本文選題：銀行危機 + 貨幣危機��； 參考：《國際金融研究》2011年03期

【摘要】：銀行危機的救助策略一直是理論界關注的焦點。本文通過構建一個兩期模型,以銀行危機是否會引發(fā)貨幣危機為評判標準,探討政府在面對商業(yè)銀行清償能力危機時救助與不救助的抉擇。經(jīng)研究發(fā)現(xiàn):當商業(yè)銀行的不良資產率高,或商業(yè)銀行在經(jīng)濟中起重要作用,抑或產出的價格彈性較小時,為了避免貨幣危機的發(fā)生,政府應該出手對商業(yè)銀行提供救助。在相反的情況時,固定匯率制度下,政府為了維護其固定匯率的信譽應該出手對商業(yè)銀行提供救助;浮動或管理浮動匯率制度下,考慮到商業(yè)銀行的道德風險問題,政府應該不予以救助。
[Abstract]:The rescue strategy of bank crisis has always been the focus of attention in the theoretical circle. Based on a two-phase model, this paper discusses the choice between the government's rescue and non-rescue in the face of the commercial bank's solvency crisis, based on the criterion of whether the banking crisis will lead to the currency crisis. It is found that when the non-performing assets rate of commercial banks is high, or commercial banks play an important role in the economy, or the price elasticity of output is small, in order to avoid the occurrence of currency crisis, the government should provide assistance to commercial banks. On the contrary, under a fixed exchange rate regime, governments should, in order to maintain the credibility of their fixed exchange rates, provide relief to commercial banks; under floating or floating exchange rate regimes, taking into account the moral hazard of commercial banks, The government should not give aid.
【作者單位】： 南開大學國際經(jīng)濟研究所;天津城市建設學院;
【分類號】：F831.1
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本文編號：2026649