本文選題：電信業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：渠道沖突　出處：《北京郵電大學(xué)》2012年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速增長,我國電信產(chǎn)業(yè)不斷發(fā)展,電信市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)越發(fā)激烈,從網(wǎng)絡(luò)覆蓋規(guī)模、業(yè)務(wù)種類及運(yùn)營模式、用戶規(guī)模、品牌競(jìng)爭(zhēng)逐漸到現(xiàn)在的渠道資源競(jìng)爭(zhēng),渠道已成為了電信業(yè)發(fā)展中的一個(gè)不可或缺的重要資源與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)手段。隨著Internet的迅猛發(fā)展,電信網(wǎng)、廣電網(wǎng)和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的進(jìn)一步融合,電子商務(wù)應(yīng)用日益普遍,為用戶提供電子化服務(wù)已成為不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的潮流,在這種背景下,國內(nèi)外大部分主流電信運(yùn)營商都在現(xiàn)有渠道系統(tǒng)的基礎(chǔ)上引入了電子直銷渠道,構(gòu)建混合營銷渠道系統(tǒng)。這種混合營銷渠道結(jié)構(gòu)是電信業(yè)渠道系統(tǒng)的重大變革,是極具應(yīng)用前景的渠道模式。然而這種渠道模式的實(shí)施在給電信業(yè)帶來機(jī)遇的同時(shí)也面臨諸多挑戰(zhàn),由于社會(huì)渠道的存在,電子直銷渠道的引入必定造成競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和沖突,這種混合渠道環(huán)境下的渠道沖突問題顯得越發(fā)突出,給運(yùn)營商帶來跨渠道的沖突與運(yùn)營方面的難題,成為關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。在這種情況下,電信運(yùn)營商面臨的不僅是是否開通電子直銷渠道的問題,為了解決混合營銷渠道沖突的矛盾,電信運(yùn)營商不得不探索混合營銷渠道新的運(yùn)作模式與沖突協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制,達(dá)成營銷渠道上下游協(xié)調(diào)和不同渠道利益之間的平衡,這已經(jīng)成為電信運(yùn)營商無法回避的重要課題。 混合渠道表面看是一個(gè)淺顯的現(xiàn)象,但如何用科學(xué)的理論對(duì)其進(jìn)行解釋和分析乃是一大挑戰(zhàn)。本論文主要以數(shù)理模型為主,定性分析為輔,以博弈論、委托代理理論、雙邊激勵(lì)理論等為基礎(chǔ),從研究傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)渠道與運(yùn)營商電子直銷渠道之間的沖突入手,全面、客觀地認(rèn)識(shí)電信業(yè)混合營銷渠道沖突與協(xié)調(diào)的過程及其影響因素,采用多種分析手段尋求有效解決渠道沖突的方法,探討可能的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制,為電信運(yùn)營商進(jìn)行混合營銷渠道的實(shí)際管理和學(xué)界進(jìn)行混合營銷渠道沖突協(xié)調(diào)的研究提供可資借鑒的視野和方法。 全文的研究將分為七章展開： 在第一章的緒論中,介紹了本文的研究背景,引出研究的問題；明確了本文的研究對(duì)象和研究方法；提出了論文的基本結(jié)構(gòu)與技術(shù)路線；并闡述本文的創(chuàng)新之處。 在第二章的理論綜述中,對(duì)營銷渠道及渠道沖突的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行總結(jié),梳理國內(nèi)電信運(yùn)營商的營銷渠道現(xiàn)狀,對(duì)國內(nèi)電信業(yè)渠道結(jié)構(gòu)體系進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)回顧,闡述其發(fā)展歷程,并從中尋求有益的制度設(shè)計(jì)及發(fā)展路線。 論文的第三章,運(yùn)用非合作博弈理論,基于消費(fèi)者渠道偏好、兩渠道的橫向價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)等要素,建立博弈模型分析運(yùn)營商電子直銷渠道與社會(huì)渠道之間的同層競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和電信運(yùn)營商與社會(huì)渠道商之間上下游的競(jìng)爭(zhēng),通過比較由于渠道系統(tǒng)結(jié)構(gòu)變化而導(dǎo)致的渠道雙方均衡利潤變化情況,研究混合營銷渠道下電子直銷渠道和傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)渠道的相互作用關(guān)系以及渠道系統(tǒng)的發(fā)展演變趨勢(shì),混合營銷渠道結(jié)構(gòu)存在的必要條件以及渠道成員對(duì)于混合渠道組合運(yùn)營模式的選擇策略。 論文的第四章,分析電信業(yè)混合營銷渠道沖突產(chǎn)生的根源。將電信業(yè)混合營銷渠道環(huán)境下的渠道沖突細(xì)分為垂直渠道沖突、水平渠道沖突和多渠道沖突,以某行為是否妨礙渠道成員實(shí)現(xiàn)其利潤最大化為判斷渠道沖突的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),綜合應(yīng)用定性研究和定量研究相結(jié)合的方法,定性分析混合營銷渠道中的水平?jīng)_突產(chǎn)生的根源；建立不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型定量分析混合營銷渠道中垂直沖突產(chǎn)生的根源；建立完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型定量分析混合營銷渠道中交叉沖突產(chǎn)生的根源。研究表明,渠道商之間追求自身利益最大化的個(gè)體理性和集體理性之間的矛盾是導(dǎo)致電信業(yè)混合營銷渠道中水平渠道沖突的根源；信息不對(duì)稱是導(dǎo)致電信業(yè)混合營銷渠道垂直渠道沖突的根源,而多層次的營銷渠道結(jié)構(gòu)中信息不對(duì)稱問題將更為嚴(yán)重,爆發(fā)沖突的可能性更大；電子直銷渠道和社會(huì)渠道之間的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以及消費(fèi)者固有的渠道偏好是導(dǎo)致電信業(yè)混合營銷渠道交叉渠道沖突的根源。 