本文關(guān)鍵詞：信息不對稱約束下的稅收行為研究，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

        信息不對稱是存在于人類經(jīng)濟(jì)社會里的一種普遍現(xiàn)象,參加經(jīng)濟(jì)交易的某一方因為獨占某個方面的信息優(yōu)勢,可以在偏離均衡價格較多的位置達(dá)成交易,從而獲取更多額外的利益,優(yōu)勢信息能夠帶來信息紅利已成為大眾認(rèn)可的客觀現(xiàn)實。研究表明,所有可能的代理人都具備某些私人信息,但誰才是最優(yōu)的潛在人選,可以通過制度設(shè)計來識別他們的真實情況,委托——代理的方式即是很好的辦法,但隨之又會產(chǎn)生逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險兩類伴生的問題。根據(jù)激勵約束機(jī)制,設(shè)計合適的合同關(guān)系,能較好解決逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險難題,但確定適當(dāng)合同的博弈過程卻是復(fù)雜的。實踐證明,信息不對稱同樣影響著稅收活動,實施稅收行為也會因為信息不對稱的存在而出現(xiàn)利益博弈。本文即試圖以信息不對稱為基本分析路徑,以參與稅務(wù)行動的國家機(jī)關(guān)、政府部門、稅務(wù)當(dāng)局、納稅人為分析對象,以委托代理和信息博弈選擇理論為工具,結(jié)合行為心理學(xué)和社會行為學(xué),對他們的稅收行為進(jìn)行深入剖析,以解釋我國當(dāng)前復(fù)雜的稅收現(xiàn)象及趨勢,進(jìn)而為稅務(wù)治理提出一定的理論見解和政策建議。第一章導(dǎo)論：研究背景及文獻(xiàn)綜述。主要介紹本文的研究背景、基本概念、文獻(xiàn)綜述,提出文章的主題和研究思路,對分析路徑和研究方法做出基本的說明,以及交代文章可能的創(chuàng)新和存在的不足。第二章委托代理：信息不對稱的一個理論框架。主要界定信息不對稱的內(nèi)涵,論述委托代理關(guān)系的形成,以及在代理關(guān)系下將產(chǎn)生逆向選擇、隱藏信息、隱藏行動等新的問題。解決這些新問題需要設(shè)計激勵機(jī)制,機(jī)制的核心是要代理人分擔(dān)風(fēng)險和分享產(chǎn)出,分成制的代理合同即符合這一要求。本章還引入了博弈的基礎(chǔ)理論,以便與委托代理搭配使用。第三章稅收立法及稅收分享中的信息不對稱分析。主要以稅收立法及稅收收入分享為對象,重點分析國家機(jī)構(gòu)中人大與政府之間,中央與地方之間在實施稅收行為上的利益博弈。在稅收立法方面,雖然職權(quán)應(yīng)該歸屬于全國人大,但因為人大所處于立法方面的信息劣勢,把立法專屬權(quán)部分讓渡給了國務(wù)院,由國務(wù)院以稅收法規(guī)的形式補(bǔ)充人大在稅收立法上的不足；國務(wù)院同樣會因為在稅收操作上的信息劣勢,將制定稅收法規(guī)的職權(quán)部分讓渡給財政部、稅務(wù)總局等,后者以稅收行政規(guī)章的形式彌補(bǔ)國務(wù)院稅收法規(guī)上的缺口；在稅法的具體執(zhí)行時各地稅務(wù)局還會出臺形式不一的“稅收準(zhǔn)規(guī)則”,并對稅法的效力產(chǎn)生更實質(zhì)的影響。稅法以這么多的形式出現(xiàn)在我國的稅務(wù)實踐中,是信息不對稱所決定的,即層層轉(zhuǎn)授訂立稅收制度規(guī)則,能夠同時滿足處于稅法信息優(yōu)勢方和劣勢方的利益,使我國稅法體系在短時期內(nèi)得以初步建立。但這些委托代理關(guān)系附帶產(chǎn)生了問題：稅收法律層級低、維持政府和征稅機(jī)關(guān)利益傾向性強(qiáng),我國現(xiàn)有稅收法律普遍以部門規(guī)章代替,且因主要由政府或稅務(wù)當(dāng)局主導(dǎo)制定,所以造成稅收規(guī)則經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)沖突、稅收公正有所損害、征稅正當(dāng)性不足等危害。這些危害大部分屬于代理人特有的逆向選擇問題,長遠(yuǎn)看,這會引發(fā)對稅收立法權(quán)來源合理性的質(zhì)疑,并且將影響納稅人的利益和積極性。在稅收收入分享方面,由于現(xiàn)實中實行的是分級財政體制,中央把各稅種分別劃分一定的比例作為各級財政收入,納稅人分散在全國各地,地方政府占有稅源狀況的詳細(xì)信息,所以中央與地方政府之間會產(chǎn)生委托代理關(guān)系里經(jīng)常存在的問題,如在稅收入庫時隱藏行動、在定稅收基數(shù)時隱藏信息、在宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策變動前實施逆向選擇,這在很大程度上損傷了中央的利益。但委托人對代理合同保有修改權(quán),并且我國還是中央集權(quán)式管理,所以中央會利用這種便利爭取額外的利益,在實施分稅制、調(diào)整出口退稅、出臺新稅種(稅目)時維護(hù)自己的利益。同時,中央政府畢竟是國家管理的兜底責(zé)任人,所以在與地方政府博弈時,會表現(xiàn)出智豬搏弈中的大豬風(fēng)范,照顧部分有難處的地方政府,達(dá)到中央與地方分享稅收收入的相對平衡。第四章稅務(wù)征收過程中的信息不對稱分析。主要集中研究稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)的征稅行為。稅務(wù)系統(tǒng)的信息分布在實施征管活動和提供征稅保障兩個方面,并具有兩個不同特點。征管時層級越向下信息占有更具優(yōu)勢,而稅務(wù)行政管理的信息越向上信息更具優(yōu)勢。所以稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)整體上向政府有夸大征稅困難和虛高征稅成績的傾向,而上級稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)對下級提供征稅保障時會占有更多的額外收益,上級往往比下級的保障更充足。稅務(wù)征管活動中表現(xiàn)出諸多隱藏行動傾向,稅務(wù)人員利用信息優(yōu)勢謀取不正當(dāng)利益,如在減免稅、稽查查處、納稅資格審核、稅款劃繳等環(huán)節(jié)出現(xiàn)了利益尋租；基層稅務(wù)人員還廣泛表現(xiàn)出逆向選擇,即在面對工作任務(wù)和階段性困難時,會集體選擇偷懶和避讓態(tài)度。這些問題其實是他們利用信息優(yōu)勢的必然選擇,傳統(tǒng)上卻更多地認(rèn)為是道德敗壞或素質(zhì)低下所造成。