【摘要】：軟件即服務(wù)（SaaS：Software as a Service）是基于云計(jì)算的軟件應(yīng)用服務(wù)，也是云計(jì)算的重要組成部分。電子直銷渠道是SaaS服務(wù)提供商普遍采用的渠道結(jié)構(gòu)，但目前國內(nèi)外眾多SaaS服務(wù)提供商在迅速擴(kuò)大實(shí)體渠道，逐漸形成電子直銷渠道與實(shí)體代理渠道共存的混合渠道結(jié)構(gòu)。在該結(jié)構(gòu)下，SaaS服務(wù)提供商與SaaS代理商橫向是供應(yīng)鏈合作關(guān)系，縱向是市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。雖然混合渠道在降低交易成本和擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)規(guī)模方面優(yōu)勢(shì)突出，但同時(shí)也使混合渠道成員陷入既合作又競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的尷尬境地。SaaS服務(wù)提供商為客戶交付軟件服務(wù)而非軟件產(chǎn)品，服務(wù)已成為SaaS的營銷主體，所以對(duì)SaaS混合渠道服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與協(xié)調(diào)的研究將有助于優(yōu)化SaaS混合渠道，對(duì)推進(jìn)SaaS快速發(fā)展具有重要意義。 本文主要研究結(jié)論體現(xiàn)在以下四個(gè)方面： 第一，SaaS混合渠道形成的必要性來源于SaaS產(chǎn)品特征與客戶偏好。從SaaS服務(wù)提供商網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道到混合渠道的渠道結(jié)構(gòu)變化現(xiàn)實(shí)出發(fā)，以資源基礎(chǔ)理論、資源依賴?yán)碚�、交易成本理論與委托代理理論作為SaaS混合渠道形成的初步理論基礎(chǔ)，，利用案例研究方法，從產(chǎn)品、市場(chǎng)和成本角度詮釋了SaaS混合渠道結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生的必要性，以初步理論基礎(chǔ)角度闡釋了SaaS服務(wù)提供商從網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道轉(zhuǎn)為SaaS混合渠道的可行性。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，資源、交易成本、委托代理成本以及外部環(huán)境為SaaS混合渠道結(jié)構(gòu)形成提供了可行性，而SaaS產(chǎn)品特征以及客戶市場(chǎng)偏好可以詮釋SaaS混合渠道結(jié)構(gòu)形成的必要性。 第二，SaaS混合渠道中實(shí)體渠道準(zhǔn)自治效率較高�；谝酝雷灾味鹊姆诸悾瑢aaS混合渠道中的實(shí)體渠道自治度分為完全整合、準(zhǔn)自治和完全自治三類。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，從供應(yīng)鏈總利潤來看，當(dāng)SaaS服務(wù)提供商的單位服務(wù)成本低于SaaS代理商時(shí)，增設(shè)混合渠道比僅采用直銷渠道有優(yōu)勢(shì)；從SaaS服務(wù)提供商利潤來看，當(dāng)SaaS代理商的客戶安裝基礎(chǔ)高于某一特定值之后，吸引加盟商加盟的混合渠道策略比僅采用直銷渠道有優(yōu)勢(shì)。SaaS混合渠道中新增實(shí)體渠道的準(zhǔn)自治策略優(yōu)于完全整合和完全自治策略。 第三，SaaS混合渠道服務(wù)模式的優(yōu)劣具有情景依賴性�；赟aaS服務(wù)及SaaS混合渠道特征，根據(jù)提供服務(wù)方的不同，本文提出了獨(dú)立服務(wù)，SaaS服務(wù)提供商整合服務(wù)和SaaS代理商整合服務(wù)三種SaaS混合渠道服務(wù)模式，研究SaaS混合渠道在各種模式下的服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并分別從SaaS混合渠道供應(yīng)鏈，SaaS服務(wù)提供商，SaaS代理商以及客戶視角比較三種服務(wù)模式的優(yōu)劣。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，各種服務(wù)模式優(yōu)劣具有情景依賴性，受單位服務(wù)成本以及服務(wù)水平成本等因素的影響，當(dāng)單位服務(wù)成本及服務(wù)水平成本參數(shù)相同時(shí)，從SaaS服務(wù)提供商以及客戶角度來看，SaaS代理商整合服務(wù)優(yōu)于其他兩種服務(wù)模式。 第四，收入共享契約及其改進(jìn)契約對(duì)SaaS混合渠道的協(xié)調(diào)能力有限。本文基于SaaS特性及以往對(duì)于混合渠道協(xié)調(diào)契約的研究，在不同服務(wù)模式下，研究收入共享契約及改進(jìn)的收入共享契約對(duì)SaaS混合渠道的協(xié)調(diào)能力。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)逆收入共享契約的協(xié)調(diào)條件十分嚴(yán)格，適用性非常有限，在獨(dú)立服務(wù)模式SaaS混合渠道的協(xié)調(diào)中發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于逆收入共享—變動(dòng)成本分?jǐn)偲跫s中的變動(dòng)成本分?jǐn)傄蜃硬话l(fā)揮協(xié)調(diào)作用，互相分享收入契約中的收入分享因子也不發(fā)揮協(xié)調(diào)作用，而且逆收入共享—變動(dòng)成本分?jǐn)偲跫s、互相分享收入契約與逆收入共享契約的協(xié)調(diào)條件相同，所以逆收入共享—變動(dòng)成本分?jǐn)偲跫s，互相分享收入契約與逆收入共享契約協(xié)調(diào)能力相同。但逆收入共享—固定成本分?jǐn)偲跫s可以協(xié)調(diào)不同服務(wù)模式下的SaaS混合渠道，雖然在非協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)下，采用該契約可以實(shí)現(xiàn)SaaS服務(wù)提供商與SaaS代理商的雙贏，但在協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)下該契約會(huì)使SaaS代理商利潤為零。 本文的創(chuàng)新主要體現(xiàn)在以下三方面： 第一，服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的SaaS混合渠道需要重新設(shè)定服務(wù)水平。