【摘要】：本文以“農(nóng)村信用社管理主體”為研究對象,通過對農(nóng)村信用社管理主體設(shè)置和調(diào)整歷史的縱向考察,探求我國農(nóng)村信用社的特殊性質(zhì),并厘清國家(中央政府)、管理主體與農(nóng)村信用社三者之間的特殊關(guān)系,從而揭示管理主體雖反復(fù)調(diào)整但始終未能促進(jìn)農(nóng)村信用社良性發(fā)展的癥結(jié)所在。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文對現(xiàn)行“省聯(lián)社”管理模式的形成原因和可能的弊害進(jìn)行了較為深入的分析,指出“省聯(lián)社”作為管理主體僅僅是在既有約束條件下,各方博弈基礎(chǔ)上的過度性安排,隨著農(nóng)村信用社商業(yè)化改造的推進(jìn),農(nóng)村信用社管理主體必須進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步改造。具體而言,本文的主要內(nèi)容可以分為以下五個部分： 第一部分是導(dǎo)論。本部分主要是介紹本文研究的目的意義等內(nèi)容,重點(diǎn)在于提出本文的主要研究問題。 第二部分是信用合作社管理主體的歷史流變的考察,通過對我國農(nóng)村信用社管理主體調(diào)整歷程的回顧,揭示出新中國農(nóng)村信用社從成立之初即徒具合作社之形骸而缺乏合作社之實(shí)質(zhì),中央政府才是農(nóng)村信用社的真正投資者和風(fēng)險責(zé)任人。由于內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的缺失,中央政府必須委托某個主體對農(nóng)村信用社進(jìn)行外部管理,以防止信用社遭受來自各方的侵害。又由于中央政府委托的管理主體并不承擔(dān)信用社虧損風(fēng)險,因此中央政府與管理主體之間會產(chǎn)生代理成本問題,管理主體有動機(jī)犧牲信用社利益以追逐自利目標(biāo)。信用社管理主體的反復(fù)調(diào)整,可以理解為中央政府希望通過管理權(quán)的恰當(dāng)配置以克服代理問題的嘗試。 本文第三部分通過對現(xiàn)行省聯(lián)社作為管理主體的成因和弊害的分析,進(jìn)而展望“省聯(lián)社”未來的改造路徑。本部分研究認(rèn)為,2003年試點(diǎn),2004年全國推行的改革將農(nóng)村信用社的行業(yè)管理權(quán)和風(fēng)險責(zé)任捆綁下放給省級人民政府,而中央政府不再承擔(dān)信用社金融風(fēng)險責(zé)任,是我國農(nóng)村信用社發(fā)展歷程中帶有標(biāo)志意義的變革。在既有約束條件下,此種改革深具合理性,但也帶來諸多弊害,僅僅是一種過渡性安排。 本文第四部分認(rèn)為在農(nóng)村信用社完成商業(yè)化、自主化和市場化改造后,省聯(lián)社代表省級人民政府充當(dāng)行業(yè)管理主體的歷史終將結(jié)束,因此需要思考如何改造省映社與各農(nóng)村信用社之間的關(guān)系,在多種建議方案中,寧夏回族自治區(qū)省聯(lián)社和重慶省聯(lián)社也進(jìn)行了初步試點(diǎn),這些方案和試點(diǎn)經(jīng)驗有助于對其他省分未來省聯(lián)社的改革提供借鑒。 本文第五部分對全文的研究內(nèi)容進(jìn)行總結(jié)并回應(yīng)第一章提出的主要研究問題。
[Abstract]:This paper takes "the management subject of rural credit cooperatives" as the research object, through the longitudinal investigation of the establishment and adjustment history of the management subjects of rural credit cooperatives, to explore the special nature of rural credit cooperatives in China, and to clarify the state (central government). The special relationship between the management subject and the rural credit cooperative reveals the crux of the problem that the management subject has failed to promote the benign development of the rural credit cooperative although it has been adjusted repeatedly. On this basis, this paper makes a more in-depth analysis of the causes and possible disadvantages of the current management mode of "Provincial Union", and points out that "Provincial Union", as the main body of management, is only under the existing constraints. With the promotion of the commercial transformation of rural credit cooperatives, the management main body of rural credit cooperatives must be further reformed. Specifically, the main content of this paper can be divided into the following five parts: the first part is the introduction. This part mainly introduces the purpose and significance of this study, focusing on the main research issues of this paper. The second part is the investigation of the historical evolution of the management subject of credit cooperatives, through the review of the adjustment process of the management subjects of rural credit cooperatives in China. It reveals that the rural credit cooperatives in New China have the form of cooperatives and lack the essence of cooperatives from the beginning of their establishment, and the central government is the real investor and risk responsible person of rural credit cooperatives. Due to the lack of internal governance mechanism, the central government must entrust a subject to carry out external management of rural credit cooperatives in order to prevent credit cooperatives from being infringed by all parties. And because the management subject entrusted by the central government does not bear the risk of loss of credit cooperatives, there will be agency cost between the central government and the management subject, and the management subject has the motivation to sacrifice the interests of credit cooperatives in order to pursue the goal of self-interest. The repeated adjustment of the management subject of credit cooperatives can be understood as an attempt by the central government to overcome the agency problem through the proper allocation of management power. The third part of this paper analyzes the causes and disadvantages of the current provincial association as the main body of management, and then looks forward to the future transformation path of the provincial association. This part of the study holds that in 2003, the reform carried out by the whole country in 2004 decentralized the industry management power and risk responsibility of rural credit cooperatives to the provincial people's governments, while the central government no longer assumed the financial risk responsibility of credit cooperatives. It is a marked change in the development of rural credit cooperatives in China. Under the existing constraints, this kind of reform is deeply reasonable, but it also brings many disadvantages, which is only a transitional arrangement. The fourth part of this paper holds that after the commercialization, autonomy and marketization of rural credit cooperatives, the history of provincial cooperatives acting as the main body of industry management on behalf of the provincial people's governments will eventually come to an end. Therefore, it is necessary to think about how to transform the relationship between the provincial reflection cooperatives and the rural credit cooperatives. Among the various proposed schemes, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous region Provincial Association and the Chongqing Provincial Union have also carried out preliminary pilot projects. These programs and pilot experience will help to provide reference for the reform of other provinces in the future. The fifth part of this paper summarizes the research content of the full text and responds to the main research issues put forward in the first chapter.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.35

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 穆爭社;;農(nóng)村信用社管理體制改革:成效、問題及方向[J];中央財經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2011年04期

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本文編號：2495328