通過博弈樹來演繹形成稅務(wù)腐敗的博弈選擇過程,可以更直觀地解釋信息不對稱、社會行為和心理對此所產(chǎn)生的決定性影響。第五章納稅過程中的信息不對稱分析。主要分析納稅人的納稅行為。納稅人對各自的經(jīng)濟(jì)交易信息占有絕對優(yōu)勢,隱藏信息表現(xiàn)為：當(dāng)面對政府或交易伙伴會吹噓經(jīng)營實力,而面對稅務(wù)當(dāng)局要么裝窮,要么提供與稅收無關(guān)的信息干擾稅務(wù)人員的征管行動；逆向選擇表現(xiàn)為籌劃納稅地點、規(guī)避嚴(yán)格的稅務(wù)管理等,即通常所謂的灰色稅收遵從；隱藏行動則表現(xiàn)為偷稅騙稅、謀取非法稅收利益、逃避稅務(wù)管理等。通過對納稅人的非遵從行為的分析也可以察覺社會守法意識狀況的無形影響,即社會心理普遍影響著具體的納稅選擇。納稅人偷稅成功并不緣于其偷稅技術(shù)高明,只是用基本相同的手法多次向不同的稅務(wù)人員嘗試的結(jié)果,即只有當(dāng)懷有偷稅企圖的企業(yè)碰巧遇上愿意犯錯的稅務(wù)主管人員,且該稅務(wù)員有能力識別出企業(yè)偷稅實情、能幫助企業(yè)掩蓋偷稅事實不易再被查獲,偷稅才會成為事實,博弈矩陣較具體地分析了偷稅事件的概率和社會認(rèn)知的影響作用。這一章還對國際范圍的稅收行為進(jìn)行了擴(kuò)展式討論。國家間稅收協(xié)作困難、資本及財富轉(zhuǎn)移、避稅天堂的存在等,都是信息極度不對稱的體現(xiàn)。發(fā)展中國家要融入國際,需要負(fù)擔(dān)的信息成本異常沉重,無論是他們的政府還是納稅人,因為發(fā)達(dá)國家是國際稅收規(guī)則的代理人�，F(xiàn)階段我國已出現(xiàn)明顯的財富資本外逃現(xiàn)象,撇開我國對私權(quán)的保護(hù)不重視等客觀背景,規(guī)避潛在的納稅義務(wù),即未來是否會被追征稅收、財富會否成為重要的課稅對象等等。這些信息的不明確,帶來人們社會心理預(yù)期不確定,進(jìn)而成為財富外逃的重要誘因。第六章緩解稅收中信息不對稱問題的政策建議。主要就文章前面分析的問題提出了具體的政策建議,也是全文的總結(jié)性意見。信息不對稱是客觀現(xiàn)象,需要理性對待。我們能做的是盡量控制其帶來負(fù)面的效應(yīng),思路有兩條：信號顯示和聲譽(yù)塑造。前者是基于社會行為的指向性,后者的目的在于利用社會心理效應(yīng),同時具體提供了五條初步的辦法。首先是面對信息量的急劇增長等客觀實際,需要在信息流經(jīng)的所有環(huán)節(jié)提高自動化水平,使信息初始狀態(tài)用電子信息的形式生成,把科技手段廣泛用于信息傳輸、獲取、分析、反饋等環(huán)節(jié),以提高準(zhǔn)確度和處理效率。而且這種提升信息化的辦法,要在國家機(jī)關(guān)、征稅過程、納稅人業(yè)務(wù)處理三個方面平行推進(jìn),配套制定三個方面法定、自動交換信息的規(guī)定,使相互間的信息占有盡量對等和共享。二是增加公眾和媒體對不對稱信息的披露,在法律和道德允許的前提下使私人信息公共化,從而減低代理人制造和保守私人信息的潛在收益,重整維護(hù)稅收公平正義的社會基礎(chǔ)。三是利用第三方的專業(yè)力量參與到稅收行為中,以客觀公正的立場維持正當(dāng)?shù)恼骷{局面,同時促使稅收規(guī)范周密具體、經(jīng)濟(jì)行為健康有序。四是針對征納雙方的數(shù)量都過于龐大、信息內(nèi)生繁衍嚴(yán)重等客觀情況,提出用擔(dān)保和垂直整合的方式,通過減少參與稅收行為的主體數(shù)量,只讓最重要的稅收信息進(jìn)入處理程序,從而大幅節(jié)約征稅人和納稅人的人力財力資源,減少多余的二次信息的生成量和內(nèi)部私人信息問題。五是稅收法制化,并且重視市場機(jī)制引導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的基礎(chǔ)功能。這一點是最根本也是最重要的,經(jīng)濟(jì)社會的發(fā)展將使稅收行為發(fā)生怎樣的變化無法預(yù)測,信息本身也是沒有價值判斷的,只是因為人的立場和動機(jī)不同才使信息不對稱有負(fù)面作用,只有通過塑造法的精神和敬畏法律的尊嚴(yán),重塑社會基本道德,遵循在產(chǎn)權(quán)私人配置環(huán)境下,市場機(jī)制要始終引導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的基本趨向,信息不對稱才不致泛濫為普遍的、有重大危害的問題,因為法制和市場無形的手,將很快擠壓信息不對稱的獲利空間。這一章結(jié)尾部分,針對文章分析列舉的現(xiàn)實現(xiàn)象和問題,還提出了四點具體的解決措施。1.針對立法,要重視稅收立法的嚴(yán)肅性,盡快把所有合理的稅收制度和規(guī)則上升為人大的法律,大幅削減轉(zhuǎn)授立法的現(xiàn)象,同時實施稅法執(zhí)行情況的常態(tài)監(jiān)督；對于稅收分享,要規(guī)范各級政府的預(yù)算編制和確認(rèn),確保財權(quán)與事權(quán)匹配,對預(yù)算執(zhí)行的監(jiān)督要具體、到位。2.對征稅方的管理,亟需理順稅務(wù)職能,把稅務(wù)系統(tǒng)從行政執(zhí)法型、收入任務(wù)型轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楣卜⻊?wù)型、事項承辦型,簡并機(jī)構(gòu)、減少層級、精簡人員,增強(qiáng)稅務(wù)的裝備能力和履職壓力,適時合并國地稅,歸并稅務(wù)及相關(guān)單位,實現(xiàn)稅務(wù)部門一體化征管格局。3.面對納稅中的問題,首先要為納稅人減負(fù),改變強(qiáng)制介入式的稅務(wù)管理方式,然后積極倡導(dǎo)納稅人自治,由納稅人群體主動去達(dá)成稅收待遇公平公正的愿景,同時還要增強(qiáng)納稅人對政府事務(wù)及其相關(guān)稅務(wù)事項的平等參與能力和磋商機(jī)制。4.國際稅收方面,一方面要增強(qiáng)稅收主權(quán)意識,對跨國資本流動、關(guān)聯(lián)交易、虛擬經(jīng)濟(jì)等方面的稅務(wù)監(jiān)管和征收要到位,調(diào)整出口退稅的政策目標(biāo)；另一方面要積極妥善保護(hù)國民在境外的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動,對“雙反”調(diào)查、并購被訴等履行國家保護(hù)義務(wù),維護(hù)國家利益,而稅收就是國家強(qiáng)大的根本后盾。

