發(fā)布時間：2018-10-21 11:29

【摘要】：2012年中國共產(chǎn)黨的十八大報告明確提出了“堅持走中國特色自主創(chuàng)新道路、實施創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略”,當(dāng)前許多企業(yè)特別是民營企業(yè)正處于市場、制度環(huán)境變化劇烈和外部競爭激烈的形勢下。改革開放雖給民營企業(yè)的發(fā)展壯大帶來很好的機(jī)遇但也提出了迫切的挑戰(zhàn)。企業(yè)面對市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的復(fù)雜性、快速發(fā)展的迫切性和戰(zhàn)略變革的穩(wěn)健性,尤其是伴隨我國民營企業(yè)發(fā)展的特殊歷史過程,現(xiàn)在大多數(shù)已經(jīng)步入企業(yè)家及高管的更新?lián)Q代階段。對于企業(yè)而言,在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型特殊階段應(yīng)該通過何種手段實現(xiàn)權(quán)力的平穩(wěn)交接,以保證企業(yè)績效是上市民營企業(yè)急需解決的問題。本文首先深入地介紹我國經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型升級的原因、目標(biāo)和任務(wù),以及民營企業(yè)的作用和發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀,提出本文的研究問題,即民營企業(yè)家更替、薪酬水平與企業(yè)績效的關(guān)系,探究企業(yè)家更替方式及其薪酬激勵方式對企業(yè)績效的影響關(guān)系。一方面,通過縱向?qū)Ρ确治鑫覈鲜忻駹I企業(yè)家更替方式對企業(yè)短期和長期效益的影響規(guī)律。另一方面,探究我國民營企業(yè)家不同薪酬激勵方式對企業(yè)績效的影響作用大小,比較激勵方式間的影響異同。本文主要研究結(jié)論如下:(1)在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型背景下,民營企業(yè)需要緊緊抓住經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型契機(jī),要根據(jù)企業(yè)未來發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略構(gòu)建企業(yè)高管選拔評價標(biāo)準(zhǔn),有助于民營企業(yè)快速適應(yīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型,明確未來戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展方向,保持自身核心競爭力。(2)企業(yè)家更替方式與企業(yè)短期/長期績效間存在顯著影響關(guān)系,內(nèi)部繼任者適合企業(yè)對短期效益的追求。而在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型階段,外部繼任者更適合企業(yè)長期戰(zhàn)略的制定以及對長期績效的追求。(3)繼任企業(yè)家來源不同,其對薪酬激勵方案的敏感程度不同。以企業(yè)績效作為繼任企業(yè)家受到來自薪酬激勵的效果評價依據(jù)發(fā)現(xiàn),外部繼任者對短期薪酬更加敏感,而內(nèi)部繼任者則更偏向于獲取股票回報。
[Abstract]:The report of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012 explicitly proposed that "adhere to the road of independent innovation with Chinese characteristics and implement the strategy of innovation-driven development." at present, many enterprises, especially private enterprises, are in the market. The system environment changes violently and the external competition is fierce under the situation. The reform and opening up has brought good opportunities to the development and expansion of private enterprises, but also put forward urgent challenges. Faced with the complexity of market economy, the urgency of rapid development and the robustness of strategic change, most enterprises have now stepped into the stage of upgrading entrepreneurs and executives, especially with the special historical process of the development of private enterprises in China. For enterprises, in the special stage of economic transformation, what means should be adopted to achieve a smooth transfer of power, in order to ensure the performance of listed private enterprises is an urgent problem to be solved. This paper first introduces the reasons, objectives and tasks of the economic transformation and upgrading in China, as well as the role and development status of private enterprises, and puts forward the research issues of this paper, namely, the relationship between the turnover of private entrepreneurs, the compensation level and the performance of enterprises. This paper probes into the relationship between entrepreneur turnover mode and its compensation incentive mode on enterprise performance. On the one hand, through longitudinal comparative analysis of the change of listed private entrepreneurs on the short-term and long-term benefits of the law. On the other hand, this paper probes into the influence of different salary incentive methods on the performance of private entrepreneurs in China, and compares the similarities and differences between the different incentive ways. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) under the background of economic transformation, private enterprises need to grasp the opportunity of economic transformation, and construct the evaluation criteria of senior management selection according to the future development strategy of enterprises, which is helpful for private enterprises to adapt to the economic transformation quickly. (2) there is a significant relationship between enterpriser turnover mode and short-term / long-term performance of the enterprise, and the internal successor is suitable for the enterprise to pursue short-term benefits. In the stage of economic transformation, external successors are more suitable for the formulation of long-term strategy and the pursuit of long-term performance. (3) different sources of successor entrepreneurs have different sensitivity to salary incentive schemes. Based on corporate performance as the basis for evaluating the effect of compensation incentives for successor entrepreneurs, it is found that external successors are more sensitive to short-term compensation, while internal successors are more inclined to obtain stock returns.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.5;F272.91;F272.92;F275

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 呂新軍;;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、高管激勵與上市公司治理效率——基于異質(zhì)性隨機(jī)邊界模型的研究[J];管理評論;2015年06期

2 趙曙明;白曉明;趙宜萱;;轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下我國企業(yè)家勝任素質(zhì)分析[J];南京大學(xué)學(xué)報(哲學(xué)·人文科學(xué)·社會科學(xué));2015年02期

3 李衛(wèi)寧;張yN寧;;新任CEO特征、管理團(tuán)隊調(diào)整與企業(yè)績效——基于ST上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)實證[J];中國管理科學(xué);2014年08期

4 李敏娜;王鐵男;;董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)、高管薪酬激勵與公司成長性[J];中國軟科學(xué);2014年04期

5 王德才;趙曙明;何瑩;;民營企業(yè)繼任模式的特點及其路徑選擇研究[J];商業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理;2013年07期

6 賀小剛;張遠(yuǎn)飛;梅琳;;創(chuàng)始人離任對企業(yè)成長的影響分析[J];管理學(xué)報;2013年06期

7 皮建才;;轉(zhuǎn)型時期家族企業(yè)經(jīng)理選擇的動態(tài)博弈分析[J];暨南學(xué)報(哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版);2013年03期

8 劉星;代彬;郝穎;;高管權(quán)力與公司治理效率——基于國有上市公司高管變更的視角[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2012年01期

9 賀小剛;燕瓊瓊;梅琳;李婧;;創(chuàng)始人離任中的權(quán)力交接模式與企業(yè)成長——基于我國上市公司的實證研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2011年10期

10 丁友剛;宋獻(xiàn)中;;政府控制、高管更換與公司業(yè)績[J];會計研究;2011年06期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王曉夢;轉(zhuǎn)型期我國民營企業(yè)家素質(zhì)提升問題研究[D];中國海洋大學(xué);2006年

，

本文編號：2284964