論文的第五章,針對(duì)電信產(chǎn)品自身的特點(diǎn),考慮了電信產(chǎn)品(服務(wù))的二次消費(fèi)特征,改進(jìn)現(xiàn)有模型,構(gòu)建了適用于電信業(yè)領(lǐng)域的混合營銷渠道中運(yùn)營商電子直銷渠道和社會(huì)渠道之間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的Stackelberg動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,以垂直一體化渠道結(jié)構(gòu)作為基準(zhǔn),分析比較分散控制下和垂直一體化結(jié)構(gòu)下的渠道系統(tǒng)的最優(yōu)利潤,設(shè)計(jì)了一種促使混合渠道達(dá)成協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)的收益分享合同,通過轉(zhuǎn)移電信二次消費(fèi)的部分收益給渠道商,解決混合渠道的交叉渠道沖突和收入分成問題,并詳細(xì)探討了運(yùn)營商和渠道商之間的合作利潤分配,電信運(yùn)營商可以通過靈活的定價(jià)機(jī)制安排誘使渠道商合作達(dá)成渠道協(xié)調(diào),從而實(shí)現(xiàn)渠道整體利潤的最大化,帶來增量收益,保證電信運(yùn)營商和渠道商的雙贏。 論文的第六章,構(gòu)建運(yùn)營商電子直銷渠道和社會(huì)渠道之間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的Stackelberg動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,將渠道商的銷售努力成本系數(shù)作為私有信息,通過比較渠道存在信息共享情形和不存在信息共享情形下運(yùn)營商和渠道商的均衡定價(jià)策略和均衡收益,分析渠道商信息共享對(duì)于整個(gè)混合渠道績(jī)效以及渠道成員收益的影響,研究渠道商信息共享對(duì)于整個(gè)混合營銷渠道的價(jià)值。圍繞混合渠道的信息共享協(xié)調(diào)激勵(lì)機(jī)制問題,運(yùn)用委托代理理論,分別設(shè)計(jì)了用來激勵(lì)渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的單邊激勵(lì)監(jiān)督機(jī)制和同時(shí)激勵(lì)運(yùn)營商和渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的雙邊激勵(lì)機(jī)制,得出了渠道雙方最優(yōu)的收益分享系數(shù)以及雙方最優(yōu)的努力水平,并討論了保證機(jī)制有效的參數(shù)條件。 第七章作為論文最后一章,對(duì)本論文的主要研究成果進(jìn)行了歸納總結(jié),并指出了本論文研究的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新點(diǎn)、不足以及未來的研究方向。 本文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新之處為： 1)本文建立了電信業(yè)混合渠道中運(yùn)營商電子直銷渠道與傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)渠道的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈模型,分析了三種渠道系統(tǒng)和三種渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下電信運(yùn)營商與社會(huì)渠道商的定價(jià)、利潤等因素的對(duì)比變化,明確了兩個(gè)渠道的相互作用關(guān)系,渠道成員對(duì)于混合渠道組合運(yùn)營模式的選擇策略,得到了電信業(yè)混合渠道穩(wěn)定存在的條件。 2)本文將電信產(chǎn)品的二次消費(fèi)特征考慮在內(nèi),建立了電信業(yè)混合營銷渠道協(xié)調(diào)的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)促使混合渠道達(dá)成協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)的收益分享合同,通過靈活的定價(jià)機(jī)制安排和合同參數(shù)設(shè)計(jì),使整個(gè)渠道的收益最大化,同時(shí)保證電信運(yùn)營商和渠道商的雙贏,從而協(xié)調(diào)混合渠道的渠道沖突,并探討了渠道雙方的合作利潤分配。 3)本文建立博弈模型分析了在電信業(yè)混合渠道中信息共享的價(jià)值,并分別設(shè)計(jì)了激勵(lì)渠道商提高信息共享努力水平的單邊激勵(lì)機(jī)制和同時(shí)激勵(lì)運(yùn)營商和渠道商的雙邊激勵(lì)機(jī)制,協(xié)調(diào)混合渠道中由于信息不對(duì)稱導(dǎo)致的渠道沖突,解決單邊和雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題,還探討了保證機(jī)制有效的參數(shù)條件。
[Abstract]:With the rapid growth of China's economy, China's telecom industry development, the increasingly fierce competition in the telecommunications market, from the size of the network coverage, business types and operation mode, the user scale, brand competition gradually to the competition of channel resources now, channel has become the telecommunications industry in the development of one of the most important resources and competition means. With the rapid development of Internet, the further integration of telecommunication network, TV network and Internet, e-commerce applications become increasingly common, to provide users with electronic service has become an irreversible trend, in this context, most domestic mainstream telecom operators have introduced electronic direct channel based on the existing channel system, construct a hybrid the marketing channel system. The hybrid marketing channel structure is a major change in the telecommunication channel system, is very promising. But this channel channel