【摘要】：全球范圍內(nèi)的上市公司幾乎都面臨現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度成熟發(fā)展而產(chǎn)生的委托代理問(wèn)題,現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度下企業(yè)所面臨的委托代理問(wèn)題是由于企業(yè)的所有者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者目標(biāo)不一致導(dǎo)致的,企業(yè)的所有者期望企業(yè)價(jià)值與股東權(quán)益最大化而企業(yè)的管理者期望自身權(quán)益最大化。股權(quán)激勵(lì)這種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)的方式一定程度上克服了公司經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)與所有權(quán)分立的弊端,股權(quán)激勵(lì)將企業(yè)的所有者與管理者的目標(biāo)趨于一致,使得公司的高級(jí)管理層在擁有公司經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的同時(shí)也能一定程度避免由于自利行為而導(dǎo)致的短期行為,公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)者為使自身利益增值會(huì)優(yōu)化自己的經(jīng)營(yíng)決策,使這些經(jīng)營(yíng)決策更有利于企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期業(yè)績(jī)?cè)鲩L(zhǎng)有利于企業(yè)可持續(xù)發(fā)展。目前我國(guó)有多家上市公司運(yùn)用股權(quán)激勵(lì)這種長(zhǎng)效激勵(lì)機(jī)制,但是對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的運(yùn)用并沒有達(dá)到成熟,有的公司對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的運(yùn)用尚待完善。綠盟科技作為我國(guó)高新技術(shù)行業(yè)中的佼佼者,同時(shí)又是已經(jīng)完成股權(quán)激勵(lì)的上市公司之一,通過(guò)對(duì)綠盟科技的案例研究,可以為我國(guó)上市公司提供寶貴的實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn)。本文首先綜述了股權(quán)激勵(lì)影響財(cái)務(wù)決策的國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,隨后引出了股權(quán)激勵(lì)影響財(cái)務(wù)決策的理論基礎(chǔ)。緊接著介紹了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的概念、類型及作用。財(cái)務(wù)決策有效性的衡量以及股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)決策的作用機(jī)理,在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了綠盟科技的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,具體包括:介紹了其實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)具體方案及完成情況,著重分析股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃實(shí)施前后綠盟科技管理層做出財(cái)務(wù)決策的變化,分析了綠盟科技實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施效果。最后對(duì)綠盟科技股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃成功實(shí)施的原因進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià),并且提出其他上市公司可以借鑒綠盟科技股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的幾點(diǎn)建議。通過(guò)對(duì)綠盟科技的案例研究發(fā)現(xiàn):綠盟科技股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的實(shí)施提高了綠盟財(cái)務(wù)決策的有效性。綠盟科技的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃對(duì)籌資決策、投資決策、營(yíng)運(yùn)資金管理決策、股利分配決策均具有顯著的相關(guān)性。
[Abstract]:Almost all the listed companies in the world are confronted with the principal-agent problem caused by the mature development of the modern enterprise system. The principal-agent problem faced by the enterprises under the modern enterprise system is caused by the inconsistent goals of the owners and managers of the enterprises. The owner expects the maximization of the enterprise value and stockholders' rights and interests, while the manager expects the maximization of their own rights and interests. To some extent, equity incentive overcomes the drawback of separation between management right and ownership right. Equity incentive tends to unify the goal of the owner and manager of the enterprise. In order to make the senior management of the company have the right to operate the company, but also to a certain extent to avoid the short-term behavior caused by self-interest behavior, the managers of the company will optimize their own business decisions in order to increase their own interests. To make these business decisions more conducive to long-term performance growth is conducive to sustainable development of enterprises. At present, there are many listed companies in our country to use the long-term incentive mechanism of equity incentive, but the application of equity incentive mechanism is not mature, some companies still need to perfect the use of equity incentive. Green Alliance Technology is one of the most outstanding high-tech industries in our country, and it is also one of the listed companies that have completed the equity incentive. Through the case study of Green Alliance Technology, it can provide valuable practical experience for the listed companies in our country. This paper first summarizes the domestic and foreign research status of equity incentive influencing financial decision, and then leads to the theoretical basis of equity incentive influencing financial decision. Then it introduces the concept, type and function of equity incentive. On the basis of the measurement of the effectiveness of financial decision and the function mechanism of equity incentive on financial decision, the paper analyzes the equity incentive scheme of Green League Science and Technology, which includes: introducing the concrete scheme of implementing equity incentive and the situation of its completion. This paper mainly analyzes the changes of financial decision made by the management of green alliance technology before and after the implementation of equity incentive plan, and analyzes the effect of implementing equity incentive of green alliance technology. Finally, the paper evaluates the reasons for the successful implementation of green alliance's technology equity incentive plan, and puts forward some suggestions that other listed companies can learn from green alliance's technology equity incentive plan Through the case study of Green League Technology, it is found that the implementation of green alliance technology equity incentive plan improves the effectiveness of green alliance financial decision. The equity incentive plan of Green Alliance Technology has significant correlation with financing decision, investment decision, working capital management decision and dividend distribution decision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F49

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