【摘要】：并購一直是資本市場上經(jīng)久不衰的話題,通過并購企業(yè)不僅可以擴(kuò)大自身市場占有率,創(chuàng)造價(jià)值增值,而且可以優(yōu)化配置資源、提質(zhì)增效,同時(shí)向市場釋放經(jīng)濟(jì)新活力。管理層作為并購方案的制定者和實(shí)施者,從并購方案的選擇到并購方案的具體實(shí)施,再到并購整合等各個(gè)階段,他們的行為動(dòng)機(jī)直接影響企業(yè)并購的效果。在管理者利益動(dòng)機(jī)下,管理層會(huì)選擇一些有違于股東意愿的高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)項(xiàng)目;由于信息不對稱等原因,股東又不能及時(shí)全面監(jiān)督和控制管理層的投資決策。而企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的主要目的是從監(jiān)督和制衡兩方面制約企業(yè)不道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),進(jìn)而降低代理成本,牽制管理層權(quán)力濫用;完善的內(nèi)部控制不僅可以優(yōu)化并購戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的選擇,還可以減少利益沖突�；诖�,本文著重研究管理層權(quán)力、內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量以及二者共同作用對企業(yè)并購績效的影響。本文以2008年-2015年已實(shí)際完成并購行為的2163家收購方企業(yè)為研究樣本,以委托代理理論、尋租理論與不完全契約理論為依據(jù),建立多元回歸模型,研究管理層權(quán)力、內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量對并購績效的作用機(jī)理,驗(yàn)證所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)分離的經(jīng)營模式下,管理層權(quán)力實(shí)力雄厚是否會(huì)追求個(gè)人利益最大化而影響并購績效;高質(zhì)量內(nèi)部控制是否提供良好并購環(huán)境從而優(yōu)化并購績效;不同質(zhì)量內(nèi)部控制作用在管理層權(quán)力上,對并購效果和業(yè)績是否產(chǎn)生有效影響。實(shí)證研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):在追逐私人利益的欲望誘惑下,管理層權(quán)力的肆意擴(kuò)張對并購績效的提升具有抑制作用;高質(zhì)量內(nèi)部控制有效監(jiān)督和制衡并購活動(dòng)的進(jìn)行,對并購績效的提升具有明顯的促進(jìn)作用;有效內(nèi)部控制通過控制措施制約管理層權(quán)力的濫用,使其無法凌駕于內(nèi)部控制之上,進(jìn)而限制管理層權(quán)力過大對并購績效提升的抑制作用。本文研究結(jié)論表明管理層權(quán)力、內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量會(huì)對并購績效產(chǎn)生影響,且內(nèi)部控制制度對管理層權(quán)力具有監(jiān)督作用,有利于提高并購績效。由此可見,企業(yè)需加強(qiáng)治理結(jié)構(gòu)建設(shè),形成合理薪酬契約制度,緩解實(shí)物中存在的代理問題和“權(quán)力尋租”問題;同時(shí)要加強(qiáng)并購交易內(nèi)部控制制度的建設(shè),提高企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量。
[Abstract]:M & A has been an enduring topic in the capital market. M & A enterprises can not only expand their own market share, create value added value, but also optimize the allocation of resources, improve quality and efficiency, at the same time release new economic vitality to the market. As the framers and implementers of the M & A scheme, the managers' behavior motivation influences the effect of M & A directly from the choice of the M & A scheme to the concrete implementation of the M & A scheme, and to the M & A integration stage. Under the motivation of managers' interests, the management will choose some high-risk projects which are contrary to the wishes of shareholders, and because of the information asymmetry, shareholders can not supervise and control the management's investment decisions in a timely and comprehensive manner. The main purpose of enterprise internal control is to restrict the enterprise immoral hazard from two aspects of supervision and balance, and then reduce the agency cost and restrain the abuse of management power. Perfect internal control can not only optimize the choice of strategic goal of M & A, but also reduce conflicts of interest. Based on this, this paper focuses on the influence of management power, internal control quality and their combined effects on corporate M & A performance. This paper takes 2163 acquirers who have actually completed mergers and acquisitions from 2008 to 2015 as research samples, based on principal-agent theory, rent-seeking theory and incomplete contract theory, establishes a multi-regression model to study the power of management. The function mechanism of internal control quality on M & A performance, to verify that under the management mode of separation of ownership and management right, whether the management power strength will pursue the maximization of personal interests and affect the M & A performance; Whether the internal control of high quality provides a good environment for M & A to optimize the performance of M & A; whether the effect of internal control of different quality has an effective influence on the effect and performance of M & A on the power of management. The empirical results show that: under the temptation of pursuing private interests, the wanton expansion of management power can inhibit the improvement of M & A performance; The high quality internal control effectively supervises and checks and balances the merger and acquisition activity, has the obvious promotion function to the merger and acquisition performance enhancement; Effective internal control restricts the abuse of management power through control measures, which makes it impossible to override the internal control, and then limits the restraining effect of excessive management power on the improvement of M & A performance. The conclusion of this paper shows that the power of management and the quality of internal control will influence the performance of M & A, and the system of internal control can supervise the power of management, which is helpful to improve the performance of M & A. It can be seen that enterprises should strengthen the construction of governance structure, form a reasonable salary contract system, and alleviate the problems of agency and "power rent seeking" existing in real objects. At the same time, we should strengthen the construction of internal control system of M & A transactions and improve the quality of internal control of enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F272.91;F275

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