本文關(guān)鍵詞：“委托-代理”關(guān)系視域下的學校變革:問題及策略　出處：《教育科學研究》2013年08期 　論文類型：期刊論文

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【摘要】："委托-代理"理論已成為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)組織及其他社會組織治理的重要邏輯起點。學校作為一種特殊的社會組織,其現(xiàn)有的"委托-代理"關(guān)系呈現(xiàn)為一種復(fù)雜的多層級"委托-代理"關(guān)系樣態(tài),在學校變革情境中,這種復(fù)雜的多層級"委托-代理"關(guān)系很容易產(chǎn)生各種制約學校變革績效的問題,如機會主義行為、敗德行為和尋租行為等�；诖�,學校變革權(quán)"委托-代理"關(guān)系的再設(shè)計,即構(gòu)建兩層級、多主體的學校變革權(quán)"委托-代理"關(guān)系,以及發(fā)揮監(jiān)督-激勵機制的制衡作用,成為當前提高學校組織變革績效的重要策略選擇。
[Abstract]:"Principal-agent" theory has become an important logical starting point for the governance of modern enterprise organizations and other social organizations. School as a special social organization. Its existing "principal-agent" relationship presents a complex multi-level "principal-agent" relationship, in the context of school reform. This complex multi-level "principal-agent" relationship can easily lead to a variety of constraints on the performance of school reform, such as opportunistic behavior, moral behavior and rent-seeking behavior. The re-design of "principal-agent" relationship of school reform right is to construct the "principal-agent" relationship of school reform right with two levels and multi-subjects, as well as to exert the function of checks and balances of supervisory and incentive mechanism. It has become an important strategy choice to improve the performance of school organizational change.
【作者單位】： 天津職業(yè)技術(shù)師范大學職業(yè)教育學院教育學系;天津職業(yè)技術(shù)師范大學研究生處;
【基金】：全國教育科學規(guī)劃2012年度教育部青年項目“高等職業(yè)教育質(zhì)量評估機制研究”(EJA120401)階段性成果
【分類號】：G471
【正文快照】： “委托-代理”理論作為制度經(jīng)濟學契約理論的主要內(nèi)容之一,目前已成為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)組織及其他社會組織治理的重要邏輯起點。學校作為一種特殊的社會組織,提高其組織變革績效已成為當前學校變革的重要議題之一�；诖�,在“委托-代理”關(guān)系視域下反思當前學校變革中存在的問題,對，

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