在混合渠道的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)研究中認(rèn)為兩個(gè)渠道設(shè)定同樣的價(jià)格會(huì)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈成員都有利，而在服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中，新增實(shí)體渠道完全整合和新增渠道準(zhǔn)自治時(shí)，SaaS服務(wù)提供商重新確定服務(wù)水平的決策方式優(yōu)于其他方式。 第二，服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的SaaS代理商的最優(yōu)服務(wù)水平與SaaS服務(wù)提供商服務(wù)水平設(shè)定無關(guān)。在服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中研究三種服務(wù)模式的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)均衡，發(fā)現(xiàn)與價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不同的是SaaS代理商最優(yōu)服務(wù)水平反應(yīng)并不依賴SaaS服務(wù)提供商的服務(wù)水平，僅是SaaS服務(wù)提供商轉(zhuǎn)移價(jià)格的反應(yīng)函數(shù)。 第三，能夠協(xié)調(diào)價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下混合渠道的契約對(duì)服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下SaaS混合渠道協(xié)調(diào)乏力。通過對(duì)傳統(tǒng)混合渠道契約協(xié)調(diào)能力的檢驗(yàn)，發(fā)現(xiàn)能夠協(xié)調(diào)傳統(tǒng)混合渠道的收入共享契約，逆收入共享契約對(duì)SaaS混合渠道協(xié)調(diào)乏力。改進(jìn)逆收入共享契約發(fā)現(xiàn)逆收入共享—變動(dòng)成本分?jǐn)偲跫s與互相分享收入契約適用情景有限，且協(xié)調(diào)能力與逆收入共享契約并無差異，而逆收入共享—固定成本分?jǐn)偲跫s可以協(xié)調(diào)不同服務(wù)模式下的SaaS混合渠道。 本論文共分八章。第一章論述了本文的研究背景，研究問題，研究目標(biāo)、研究方法等。第二章綜述相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)，為本文研究奠定理論基礎(chǔ)。第三章研究SaaS混合渠道結(jié)構(gòu)形成動(dòng)因，利用案例研究方法檢驗(yàn)并修正理論模型。第四章梳理SaaS混合渠道經(jīng)濟(jì)技術(shù)特征，依據(jù)這些特征提出了SaaS混合渠道服務(wù)模式，構(gòu)建SaaS混合渠道的服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型。第五章研究SaaS混合渠道新增實(shí)體渠道不同自治度對(duì)SaaS混合渠道供應(yīng)鏈利潤的影響，并比較SaaS服務(wù)提供商的不同服務(wù)水平確定策略。第六章研究SaaS混合渠道在SaaS服務(wù)提供商整合服務(wù)模式以及SaaS代理商整合服務(wù)模式下的服務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并分別從SaaS混合渠道供應(yīng)鏈，SaaS服務(wù)提供商，SaaS代理商以及客戶視角比較三種服務(wù)模式的優(yōu)劣。第七章基于SaaS特性及以往混合渠道協(xié)調(diào)契約的研究，在不同服務(wù)模式情景下，驗(yàn)證收入共享契約及改進(jìn)契約對(duì)SaaS混合渠道的協(xié)調(diào)能力。第八章總結(jié)本文的研究結(jié)論及其對(duì)理論與實(shí)踐貢獻(xiàn)，并客觀地指出本文研究局限與不足，提出未來可以繼續(xù)研究的方向。
[Abstract]:Software as a Service (SaaS) is a software application service based on cloud computing and an important part of cloud computing. Electronic direct selling channel is a channel structure commonly used by SaaS service providers. However, many SaaS service providers at home and abroad are rapidly expanding their physical channels and gradually forming electronic direct selling channels and real-time channels. Under this structure, the relationship between SaaS service providers and SaaS agents is a supply chain cooperative relationship horizontally and a market competition relationship vertically. Although the advantages of the mixed channel in reducing transaction costs and expanding the market scale are outstanding, it also makes the members of the mixed channel fall into the embarrassment of cooperation and competition. SaaS service providers deliver software services to customers rather than software products. Services have become the main marketing body of SaaS. Therefore, the research on competition and coordination of SaaS mixed channel services will help optimize the SaaS mixed channel, which is of great significance to promote the rapid development of SaaS.
