【摘要】：為研究物流企業(yè)和貸款企業(yè)授信質押融資時的博弈行為,建立考慮銀行核查作用的兩企業(yè)演化博弈的非線性模型,對其進行了穩(wěn)定性分析,還借助鐘萬勰等發(fā)展的精細積分方法開展了數(shù)值研究,理論分析和數(shù)值計算結果吻合較好。研究表明:監(jiān)管成本、罰款金額等參數(shù)都是博弈雙方策略選擇的影響因素;另外,銀行合理調(diào)整信用等級,將顯著影響博弈雙方積極性,達到強化融資監(jiān)管的目的。
[Abstract]:In order to study the game behavior of logistics enterprises and loan enterprises, the nonlinear model of evolutionary game of two enterprises considering the role of bank verification is established, and the stability of the game is analyzed. The numerical study is carried out by using the precise integration method developed by Zhong Wanxie et al. The results of theoretical analysis and numerical calculation are in good agreement with each other. The research shows that the parameters such as supervision cost and amount of fine are the influencing factors of the strategy choice of both sides of the game. In addition, the reasonable adjustment of credit rating of banks will significantly affect the enthusiasm of both sides of the game and achieve the purpose of strengthening the supervision of financing.
【作者單位】： 南京航空航天大學民航學院;航聯(lián)保險經(jīng)紀有限公司;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(70771046)
【分類號】：F224;F832.4

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