本文關(guān)鍵詞： 信息披露 公司價(jià)值 投資者行為　出處：《廣西大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)誕生,便面臨著“信息不對(duì)稱”的困境。保險(xiǎn)人和投保人之間的信息博弈決定著保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的生死存亡。在保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)中,“完全信息”的重要性從不曾弱化過。盡管如此,保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)中因信息不對(duì)稱造成的矛盾依然隨處可見。在保險(xiǎn)產(chǎn)品銷售過程中,逆向選擇、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題依然存在,虛假宣傳、違規(guī)操作依然嚴(yán)重?fù)p害著保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的形象。因此,保險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管部門先后多次出臺(tái)了各項(xiàng)法規(guī)條文,試圖加強(qiáng)行業(yè)內(nèi)的信息披露,營(yíng)造一個(gè)誠(chéng)信的保險(xiǎn)運(yùn)營(yíng)環(huán)境,維護(hù)保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展,切實(shí)體現(xiàn)保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)對(duì)整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)的保障作用。 在我國(guó),對(duì)保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的監(jiān)管主要由中國(guó)保監(jiān)會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)。對(duì)于部分上市保險(xiǎn)公司,證監(jiān)會(huì)也有一定的監(jiān)管權(quán)力。因此,為了考察信息披露對(duì)我國(guó)上市保險(xiǎn)公司的影響,本文選取中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)與中國(guó)保監(jiān)會(huì)制定的保險(xiǎn)公司信息披露法規(guī),利用事件研究法,考察兩次比較重要的保險(xiǎn)業(yè)信息披露規(guī)則事件前后保險(xiǎn)公司市場(chǎng)價(jià)值變化情況,并使用高頻分筆交易數(shù)據(jù)考察不同類型投資者行為差異。從而判斷信息披露水平的提升,對(duì)上市保險(xiǎn)公司市場(chǎng)績(jī)效的影響,并試圖分析這種影響的來源及規(guī)模。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：更透明的保險(xiǎn)業(yè)信息披露制度可以顯著提高上市保險(xiǎn)公司的市場(chǎng)績(jī)效,增加公司價(jià)值,并且該效應(yīng)可維持較長(zhǎng)時(shí)間；更透明的保險(xiǎn)信息披露體系傾向于吸引機(jī)構(gòu)投資者進(jìn)入,從而得到機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的“獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)”,增加其股票在證券市場(chǎng)上的收益,即公司價(jià)值的提升主要來源于相對(duì)理性的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持有偏好。 本文研究結(jié)果一方面有著清晰的政策含義,如為建設(shè)完善的保險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管體系提供了更加穩(wěn)健的現(xiàn)實(shí)依據(jù)和建設(shè)方向,并結(jié)合本文結(jié)果,分別從監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)、保險(xiǎn)公司、投資者和市場(chǎng)制度建設(shè)等角度出發(fā),制定了相應(yīng)的鼓勵(lì)措施,激勵(lì)保險(xiǎn)公司完善自身信息披露制度,提高信息披露水平,從而提高整個(gè)保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的信息透明度,另一方面也指出了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和個(gè)人投資者之間的行為差異,在行為研究方面做了初步研究。
[Abstract]:Since the birth of the insurance industry, it has faced the dilemma of "information asymmetry". The information game between the insurer and the policy holder determines the life or death of the insurance industry. The importance of "complete information" has never been weakened. However, contradictions caused by asymmetric information in the insurance industry are still everywhere. In the process of selling insurance products, adverse selection. Moral hazard problems still exist, false propaganda, illegal operations are still seriously damaging the image of the insurance industry. Therefore, the insurance regulatory authorities have issued a number of regulations and provisions. This paper attempts to strengthen the disclosure of information in the industry, create a good faith insurance operation environment, maintain the healthy development of the insurance industry, and effectively reflect the insurance industry to the entire economic and social protection role. In China, China Insurance Regulatory Commission is mainly responsible for the supervision of the insurance industry. For some listed insurance companies, the CSRC also has certain regulatory powers. In order to investigate the impact of information disclosure on listed insurance companies in China, this paper selects the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission to formulate the insurance company information disclosure regulations, using the incident study method. This paper examines the changes in market value of insurance companies before and after two more important insurance disclosure rules. And the use of high-frequency split transaction data to investigate the behavior of different types of investors, so as to judge the level of information disclosure, the impact on the market performance of listed insurance companies. And try to analyze the source and scale of this impact. This study found that: more transparent insurance information disclosure system can significantly improve the market performance of listed insurance companies and increase the value of the company. And the effect can be maintained for a long time. A more transparent insurance disclosure system tends to attract institutional investors, thereby receiving "incentives" from institutional investors to increase returns on their stocks in the securities market. That is to say, the promotion of corporate value mainly comes from the relative rational institutional investors' holding preference. On the one hand, the research results of this paper have clear policy implications, such as for the construction of a sound insurance regulatory system to provide a more robust practical basis and construction direction, and combined with the results of this paper, respectively from the regulatory bodies. Insurance companies, investors and market system construction and other angles, formulated the corresponding incentives to encourage insurance companies to improve their own information disclosure system, improve the level of information disclosure. On the other hand, it also points out the behavioral differences between institutional investors and individual investors, and makes a preliminary study on behavior research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F842.3;F830.43

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