The main conclusions of this paper are reflected in the following four aspects:
Firstly, the necessity of the formation of SaaS mixed channel comes from the characteristics of SaaS products and customer preference. Starting from the changing reality of the channel structure from SaaS service provider's network direct channel to mixed channel, this paper takes resource-based theory, resource-dependent theory, transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory as the preliminary theoretical basis for the formation of SaaS mixed channel. On the basis of case study, this paper explains the necessity of SaaS mixed channel structure from the perspective of product, market and cost, and explains the feasibility of SaaS service provider changing from network direct channel to SaaS mixed channel from the perspective of preliminary theoretical basis. The formation of mixed channel structure provides feasibility, and the characteristics of SaaS products and customer market preference can explain the necessity of the formation of SaaS mixed channel structure.
Secondly, the quasi-autonomy efficiency of entity channel in SaaS mixed channel is higher. Based on the previous classification of channel autonomy, the degree of entity channel autonomy in SaaS mixed channel is divided into three categories: complete integration, quasi-autonomy and complete autonomy. From the point of view of SaaS service provider's profit, when the customer installation base of SaaS agent is higher than a certain value, the strategy of attracting franchisee to join in the mixed channel is superior to that of using only the direct channel. Integration and complete autonomy strategy.
Thirdly, SaaS mixed channel service model is scenario-dependent. Based on the characteristics of SaaS service and SaaS mixed channel, this paper proposes three SaaS mixed channel service modes: independent service, SaaS service provider integration service and SaaS agent integration service, and studies various SaaS mixed channel service modes. The results show that the advantages and disadvantages of the three service modes are scenario-dependent, influenced by unit service cost and service level cost, when unit service cost and service water cost are considered. When the average cost parameters are the same, SaaS agent integration service is superior to the other two service modes from the point of view of SaaS service providers and customers.
Fourthly, revenue sharing contract and its improved contract have limited coordination ability to SaaS mixed channel. Based on the characteristics of SaaS and previous studies on mixed channel coordination contract, this paper studies the coordination ability of revenue sharing contract and improved revenue sharing contract to SaaS mixed channel under different service modes. The coordination conditions of the contract are very strict and the applicability is very limited. In the coordination of the independent service model SaaS mixed channel, we find that the variable cost allocation factor in the inverse revenue sharing-variable cost allocation contract does not play a coordinating role, and the income sharing factor in the mutual revenue sharing contract does not play a coordinating role, and the inverse revenue sharing factor does not play a coordinating role. Sharing-variable cost sharing contract has the same coordination conditions as reverse revenue sharing contract, so reverse revenue sharing-variable cost sharing contract has the same coordination ability as reverse revenue sharing contract. But reverse revenue sharing-fixed cost sharing contract can coordinate different service modes. The SaaS mixed channel can achieve win-win situation between SaaS service provider and SaaS agent under non-coordinated condition, but the contract will make the profit of SaaS agent zero under coordinated condition.
The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following three aspects:
Firstly, the SaaS mixed channel under service competition needs to reset its service level. In the study of price competition in mixed channel, it is considered that setting the same price in two channels will benefit the members of supply chain. In service competition, when the new entity channel is fully integrated and the new channel is quasi-autonomous, the SaaS service provider redefines its service. The level of decision-making is superior to other ways.
Second, the optimal service level of SaaS agents under service competition is independent of the service level setting of SaaS service providers. Provider's transfer price response function.
Thirdly, the contract which can coordinate the mixed channel under the price competition is weak in the coordination of the SaaS mixed channel under the service competition. Through the test of the coordination ability of the traditional mixed channel contract, it is found that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the traditional mixed channel, and the reverse revenue sharing contract is weak in the coordination of the SaaS mixed channel. Reverse revenue sharing-variable cost sharing contract and mutual revenue sharing contract have limited application scenarios, and there is no difference between coordination ability and reverse revenue sharing contract. Reverse revenue sharing-fixed cost sharing contract can coordinate SaaS mixed channel under different service modes.
Chapter 1 discusses the research background, research issues, research objectives, research methods, etc. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature to lay a theoretical foundation for this study. Chapter 3 studies the motivation of the formation of SaaS mixed channel structure, and uses case study method to test and revise the theoretical model. Chapter 4 combs the SaaS mixed channel. Based on the economic and technological characteristics, the SaaS mixed channel service model is proposed and the service competition model of SaaS mixed channel is constructed. Chapter 5 studies the influence of different autonomy of new entity channels on the profit of SaaS mixed channel supply chain, and compares the different service levels of SaaS service providers to determine the strategy. This paper studies the service competition of SaaS mixed channel under SaaS service provider integration service model and SaaS agent integration service model, and compares the advantages and disadvantages of the three service models from the perspectives of SaaS mixed channel supply chain, SaaS service provider, SaaS agent and customer respectively. Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions of this study and its contributions to theory and practice, and objectively points out the limitations and shortcomings of this study, and puts forward the direction for future research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F49

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