國有企業(yè)高管政治晉升與并購績效研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-10 17:09
【摘要】：在公司治理過程中一直存在兩個悖論:國有企業(yè)高管作為職業(yè)經理人,雖然薪酬相對較低,但是企業(yè)業(yè)績卻在高速增長�？v觀并購大潮主并購方樂于積極主動的尋找目標公司,花費大量金錢、資本實施并購,但是往往績效很差,違背股東財富最大化的目標。到底是什么樣動機和原因影響了高管的選擇?與此同時,研究表明國有企業(yè)資本保值增長率并沒有對高管的升遷產生顯著正的影響,這表明目前國有企業(yè)的發(fā)展方式仍然是“規(guī)模導向型”;國有企業(yè)職位的高管薪酬沒有對國有企業(yè)高管的升遷產生顯著的影響,國有企業(yè)高管職業(yè)經理人身份弱化,更像是政府官員而非職業(yè)經理人�？v觀30多年的歷史,國有企業(yè)的發(fā)展功不可沒,在面臨改革深水區(qū)時,核心問題就是解決國有企業(yè)公司治理問題;高管的激勵機制成為改革的重中之重;由于國有企業(yè)高管身份特殊,具備“準官員”身份,使得研究政治晉升問題有著“標新立意”的意義。以“錦標賽晉升機制”作為視角,國資委作為委任國有企業(yè)高管的直接負責人,考核標準單一;這使得國有企業(yè)高管謀求企業(yè)資本以及規(guī)模的擴張,實現企業(yè)的發(fā)展能更好地實現企業(yè)和個人的雙贏具備可能性。從另一方面說,國有企業(yè)由于背景特殊,與政府有著不可分割的依賴粘性,即使國有企高管具備的職業(yè)經理人身份,其向政府“尋租”可以為企業(yè)的發(fā)展謀求更好的條件以及更多的便利。以上邏輯表明,國有企業(yè)高管追求政治晉升在現實中具備可行性和必要性。作為國有企業(yè)高管在面臨能夠實現政治晉升機會時,探索能夠實現擴張“規(guī)�！毙再|的管理活動可以解決委托-代理問題的先天矛盾。并購行為作為擴張規(guī)模挖掘企業(yè)核心競爭能力的手段之一,國企高管如何應用該手段?在以往相關文獻回顧的基礎上,實證研究探討了高管政治晉升、并購規(guī)模、并購規(guī)模以及并購績效。研究樣本選取的是2004至2013年間滬、深A股上市的國有控股上市公司,實證結果顯示:面對不同程度的政治晉升可能性,相比較其他方式,并購是國有企業(yè)高管選擇的最普遍方式。多數發(fā)生政治晉升行為的高管都在發(fā)生變更前的1-2年進行過并購行為。存在高管政治晉升的主并購方企業(yè)對于并購規(guī)模的選擇正相關性,可能性越大的國企高管,并購規(guī)模就越大。主并購方企業(yè)一旦進行并購選擇,在就會在企業(yè)動態(tài)的過程中,不斷增加資本投入量,值得注意的是并購規(guī)模呈現“倒U型”曲線,到達了峰值臨界點之后,擴張規(guī)模可能適得其反,背離目標。雖然國有企業(yè)高管出發(fā)點在于利用政府“扶持之手”實現企業(yè)的發(fā)展、個人的升遷。但不可否認的是,從長遠來看并購績效不容樂觀,發(fā)生政治晉升行為的國有企業(yè)其并購績效相對較差。本文的研究意義在于強調了并購行為的風險,需要完善國有企業(yè)并購項目的選擇;對于國企高管來說,“問責制度”不夠明晰,多數高管只需要對擔任高管期間業(yè)績負責,使得其僅僅將擔任職業(yè)經理人作為升遷的跳板。不可否認的是,管理者行為對于企業(yè)具有滯后性,類似主并購方企業(yè)并購行為的考察要延長時間跨度,否則會造成國有資產的流失和浪費。從理論來說,政治晉升是一種隱性激勵,需要和顯性激勵發(fā)揮協(xié)同作用,通過聲譽、自我實現等改善公司治理質量,國企高管為了實現“準官員”的政治升遷,會在意“企業(yè)家”身份的未來,有助于分析一些國有企業(yè)的行為。
[Abstract]:There are always two paradoxes in the process of corporate governance: state-owned enterprise executives as professional managers, although the salary is relatively low, but corporate performance is growing at a high speed. At the same time, the research shows that the growth rate of capital preservation in state-owned enterprises does not have a significant positive impact on the promotion of senior executives, which indicates that the development mode of state-owned enterprises is still "scale-oriented"; the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is not. State-owned enterprises have a significant impact on the promotion of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. The status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is weakened, more like government officials than professional managers. Incentive mechanism has become the top priority of the reform; because of the special status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises and the status of "quasi-official", the study of political promotion has the meaning of "innovative ideas". On the other hand, because of the