    Information asymmetry is a widespread phenomenon. One side who attends the economic transaction has information superiority. It may distract from exclusive equilibrium price, thus obtaining more additional benefit. Information superiority can bring information dividend has become the objective reality. Only A few participants really have the advantage of information resources. But many participants claim to have absolute useful information. It brings huge impact to the traditional trading rules. Research shows that the true or false of agents with private information can identify through institution design, for example, the way of the principal-agent. But it can produce adverse selection and moral risk. According to the mechanisms of the incentive and the mechanisms of the restraint, it can be resolved by designing appropriate contracts. And the game process is very complex. The taxation also exist the interest game due to information asymmetry. This article is based on the information asymmetry theory. The participants of the game include state organs, government departments, taxation department and taxpayer. It analyzed the taxation by using the principal-agent and the information game from the perspective of behavioral psychology and social behavior. Then, it explained the complex tax phenomenon and trends. At last, it put forward some suggestions for the tax governance.Chapter one is introduction. This chapter introduced the research background, basic conception and the research status. It also put forward the subject, the research thoughts, analysis path, research methods, the possible contribution and the shortage.Chapter two is atheoretical framework:the principal-agent.It mainly defined the connotation of the formation of agency relationship and oncoming problems of adverse selection and moral risk.To solve shese problems,it needed to design the incentive mechanism.The core of the mechanism is to share the risk and the output.And the angency contract is consistent with the requirements.In order to be with the principal-agent theory,it also introduced the game theory.Chapter three is the information asymmetry analysis of tax legislation and tax revenue sharing. This chapter focused on the tax legislation and tax revenue sharing. And it mainly analyzed the interest game of taxation behavior of the government, especially between the central government and the local government.On the aspect of tax legislation, the authorities should be belong to the National People’s Congress. But the exclusive legislation right partially transfers to the state council due to the information inferiority of the National People’s Congress. The state council perfects the tax laws and regulations. At the same, the state council has the information inferiority of tax operation. The functions of regulations partially transfers to the finance Ministry, the State Taxation Administration