發(fā)布時間：2018-09-07 13:58

【摘要】：金融監(jiān)管不足是本次國際金融危機的重要推手,而產品創(chuàng)新過度源于微觀審慎監(jiān)管帶來的監(jiān)管套利,微觀審慎監(jiān)管的順周期效應、影子銀行體系及系統(tǒng)性重要銀行監(jiān)管的缺失則加劇了危機的深度。因此,宏觀審慎監(jiān)管的未來任務需要擴大監(jiān)管范圍,從總體上把握系統(tǒng)性風險,需要央行、金融機構、監(jiān)管部門的整體配合,需要央行從源頭控制流動性這一公共品,需要央行職能的重塑;然而宏觀審慎監(jiān)管的執(zhí)行也面臨一些不確定因素。
[Abstract]:Inadequate financial supervision is an important driver of the international financial crisis, and excessive product innovation stems from regulatory arbitrage brought about by micro-prudential supervision, and the pro-cyclical effect of micro-prudential supervision. The shadow banking system and the absence of systemic banking supervision exacerbated the crisis. Therefore, the future task of macro-prudential supervision needs to expand the scope of supervision, grasp systemic risks in general, need the overall cooperation of the central bank, financial institutions, and regulatory authorities, and need the central bank to control liquidity from the source as a public good. Central bank functions need to be reshaped; however, macro-prudential regulation also faces some uncertainties.
【作者單位】： 南京大學經濟學院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科基金項目,項目編號:10yjc630283
【分類號】：F831;F832.1

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本文編號：2228460