special background, state-owned enterprises have an inseparable dependence on the government, even if state-owned enterprise executives have the status of professional managers, they "seek" the government. The above logic shows that the pursuit of political promotion by executives of state-owned enterprises is feasible and necessary in reality. As executives of state-owned enterprises, when faced with the opportunity to achieve political promotion, it is possible to explore management activities that can expand the "scale" nature. Solving the congenital contradiction of the principal-agent problem. As one of the means to expand the scale and tap the core competitiveness of enterprises, how do the executives of state-owned enterprises use this method? Based on the review of relevant literature, this paper empirically studies the political promotion of executives, the scale of mergers and acquisitions, the scale of mergers and acquisitions and the performance of mergers and acquisitions. From 2004 to 2013 in Shanghai, Shenzhen A-share listed state-owned listed companies, the empirical results show that: in the face of varying degrees of political promotion possibilities, compared with other ways, mergers and acquisitions are the most common choice of state-owned enterprise executives. The choice of M&A scale is positively correlated with the choice of M&A scale by the main merger and acquisition enterprises with political promotion. The larger the possibility of the executives of state-owned enterprises, the larger the scale of M&A. After the peak of the critical point, the expansion of the scale may be counterproductive, deviating from the goal. Although the starting point of state-owned enterprise executives is to use the government's "hands" to achieve the development of enterprises, personal promotion. But it is undeniable that in the long run, the performance of mergers and acquisitions is not optimistic. The significance of this study is to emphasize the risk of mergers and acquisitions, need to improve the choice of state-owned enterprise mergers and acquisitions projects; for state-owned enterprise executives, "accountability system" is not clear enough, most executives only need to be responsible for the performance of senior executives, so that they will only serve as professional managers as a springboard for promotion. In theory, political promotion is a kind of implicit incentive, which needs to cooperate with explicit incentive to improve corporate governance through reputation and self-realization. Quantity, in order to achieve the political promotion of "prospective officials", executives of state-owned enterprises will care about the future of "entrepreneurship", which helps to analyze the behavior of some state-owned enterprises.
