by Probit model. In this paper, the influence of adverse selection (risk heterogeneity) is controlled by grouping, and the contribution of learning effect is excluded by the control group, which proves that there is no moral hazard in the market of commercial third party liability insurance. Therefore, the information asymmetry in this market is completely contributed by adverse selection.
【作者單位】： 清華大學經(jīng)管學院;
【基金】：北京市屬高等學校高層次人才引進與培養(yǎng)計劃項目YETP0137的資助~~
【分類號】：F842.6;F426.471;F224

【參考文獻】

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本文編號：1659362