mode The implementation is also facing many challenges in bringing opportunities in the telecommunications industry at the same time, because of the existence of social channels, the introduction of electronic direct channel will cause the competition and conflict, the hybrid channel under the environment of channel conflict that appears increasingly prominent, bring conflict and operational aspects of the problem of cross channel to operators, become the focus of focus. In this case, telecom operators faced is not only whether the opening of electronic direct channel problems, in order to solve the contradiction of mixed marketing channel conflict, telecom operators have to explore new marketing channel mixed operation mode and conflict coordination mechanism, between marketing channels of different channels downstream coordination and balance of interests, which has has become an important topic of telecom operators can not be avoided.
The hybrid channel surface is a simple phenomenon, but how to use scientific theory to explain and analyze its is a big challenge. This thesis is mainly based on the mathematical model, qualitative analysis, game theory, principal-agent theory, incentive theory, starting from the overall, the conflict between the traditional research social channels and operators of electronic direct channel, objective understanding of factors of telecommunications mixed marketing channel conflict and coordination process and its effects, using a variety of analysis methods to find effective method to solve the channel conflict, to explore the possible mechanism of coordination, the actual management of mixed marketing channels for telecom operators and provide vision and methods for reference the research of mixed marketing channel conflict coordination.
The full text of the study will be divided into seven chapters.
In the introduction of the first chapter, we introduce the research background of this paper, draw the research questions, clarify the research objects and research methods, put forward the basic structure and technical line of the paper, and elaborate the innovation of this paper.
In the second chapter of the theoretical review and related theories of marketing channel and channel conflict are summarized, the current situation of marketing channels combing the domestic telecom operators, a systematic review of the domestic telecommunications industry distribution system, this paper introduces its development course, and to seek useful system design and development from the route.
In the third chapter, using non cooperative game theory, consumer channel preference based on two channel lateral price competition and other factors, the game model between electronic direct channel operators and social channels with the same level of competition and telecom operators and social channels on the lower reaches of the competition, by comparing due to changes in system structure and channel to change the equilibrium channel profit, development and evolution trend to study the interaction between mixed marketing channels under the electronic channel and traditional social channels and channel system, a necessary condition for the existence of mixed marketing channel structure and channel member selection strategy for hybrid channel combination operation mode.