【學位授予單位】：遼寧大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.1;F271;F275;F272.91
本文編號：2235084
[Abstract]:There are always two paradoxes in the process of corporate governance: state-owned enterprise executives as professional managers, although the salary is relatively low, but corporate performance is growing at a high speed. At the same time, the research shows that the growth rate of capital preservation in state-owned enterprises does not have a significant positive impact on the promotion of senior executives, which indicates that the development mode of state-owned enterprises is still "scale-oriented"; the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is not. State-owned enterprises have a significant impact on the promotion of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. The status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is weakened, more like government officials than professional managers. Incentive mechanism has become the top priority of the reform; because of the special status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises and the status of "quasi-official", the study of political promotion has the meaning of "innovative ideas". On the other hand, because of the special background, state-owned enterprises have an inseparable dependence on the government, even if state-owned enterprise executives have the status of professional managers, they "seek" the government. The above logic shows that the pursuit of political promotion by executives of state-owned enterprises is feasible and necessary in reality. As executives of state-owned enterprises, when faced with the opportunity to achieve political promotion, it is possible to explore management activities that can expand the "scale" nature. Solving the congenital contradiction of the principal-agent problem. As one of the means to expand the scale and tap the core competitiveness of enterprises, how do the executives of state-owned enterprises use this method? Based on the review of relevant literature, this paper empirically studies the political promotion of executives, the scale of mergers and acquisitions, the scale of mergers and acquisitions and the performance of mergers and acquisitions. From 2004 to 2013 in Shanghai, Shenzhen A-share listed state-owned listed companies, the empirical results show that: in the face of varying degrees of political promotion possibilities, compared with other ways, mergers and acquisitions are the most common choice of state-owned enterprise executives. The choice of M&A scale is positively correlated with the choice of M&A scale by the main merger and acquisition enterprises with political promotion. The larger the possibility of the executives of state-owned enterprises, the larger the scale of M&A. After the peak of the critical point, the expansion of the scale may be counterproductive, deviating from the goal. Although the starting point of state-owned enterprise executives is to use the government's "hands" to achieve the development of enterprises, personal promotion. But it is undeniable that in the long run, the performance of mergers and acquisitions is not optimistic. The significance of this study is to emphasize the risk of mergers and acquisitions, need to improve the choice of state-owned enterprise mergers and acquisitions projects; for state-owned enterprise executives, "accountability system" is not clear enough, most executives only need to be responsible for the performance of senior executives, so that they will only serve as professional managers as a springboard for promotion. In theory, political promotion is a kind of implicit incentive, which needs to cooperate with explicit incentive to improve corporate governance through reputation and self-realization. Quantity, in order to achieve the political promotion of "prospective officials", executives of state-owned enterprises will care about the future of "entrepreneurship", which helps to analyze the behavior of some state-owned enterprises.
【學位授予單位】：遼寧大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.1;F271;F275;F272.91
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前10條
1 武文超;;國企管理層政治晉升激勵與會計盈余質量研究[J];會計之友;2016年17期
2 趙立彬;趙妍;;高管年齡與公司并購——基于政治晉升激勵視角[J];投資研究;2016年07期
3 余緒鵬;;官員晉升錦標賽:經濟增長的政治邏輯——基于相關文獻的梳理與分析[J];華東經濟管理;2016年06期
4 曹偉;楊德明;趙璨;;政治晉升預期與高管腐敗——來自國有上市公司的經驗證據[J];經濟學動態(tài);2016年02期
5 葛結根;;并購支付方式與并購績效的實證研究——以滬深上市公司為收購目標的經驗證據[J];會計研究;2015年09期
6 宋淑琴;代淑江;;管理者過度自信、并購類型與并購績效[J];宏觀經濟研究;2015年05期
7 郭廣珍;張平;;政治晉升、財政分權與地方政府消費性支出:理論與實證分析[J];世界經濟文匯;2014年04期
8 王曾;符國群;黃丹陽;汪劍鋒;;國有企業(yè)CEO“政治晉升”與“在職消費”關系研究[J];管理世界;2014年05期
9 陳仕華;姜廣省;盧昌崇;;董事聯(lián)結、目標公司選擇與并購績效——基于并購雙方之間信息不對稱的研究視角[J];管理世界;2013年12期
10 田高良;韓潔;李留闖;;連鎖董事與并購績效——來自中國A股上市公司的經驗證據[J];南開管理評論;2013年06期
相關碩士學位論文 前3條
1 張晨宇;晉升機會對薪酬差距的影響研究[D];西南財經大學;2014年
2 盤宇章;財政分權改革、政治晉升與公共支出結構[D];西南財經大學;2011年
3 李麗;基于BHAR法的上市公司并購長期績效的實證研究[D];南京航空航天大學;2007年
，本文編號：2235084
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/jixiaoguanli/2235084.html
最近更新
教材專著