etc. The local taxation bureau also promulgates many tax regulations. It has the more substantial influence on the taxation behavior. Different levels of tax laws have impact on our country’s taxation behavior. It determined by the information asymmetry. This way can satisfy the interests of the participants of information inferiority and build the tax system in a short period. But it also produces many problems, for example, the low level tax laws, the powerful trend of maintaining the interests of the government and tax bureau etc. Current tax laws are replaced by the departmental rules which formulated by the local government and tax bureau. So it produces confliction of tax regulations, damages the tax justice, etc. These damages mainly belong to the adverse selection problems of the agent. It can’t damage the interest of the principal, but the source and reasonable of legislative power of taxation should be doubted. It affects the interest and enthusiasm of the taxpayer.In the aspect of the tax revenue sharing, the central government divides the part of tax as local government revenue due to the classified fiscal system. The taxpayer scatters over the country. The local government occupies the details of tax status. Then, it will produce many problems, for example, hidden action in the process of tax warehousing and defining the tax base. The adverse selection should damage the interests of the central government. But the principal has the rights for modifying contracts. On one hand, the central government would obtain the additional benefit due to the centralized management. At the other hand, because the central government is the last responsible role of government management, it will act as the big pig during the process of Boxed Pigs Game and think about the difficulties of local governments. At last, it wants to attain the relative coordination in the tax revenue sharing between the central government and the local government.Chapter four is the information asymmetry analysis of tax collection process. It primarily studied the taxation behavior of the tax bureau. The information distribution of tax information systems has the function of implementing tax activities and securing taxation. The lower government has information inferiority, the senior government has more information superiority. So, the tax bureau has the trend to exaggerate taxation difficulties and taxation performance. The upper tax bureau can get more sufficient safeguard. The tax staff obtains illegitimate interests by using information superiority, for example, profit rent during the link of tax activities. The base tax staff also shows the adverse selection. When facing tasks and difficulties, they will be lazy and avoiding. These problems are the results of using information superiority. But it is caused by the moral decay and the low quality. Though game tree, it can intuitively interpret the decisive influence caused by the