In the fourth chapter, analysis of the causes of the telecommunications industry mixed marketing channel conflict. The telecommunications industry mixed marketing channels under the environment of channel conflict is divided into vertical channel conflict, channel conflict and channel conflict level, with certain behaviors hinder the channel members to achieve its maximum profit for the channel conflict judgment standard, method of comprehensive application qualitative research and quantitative research, qualitative analysis of root level conflict generated in mixed marketing channels; establish analysis causes vertical conflict of mixed marketing channels in the dynamic game model of incomplete information quantitative; establish a complete information dynamic game model for quantitative analysis of root cross conflict mixed marketing channels. The research shows that the pursuit of contradiction between individual and collective rationality of their own interests to maximize the channel between the telecommunications industry is the result of water mixed marketing channels The root level of channel conflict; information asymmetry is the root cause of the telecommunications industry mixed marketing channel of the vertical channel conflict, and the problem of information asymmetry in the multi-level marketing channel structure will be more serious, the possibility of the outbreak of the conflict between the larger; electronic direct marketing channels and social channels price competition and consumer channel preference is the root cause of telecommunications mixed industry marketing channel cross channel conflict.
In the fifth chapter, according to the characteristics of telecom products itself, considering the telecom product (service) of the two consumer characteristics, improve the existing model, constructed Stackelberg dynamic game model of the competition between mixed marketing channels for telecom operators in the field of electronic direct marketing channels and social channels, with the vertical integration channel structure as a reference the optimal profit analysis, decentralized channel system under control and vertical integration under the structure, a contract to share the channel to reach a state of harmony to promote mixed income design, through the transfer of part of the electric letter two consumer benefits to solve the cross channel, channel conflict and mixed income into the channel, and discusses the cooperation the distribution of profits between operators and distributors, telecom operators can arrange to channel cooperation of channel coordination through flexible pricing, Thus the maximization of the overall profit of the channel is realized, the incremental revenue is brought, and the win-win of the telecom operators and the channel merchants will be ensured.
In the sixth chapter, the construction of Stackelberg dynamic game model of the competition between the operators of electronic direct marketing channels and social channels, the sales effort cost coefficient channels as private information, by comparing the channel information sharing case and no equilibrium pricing strategies and equilibrium income business channels and information sharing case of channel analysis business information sharing for the mixed channel performance and channel members income influence research channels of information sharing for the entire mixed channel value. Around the mixed channel problem of information sharing and coordination mechanism, using the principal-agent theory, bilateral incentive mechanism are designed to encourage unilateral channels to improve information sharing level of incentive and supervision efforts at the same time, the incentive mechanism and the carriers and channels to improve information sharing level, the both sides of the channel The optimal income sharing coefficient and the optimal level of effort are also discussed, and the effective parameters of the guarantee mechanism are discussed.
The seventh chapter, as the last chapter of the thesis, summarizes the main research results of this paper, and points out the main innovations, shortcomings and future research directions.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows:
1) this paper establishes competition game model of telecom operators in the hybrid channel electronic direct channel and traditional social channels, analyzes the pricing of telecom operators and social channels to the three channel system and three kinds of channel power structure, to compare the changes of income and other factors, clearly the interaction between the two channels for the selection of channel members, channel combination strategy of mixed operation mode, obtain the existence of telecommunications mixed stable channel conditions.
2) this paper will consider the two consumer characteristics of telecom products, establish a dynamic game model of telecom industry mixed marketing channel coordination, design a hybrid channel to reach a state of harmony to promote revenue sharing contract, through flexible pricing system and contract design parameters, the maximum profit of the whole channel, at the same time guarantee both telecom operators and channels, channel conflict and coordination of hybrid channels, and discusses the cooperation profit distribution channels between the two sides.
3) this paper builds the game model analysis of information sharing in the telecommunications industry in hybrid channel value, and we design the incentive channels to improve information sharing efforts level unilateral incentive mechanism and the simultaneous excitation of carriers and channels of the bilateral incentive mechanism, coordination of hybrid channels due to channel conflict caused by information asymmetry, unilateral and bilateral settlement the moral hazard problem, also discusses how to ensure the effective mechanism of parameters.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京郵電大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F626

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