【摘要】：生態(tài)工業(yè)鏈的穩(wěn)定性是檢驗(yàn)生態(tài)工業(yè)園建設(shè)的一項(xiàng)重要內(nèi)容,隨著社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展人們對生態(tài)問題越來越關(guān)注,生態(tài)工業(yè)園在國內(nèi)外已經(jīng)得到廣泛實(shí)踐,而生態(tài)工業(yè)園的建設(shè)成效狀況和運(yùn)行情況卻不容樂觀。本文以生態(tài)工業(yè)鏈穩(wěn)定性為研究對象,試圖運(yùn)用演化博弈理論分別對雙方合作的單鏈穩(wěn)定性和多方合作的多鏈穩(wěn)定性展開研究。 利用演化博弈理論,建立單鏈條件下企業(yè)雙方合作的違約博弈模型,并對其進(jìn)行數(shù)值模擬分析。在數(shù)量生態(tài)學(xué)中的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)模型上,考慮政府補(bǔ)貼對廢棄物再利用的影響,建立單鏈條件下的改進(jìn)違約博弈模型,并對企業(yè)雙方博弈過程進(jìn)行分析計(jì)算。結(jié)果表明,該博弈過程有惟一的演化均衡點(diǎn)即上游企業(yè)和下游企業(yè)同時(shí)采取合作策略。在演化博弈過程中,政府補(bǔ)貼發(fā)揮關(guān)鍵作用：即在特定情形下,政府的補(bǔ)貼必須合理(不能過高也不能過低)才能快速達(dá)到演化均衡點(diǎn)。 本文開展了多條生態(tài)產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈條件下的企業(yè)博弈穩(wěn)定分析。建立了三個(gè)結(jié)點(diǎn)、五個(gè)鏈條的復(fù)雜產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈模式,在此基礎(chǔ)上,定義了企業(yè)的博弈規(guī)則和收益函數(shù),明確了三個(gè)結(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)的64種策略組合。通過編程軟件進(jìn)行數(shù)值模擬仿真分析,仿真結(jié)果表明,在多條生態(tài)產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈條件下,參與生態(tài)工業(yè)鏈的企業(yè)越多,產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈之間的穩(wěn)定性越高；企業(yè)的投機(jī)取巧行為能給企業(yè)帶來短期效益,但會(huì)破壞生態(tài)工業(yè)鏈整體的長期穩(wěn)定性。在數(shù)值仿真分析中,通過控制變量法對各參數(shù)進(jìn)行敏感性分析,確定在既定的條件下企業(yè)采取何種策略處理副產(chǎn)品。 本文將動(dòng)態(tài)演化博弈理論與多主體仿真理論相結(jié)合,并應(yīng)用于生態(tài)工業(yè)鏈接的穩(wěn)定性分析中,為生態(tài)工業(yè)園的發(fā)展提供了新視角,仿真的結(jié)果對生態(tài)工業(yè)園中的企業(yè)行為決策具有一定的指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:The stability of eco-industrial chain is an important content in the construction of eco-industrial park. With the development of social economy, people pay more and more attention to ecological problems, and eco-industrial park has been widely used at home and abroad. However, the construction effect and operation of eco-industrial park are not optimistic. In this paper, the stability of eco-industrial chain is taken as the research object, and the evolutionary game theory is used to study the single-chain stability of cooperation and the multi-chain stability of multi-party cooperation, respectively. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the default game model of enterprise cooperation under single-chain condition is established, and the numerical simulation is carried out. In the dynamic model of quantity ecology, considering the influence of government subsidy on the reuse of waste, the improved default game model under single chain condition is established, and the game process between enterprise and enterprise is analyzed and calculated. The results show that the game process has a unique evolutionary equilibrium point, that is, upstream firms and downstream firms simultaneously adopt cooperative strategies. In the evolutionary game process, government subsidies play a key role: under certain circumstances, government subsidies must be reasonable (not too high or too low) in order to reach the evolutionary equilibrium point quickly. In this paper, the stability analysis of enterprise game under the condition of multiple ecological industrial chains is carried out. The complex industrial chain model with three nodes and five chains is established. On this basis, the game rules and income function of the enterprise are defined, and 64 kinds of strategy combinations of the three node enterprises are defined. The simulation results show that under the condition of multiple eco-industrial chains, the more enterprises participate in the eco-industrial chains, the higher the stability between the industrial chains. The opportunistic behavior of enterprises can bring short-term benefits to enterprises, but it will destroy the long-term stability of ecological industrial chain. In the numerical simulation analysis, the sensitivity of each parameter is analyzed by the control variable method, and the strategy to deal with the by-product is determined under the given conditions. This paper combines the theory of dynamic evolutionary game with the theory of multi-agent simulation, and applies it to the stability analysis of eco-industrial link, which provides a new perspective for the development of eco-industrial park. The simulation results have certain guiding significance for enterprise behavior decision in EIP.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F403;F224.32

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