information asymmetry, social behavior and psychology.Chapter five is the information asymmetry analysis of tax payment process. It mainly analyzed the tax behavior. The taxpayer has the superiority for its transaction information. The phenomena of hiding information are that they brag about their economic capabilities. When they face the tax bureau, they always are poor and provide useless information for influencing tax activities. The phenomena of adverse selection are that they plan tax payment places and avoid strict tax management, etc. It is also called the grey tax compliance. Hiding activities have many forms, for example, tax evasion, tax fraud, seeking illegal tax benefits, escaping taxation management, etc. It also reflects that social psychology influences the specific tax selection. The success of tax evasion and tax fraud is not caused by high skills. It is the result that the taxpayer uses a same skill on different tax person. Game matrix specifically analyzes the probability of tax evasion event and the effects of social cognition.In addition, this chapter also discussed international taxation activities. The difficulties of national tax coordination, transformation of capital and wealth, tax havens are the phenomena of information asymmetry. Because of the role of the developed country which formulates tax regulations, the developing country need afford unusually heavy information costs, including the government and the taxpayer. Now, our country has phenomena of capital flight. It is caused by uncertain information.Chapter six is the suggestion for resolving information asymmetry problems in the tax process. It put forward many specific recommendations. Of course, the phenomenon of information asymmetry could not exterminate. The realistic choice is tolerant of these phenomena. But it needs try our best to control the negative effect. The thoughts are signal display and shaping the reputation. The former is based on the orientation of social behavior. And the key of the latter is using social and psychological effects. At the same time, it also put forward five preliminary approaches. Firstly, facing the rapid development of amount of information, it need to improve automation level of the information process, improve accuracy and processing efficiency of information transmission, obtaining, analysis and feedback by technological means. Meanwhile, the informatization should be implemented in three aspects of the government, taxation process and taxpayer business processing. And it should issue regulations to assure the equivalence of information for occupies and sharing. Secondly, it increases the disclosure of asymmetric information required by the public and the media and makes the private information be public in a legal and moral way. Thereby, it can reduce contingent profits for private information made or kept by the agent. So, it assured the tax justice. Thirdly, it is necessary