本文選題：董事責(zé)任保險　切入點：過度投資　出處：《海南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來,大量財務(wù)丑聞的頻頻曝光,使公司董事及高管人員面臨前所未有的詳盡審查和責(zé)任風(fēng)險。隨著投資者利益保護意識的不斷提升,針對上市公司的集體訴訟逐漸增加,董事和高管人員的執(zhí)業(yè)風(fēng)險不斷加大,董事責(zé)任保險的潛在需求愈發(fā)凸顯。關(guān)于董事責(zé)任保險理論的研究,國外學(xué)者從股東利益保護、外部監(jiān)督、管理層風(fēng)險厭惡、信號傳遞以及財務(wù)效應(yīng)等方面對其進行了詳盡的探討,并形成了比較完整的董事責(zé)任保險購買需求動因理論體系。國內(nèi)學(xué)者也從法理、功效和需求等方面對董事責(zé)任保險進行了全方位的分析,并達(dá)成了較為一致的觀點。然而,對于董事責(zé)任保險與公司治理方面的研究則顯得相對匱乏,而且在有限的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)中,關(guān)于董事責(zé)任保險與企業(yè)投資效率的研究更是屈指可數(shù)。 投資效率關(guān)系到企業(yè)價值的提升和股東財富的增加,但現(xiàn)實資本市場中存在信息不對稱和委托代理問題,這些因素會導(dǎo)致企業(yè)投資決策出現(xiàn)偏差,引發(fā)過度投資或投資不足。國外研究表明董事責(zé)任保險可充當(dāng)外部監(jiān)督機制,對上市公司董事及高管人員進行監(jiān)督,以減少其機會主義行為,降低公司委托代理成本,進而緩解企業(yè)過度投資或投資不足。但與此同時,董事責(zé)任保險也有可能引發(fā)逆向選擇或加劇道德風(fēng)險,進一步降低企業(yè)投資效率。因此,結(jié)合我國特定的制度背景和法律環(huán)境,探索董事責(zé)任保險對我國企業(yè)的投資效率究竟是否存在治理作用就顯得尤為重要,也具有開拓性的理論和實踐意義。 本文基于我國深滬A股上市公司2006-2012年的財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)和手工搜集的有關(guān)董事責(zé)任保險的數(shù)據(jù),在區(qū)分過度投資和投資不足的企業(yè)非效率投資基礎(chǔ)上,采用規(guī)范分析、描述性統(tǒng)計、相關(guān)性分析和回歸分析等多種研究方法,對董事責(zé)任保險與企業(yè)投資效率的相關(guān)性進行了深入的探討。實證研究結(jié)果表明,董事責(zé)任保險能夠改善企業(yè)過度投資,但是不能緩解企業(yè)投資不足,董事責(zé)任保險在對企業(yè)投資效率的治理作用方面表現(xiàn)出一定的選擇性。我國上市公司應(yīng)全面審視并相機利用董事責(zé)任保險作為改善企業(yè)投資效率的工具。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the frequent exposure of a large number of financial scandals, company directors and executives are facing unprecedented scrutiny and liability risks. With the increasing awareness of the protection of investors' interests, class-action litigation against listed companies has gradually increased. The risk of directors and executives is increasing, and the potential demand of directors liability insurance becomes more and more obvious. On the theory of directors liability insurance, foreign scholars from shareholders' interests protection, external supervision, management risk aversion, The signal transmission and financial effect are discussed in detail, and a relatively complete theoretical system of directors' liability insurance purchase demand motivation is formed. In the aspects of efficiency and demand, the director's liability insurance has been comprehensively analyzed and reached a more consistent point of view. However, the research on directors' liability insurance and corporate governance is relatively scarce. In the limited literature, the research on directors liability insurance and enterprise investment efficiency is even more rare. Investment efficiency is related to the promotion of enterprise value and the increase of shareholder wealth, but there are information asymmetry and principal-agent problems in the real capital market, which will lead to the deviation of enterprise investment decision. Foreign studies show that directors liability insurance can act as an external supervision mechanism to supervise the directors and executives of listed companies in order to reduce their opportunistic behavior and reduce the cost of agency. But at the same time, directors' liability insurance may lead to adverse selection or aggravate moral hazard, and further reduce the efficiency of enterprise investment. Combined with the specific institutional background and legal environment of our country, it is particularly important to explore whether directors' liability insurance has a governance effect on the investment efficiency of Chinese enterprises, and it is also of pioneering theoretical and practical significance. Based on the financial data of Shenzhen and Shanghai A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2012 and the data on directors' liability insurance collected by hand, this paper adopts normative analysis and descriptive statistics on the basis of distinguishing overinvestment from inefficient investment of underinvested enterprises. The correlation between directors' liability insurance and enterprise investment efficiency is discussed in depth by correlation analysis and regression analysis. The empirical results show that directors' liability insurance can improve the overinvestment of enterprises. However, it cannot alleviate the lack of investment by enterprises. The director's liability insurance has a certain selectivity in the governance of the enterprise's investment efficiency. The listed companies in our country should examine the director's liability insurance comprehensively and use it as a tool to improve the enterprise's investment efficiency.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：海南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F842.69;F275

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