to invite the third-party professional strength to participate in the tax behavior and maintains the objective and fair position. It can standard the tax law and make the economic behavior healthy and orderly. Fourthly, it should adopt the way of guarantee and vertical integration for the big amount of taxpayers and the serious endogenous breeding information. Through reducing the amount of taxpayers, it can make important tax behavior enter into processing procedures. It also can significantly save resources of the tax agent and the taxpayer, reduce the amount of second information formation, and overcome information rent. At last, it should pay attention to tax legalization and the function of market mechanism. It is the most fundamental and the most important. The effects of the development of economic society on tax behavior can not be predicted. The information is objective. The different of person’s standpoint and motives can make the information asymmetry be negative. It can be resolved by tax regulations. Through these basic rules, the information asymmetry can not be common. Because the invisible market hand and the legalization can quickly squeeze the profit space of information asymmetry.This chapter is the last section. And it also put forward four specific suggestions for the above phenomena and problems. At first, it should pay attention to the seriousness of tax legislation. The National People’s Congress should formulate and promulgate all reasonable tax laws and regulations as soon as possible, reduce the phenomena of delegated legislation greatly, and regulate normally the implementation of tax laws and regulations. For the tax sharing, it needs to normalize budgeting of governments at all levels in order to ensure property rights and the power matching. It also needs to transfer the tax system mainly from turnover tax to property tax to narrow the coverage of the tax objects and reduce the economic effects of tax. Secondly, for the taxation participant, it needs to straighten out the function of taxation. And the tax system should realize the transformation from enforcing tax laws and completing tax revenue to servicing the public. Then, it needs to reduce tax bureau and the tax staff to realize the government department integration pattern. Thirdly, in order to resolve problems of taxation, it needs to change the compulsory intrusive tax management, advocate the taxpayer autonomous and make the taxpayer take part in government affairs and related tax matters. At last, in the aspect of international tax, on one hand need to strengthen tax sovereignty consciousness, regulate the tax of international capital flows, related transaction, and virtual economy, etc. In addition, it needs to adjust the export tax refund policy. On the other hand, it needs to protect economic activities in foreign and maintain economic freedom. In a word, taxation is the fundamental backing of a stronger country.

信息不對稱約束下的稅收行為研究

內(nèi)容摘要4-9ABSTRACT9-131. 導(dǎo)論：研究背景及文獻(xiàn)綜述17-28    1.1 選題背景及研究意義17-19    1.2 文獻(xiàn)綜述19-23        1.2.1 信息不對稱理論的興起和發(fā)展20-21        1.2.2 用信息不對稱理論分析稅收現(xiàn)象21-22        1.2.3 既有以信息不對稱研究稅收問題的主要不足22-23    1.3 研究方法及分析工具23-24    1.4 研究思路及文章結(jié)構(gòu)24-25    1.5 創(chuàng)新與不足25-282. 委托代理：信息不對稱的一個理論框架28-39    2.1 信息不對稱的含義28-29    2.2 委托——代理關(guān)系的形成29-31    2.3 委托代理關(guān)系帶來新問題31-33    2.4 委托代理關(guān)系中的激勵機(jī)制33-36    2.5 博弈方法與信息不對稱36-393. 稅收立法及稅收分享中的信息不對稱分析39-63    3.1 制定稅法等稅收規(guī)制的信息不對稱分析39-48        3.1.1 嚴(yán)格意義的稅收立法行為的信息不對稱分析41-42        3.1.2 制定稅收性法規(guī)及規(guī)章的信息不對稱分析42-44        3.1.3 制定稅法及其規(guī)制形成委托代理而引致的問題44-48    3.2 分稅制下的利益博弈及道德風(fēng)險48-57        3.2.1 地方出現(xiàn)隱藏行動的道德風(fēng)險49-50        3.2.2 隱藏信息的道德風(fēng)險50-57    3.3 委托人的道德風(fēng)險問題57-63        3.3.1 中央政府在劃分稅收級次上的道德風(fēng)險57-58        3.3.2 地方政府執(zhí)行房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策的道德風(fēng)險58-60        3.3.3 上下級政府間的利益博弈及中央政府的自我管理60-634. 稅務(wù)征收過程中的信息不對稱分析63-84    4.1 征稅過程的委托——代理關(guān)系63-65    4.2 稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)對政府的隱藏信息行為65-68    4.3 上下級稅務(wù)機(jī)關(guān)之間的利益博弈68-73        4.3.1 征稅保障上的代理人現(xiàn)象69-70        4.3.2 稅收執(zhí)法上的委托人危機(jī)70-73    4.4 征稅過程中的隱藏行動問題73-77        4.4.1 稅務(wù)腐敗的現(xiàn)實情形分析73-76        4.4.2 稅務(wù)腐敗行為的形成過程76-77    4.5 征稅過程中的逆向選擇問題77-84        4.5.1 稅務(wù)人員逆向選擇的客觀條件78-80        4.5.2 考錄稅務(wù)公務(wù)員的逆向逆向選擇80-81        4.5.3 行業(yè)稅負(fù)管理中的逆向選擇81-845. 納稅過程中的信息不對稱分析84-104    5.1 納稅過程中的委托代理關(guān)系84-86    5.2 不完全信息下的偷稅博弈86-92    5.3 不對稱信息下納稅程度的現(xiàn)實分析92-100    5.4 開放環(huán)境下的信息不對稱影響稅收行為100-1046. 緩解稅收中信息不對稱問題的政策建議104-123    6.1 稅收上的信息不對稱難題104-105    6.2 破解信息不對稱的基本思路105-107    6.3 減少信息不對稱問題的政策建議107-117        6.3.1 電子信息化建設(shè)及拓寬信息獲取路徑107-109        6.3.2 公眾監(jiān)督與媒體披露109-111        6.3.3 中介機(jī)構(gòu)和專業(yè)人士的評估111-113        6.3.4 擔(dān)保和垂直整合113-115        6.3.5 堅守法制化原則,堅信市場引導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)行為的基礎(chǔ)作用115-117    6.4 應(yīng)對文章中討論的不利稅收現(xiàn)象的具體措施建議117-123        6.4.1 理順稅法體系,增強(qiáng)稅法權(quán)威和容易執(zhí)行117-118        6.4.2 簡并稅務(wù)管理職能,增強(qiáng)稅務(wù)管理效率118-120        6.4.3 稅收不遵從的治理及納稅人意識的培育120-121        6.4.4 增強(qiáng)國家在國際事務(wù)中的行動能力,維護(hù)國家和國民的利益121-123參考文獻(xiàn)123-136后記136-138致謝138-139

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：信息不對稱約束下的稅收行為研究，，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。